THE
ŚIVAJÑĀNABODHA-SAṄGRAHABHĀṢYA
OF
ŚIVĀGRAYOGIN

ENGLISH TRANSLATION WITH INTRODUCTION
AND INDEXES

K. JAYAMMAL

RADHAKRISHNAN INSTITUTE
FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

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DR T. S. DEVADOSS

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with best
compliments

K. Jayammal

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BY

K. JAYAMMAL

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FOREWORD

The *Śivajñānabodha* of Meykaṇḍār is a canonical text in the Śaiva Siddhānta tradition. It occupies a place of unique importance in Siddhānta literature by virtue of its rich content. In twelve *sūtras*, the philosophy and religion of the Śaiva siddhānta have been presented in a succinct manner. Śivāgrayogin (16th century) who was a great scholar both in Sanskrit and Tamil has provided two Sanskrit commentaries (for the above *sūtras*) which are known as *Saṅgrahabhāṣya* (short commentary) and *Vistarabhāṣya* (detailed commentary). The Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy has brought out the Sanskrit text of *Saṅgrahabhāṣya* edited by Dr. R. Balasubramanian first in the *Indian Philosophical Annual* (volumes 20 & 21) and later in a book form under Madras University Philosophical Series-49 in 1992.

The Radhakrishnan Institute's main thrust area has been on critical studies of the philosophical classics, systems and religious traditions with special reference to Advaita and other systems of thought. It is therefore significant that a work on Śaivism which is one of the six systems established by Ācārya Śaṅkara (*Ṣaṇmatasthāpakācārya*) apart from Advaita Vedānta, has been taken up for publication. In this direction, my predecessors, Dr. V. A. Devasenapathy initiated the work in this field and Dr. R. Balasubramanian edited the text with the cooperation of the members of the Institute.

What is attempted in the present study by Dr. K. Jayammal, UGC Research Associate, is to translate the text into English for the benefit of those who do not have adequate knowledge in Sanskrit. The translation is true to the original and I do hope that the scholars will be definitely benefited by this work and trust this would provide greater impetus to carry out further research in Śaiva Siddhānta.

T. S. DEVADOSS

PREFACE

The *Śivajñānabodha* of Meykaṇḍār, the foremost among the fourteen *Meykaṇḍa Śāstras* is one of the most significant landmarks in the Śaiva Siddhānta tradition. It consists of twelve *sūtras* and its general structure may be compared to the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa. The text is extant both in Sanskrit and Tamil with several commentaries in these languages.

Śivāgrayogin is one of the most illuminating stars in the galaxy of eminent preceptors of the Sūryanār Koil Ādhīnam in Tamil Nadu. According to the tradition, he was a scion of the Skandaparaṁparā. Well-versed both in Tamil and Sanskrit traditions of Śaiva Siddhānta, Śivāgrayogin wrote a number of works on Śaiva Siddhānta in the form of commentaries and independent treatises. He is the author of two Sanskrit commentaries on the *Śivajñānabodha*, which are popularly referred to as *Śivāgrabhāṣya.* He first provides a concise commentary called *Saṅgrahabhāṣya* followed by a detailed commentary called *Vistarabhāṣya.*

The Sanskrit text of the *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* has been published by the University of Madras under the Madras University Philosophical Series — 49 in 1992. It may be mentioned that so far no attempt has been made to translate the text into English.

The present work consists of three parts. The introductory part elaborately deals with the nature of the text, its author, his date and his other works. The major part consists of a complete translation of the text in English. The third part consists of an index of the texts quoted by the author and an alphabetical index of the passages cited by him. Here the passages are traced to their original source to the extent possible. The pagination given in the index corresponds to that of the Sanskrit text published by the University of Madras cited above.

I am immensely grateful to Dr. R. Balasubramanian, Chairman, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi and former Director, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras for initiating me to the study of Śaiva Siddhānta providing necessary guidance.

I express my thanks and gratitude to Dr. T. S. Devadoss, Director, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras for his guidance and encouragement. I also thank him for his foreword to this work.

I record my deep debt of gratitude to my esteemed teacher Brahmaśrī Bhāṣyabhāvajña Varahoor Kalyanasundara Sastrigal, former Professor of Vedānta, Vivekananda College, Madras. I had the good fortune of studying the whole text of the *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* under him.

I am gratefully indebted to Dr. M. Narasimhachary, Professor and Head of the Department of Vaishnavism, University of Madras who made improvements and modifications in the translation of the text.

I record my grateful thanks to late Dr. K. Sivaraman, Professor, Department of Religious Studies, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada for his valuable suggestions.

I express my sincere thanks to Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan, Reader, Department of Vaishnavism, University of Madras, Dr. S. Paneerselvam, Reader and Dr. G. Mishra, Lecturer, in the Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, for their help in all aspects connected with the publication of this book.

I am thankful to the Authorities of the University Grants Commission, New Delhi for having given me Research Associateship from 1988 — 1993. I also thank the Authorities of the University of Madras for permitting me to work at the Radhakrishnan Institute.

In fine, my sincere thanks are due to Messrs. Avvai Achukkoodam for their co-operation and neat execution of this work.

K. JAYAMMAL

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INTRODUCTION

1. THE ŚIVAJÑĀNABODHASAṄGRAHABHĀṢYA

The *Śivajñānabodha* of Meykaṇḍār is one of the canonical treatises on the Śaiva Siddhānta. "*Śivajñānabodha*" literally means an exegetic evaluation (*bodha*) of the philosophic contents of the *Śaivāgamas* (*Śivajñāna*). The *Śivājñānbodha* is a work of twelve *sūtras* and its general structure may be compared with the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa with its four *pādas*.

In Sanskrit, Śivāgrayogin himself wrote two commentraries on the *Śivajñānabodha* which are popularly known as "*Śivāgrabhāṣya.*" "In interpreting the aphorisms of the *Śivajñānabodha* Śivāgrayogin first provides a short commentary called the *Saṅgrahabhāṣya* immediately followed by a detailed commentary called the *Vistarabhāṣya.*"* Śivāgrayogin as a preceptor of the *siddhānta* philosophy occupies a pre-eminent place in the school of Śaivasiddhānta. An erudite scholar both in Tamil and Sanskrit, he wrote a number of books on the *siddhānta* in the form of commentaries and independent treatises.

Śivāgrayogin's immense learning in Sanskrit is clearly evident from his commentaries. The profound influence of the Vedānta on him is revealed through the style and the method in which he explains the aphorisms. "He follows the conventional method of *Pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta* dialectics in expounding the *siddhānta* views and justifies the *siddhānta* position in all aspects by citing the authority of several major *Āgamas.*"** By adequate and apt logical inductions, he refutes the theories of disputants and firmly establishes the doctrine of the Śaivasiddhānta by striking inferences and illustrations. In support of his view, he quotes profusely from the *Śaivāgamas* and related texts. Śivāgrayogin has refuted the *Śivasamavāda* advocated by Aghora Śivācārya in his commentary on the *Sarvajñānottara*. Śivāgrayogin inclines to accept Śrīkaṇṭha's view that Śiva is not only the *nimittakāraṇa* but also the *upādānakāraṇa* of the world and gives a detailed exposition of the rival point of view, namely, that of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya,* followed by detailed criticism.

---

* Jayendra Soni, *Philosophical Anthropology in Śaiva Siddhānta* Motilal Banarsidas, New Delhi, 1989, p. 54.

** R. Balasubramanian, *The Śaivaparibhāṣā*, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras. 1982, p. 4.

The brief commentary, namely the *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* expounds the *siddhānta* doctrine in a lucid style. Thus it paves the path for an easy understanding of his *Vistarabhāṣya.* The commentary begins with a series of questions regarding the *siddhānta* raised by Nandikeśvara addressing Lord Śrīkaṇṭha seated on Mount Meru Thus the *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* is traced to a divine origin. In the introductory portion, an account of the principles of the *siddhānta* doctrines along with the view of the disputants are dealt with in a nut-shell.

The major problems, namely the cause of the world, creation of the world, individual soul, knowledge leading to liberation, initiation, preceptor and finally liberation are referred to as the main subject-matter. The four basic factors called the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* are explicated clearly.

The *sūtras* I and II state the "*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*" and "*taṭasthalakṣaṇa*" for *Pati* and adduce authorities for the existence of *Pati.* The *sūtras* III and IV explain the nature of *Paśu* and provide its proof. The fifth *sūtra* proves that Śiva is the agent for concealment (*tirodhāna*). *Sūtra* VI deals with the definitions of *paśu* and *Śiva* directly and of *pāśa* indirectly. The seventh *sūtra* by means of *pariśeṣānumāna* delineates *paśu* who is different from *Pati.* The *sūtras* VIII and IX discuss the means of liberation. *Sūtra* X expounds liberation after explaining the annihilation of *pāśa* The *sūtras* XI and XII state the internal and external limbs of devotion.

Thus in an effective and scholarly manner, Śivāgrayogin develops and elucidates the doctrines of the Śaiva Siddhānta on the basis of the short and cryptic text of the *Śivajñānabodha*.

"It is to his credit that he was able, skilfully, and scholastically to collate the prevalent ideas of his school, combined with his own penetrating insights to elucidate the inherent meaning of the very compact "*Śivajñānabodha.*"*

---

* Jayendra Soni, *Philosophical Anthropology in Śaiva Siddhānta*. Motilal Banarsidas, New Delhi. 1989, p. x.

2. ŚIVĀGRAYOGIN

Śrī Ativarṇāśrama Ācāryavarya Śaiva samayaparipālaka Śivāgrayogīndra Jñāna Śivācārya Svāmigal, the author of the *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrabhāṣya* and *Vistarabhāṣya* (both of which are popularly known as the *Śivāgrabhāṣya*) was a descendent of the illustrious *Skandaparamparā*. Lord Śiva is said to have directly taught the *siddhānta* to Skanda and Nandin and installed them as *Ācāryas*. Lord Skanda enunciated the doctrines of Śaiva Siddhānta to Sage Vāmadeva. Vāmadeva was succeeded by Nīlakaṇṭha Śivācārya, who was followed by Viśveśvara Śivācārya, resident of a Math in the Maṇikarṇikāghāt in Kāśī. Next to him was Sadāśiva Śivācārya, who was succeeded by Śivamārga Prakāśa Deśika. He in turn anointed Śivakkoḻundu Śivācārya, who was also called Śivāgrayogin. He established a mutt in Sūryanār Koil in Tamil Nadu. During that time, the author of the present work, who was born in a brahmin family in Toṇḍai Nāḍu was well versed in literature and philosophy both in Tamil and Sanskrit languages. Yearning for light that would lead him to self-realisation, he was in quest of a *guru*. Hearing about the greatness of Śivakkoḻundu Śivācāryā, he approached him. Pleased with the *tīvra-śaktinipāta* of the disciple, and finding him competent to be his successor, the teacher taught him the vedic and ágamic truths, initiated him with *nirvāṇadīkṣā* and consecrated him as the second *ācārya*, of the *ādhīnam*, under the name Śivāgrayogin. Being conversant with both Tamil and Sanskrit traditions of Śaivasiddhānta, he became prodigious in his learning and soon became one of the illustrious pontiffs of the Sūryanār Koil Ādhīnam. By constant contemplation and meditation, he always had self-realisation, which enabled him to transcend the distinctions of *varṇa* and *āśrama*. Hence he was befittingly called, "*ativarṇāśrama* Śivāgrayogin."

Patronised by the ruler of Tanjore he was taken to Tanjore where he preached his doctrine and philosophy. According to an oral tradition, the king arranged a debate between Śivāgrayogin and Maṇavāla Māmuni, a *Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācārya* for the determination of the question, which school of philosophy, *Śaiva* or *Vaiṣṇava* was superior.* It is said that the dispute went on for seventeen days and finally Śivāgrayogin won. As per the instruction of Śivāgrayogin, the king built a mutt in Tiruveezhimalai for him, where he lived and taught till he breathed his last. Hence he was also named as "Veezhi Śivāgrayogin".

There arose a dispute as to whether people of the fourth *varṇa* (*caturtha varṇa*), the followers of the *Āgamas*, like *Smārtas*, the followers of *śruti* were eligible for *sannyāsa* or not. With his wealth of knowledge, experience and apt quotations from the *Āgamas*, Śivāgrayogin proved beyond doubt that the fourth *varṇa* too was eligible for *Śaivasannyāsa*. In order to explain the rules, regulations and observances for those who are initiated in the *samaya* and *nirvāṇadīkṣā*, he wrote the *Kriyādīpikā*, which is also called the *Śivāgrapaddhati*.

He also wrote *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati* which explains that all the four *varṇas* are eligible for *Śaivasannyāsa* and deals elaborately with the observances of a *Śaivasannyāsin*. Being inspired by his preceptor he wrote in sanskrit a brief commentary (*Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrhaabhāṣya*) and an extensive commentary *vistarabhāṣya* generally referred to as *Śivagrabhāṣya* on the *Śivajñānabodha*. Subsequently he wrote many important works such as *Śaivaparibhāṣa* in Sanskrit, *Śivaneriprakāśam* in Tamil and commentaries on some other works, such as on *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*. His close disciple Nandi Śivāgrayogin wrote a commentary on the *Śivaneriprakāśam*.

After the demise of his *Ācārya*, Śivāgrayogin consecrated his disciple Nandi Śivāgrayogin in the Sūryanār Koil. In Tiruveezhimalai he propagated Śaivasiddhānta. After his death a special building was built in his honour by the local king.

The following is the order of succession of teachers in the *Skandaparamparā*.*

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* For further details refer to Śrīlaśrī Ambalavāna Deśika Paramācārya Svāmigal, *Śiva Neri Prakāśam*, Tiruvāduthurai Ādhīnam, 1968, Introduction, p. 4.

* *Cf.* : Śrīlaśrī Ambalavāna Deśika Paramācārya Svāmigal, *Śivaneri Prakāśam*, Tiruvāduthurai Ādhīnam, 1961, Introduction, p. 8.

Śrī Skanda

Vāmadeva ṛṣi

Nīlakaṇṭha Śivācārya

Visveśvara Śivācārya

Sadāśiva Śivācārya

Śivamārga Prakāśa Śivācārya

Śivakoḻundu Śivācārya | established a mutt at Sūryanār
Śivāgrayogin | Koil in Tamilnadu

Veezhi Śivāgrayogin -author of the *Śivāgrabhāṣya*

Nandi Śivāgrayogin

3. DATE OF ŚIVĀGRAYOGIN

Śivāgrayogin is reputed to have flourished in the latter half of the 16th Century, although his exact date is uncertain. In his *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati*, Śivāgrayogin directly refers to King Sadāśivarāya, the Karnataka King and Chinna Seppayya Acyuta, the Tanjore ruler. The references are as follows:

श्रीकर्णाटरमापतौ गजपतिप्राज्योपदानेकप-
स्फायद्दानमहापगालहरिकानाद्योपकण्ठस्थले।
अश्वेशार्पितघोटनिष्ठुरखुरक्षुण्णारिराणमण्डली-
कोटीरेन्द्रमणौ सदाशिवराये महीं रक्षति ॥
तस्याज्ञापरिपालके रिपुमहीपालाब्धिमन्थाचले
कन्याधेनुसहस्रभूरितिलराश्यनाग्रहारप्रदे ।
सह्योर्वीधरकन्यकासहचरीं भूदेवदेवाश्रयां
चोलक्ष्मां चिनचेप्पयाच्युतनृपे तञ्जापुरे शासति ॥
सदाशिवाचार्यदयानपायः
शिवागमाम्भोनिधिकर्णधारः ।
शिवाग्रयोगी जगदेकमान्यः
स शैवसन्यासविधिं करोति ॥

From the above verses it is clear that Śivāgroyogin was a contemporary of both Sadāśivarāya, the King of Karnataka who ruled Vijayanagaram from 1543 to 1573 A.D. and Chinnaseppayya Acyuta who ruled Tanjore from 1549 to 1572 A.D.

"Sadāśivarāya was the son of Rangarāya, brother of Acyuta rāya in succession of Vijayanagara kings and he was the last in the line of Tuluva Kings. He ruled Vijayanagaram from 1543 A.D. to 1573 A.D. The kingdom of Tanjore was given as a marriage present to Mūrtyambā, during her marriage with Chinna Seppayya Nāyaka. Mūrtyambā was the sister of Tirumalāmbā, the queen of Acyuta Rāyā. In the line of Nāyaka kings of Tanjore, Chinna Seppaya Nāyaka was the first and he ruled Tanjore from 1549 to 1572 A.D. Acyuta Nāyaka was his son, who ruled Tanjore from 1572 to 1614 A,D."[1]

S. Anavartam Pillai is definite that Śivāgrayogin should have flourished during the latter half of the sixteenth century. He also

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1. M. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, *Śaivaparibhāṣa*, govt. Branch Press, Mysore, 1956, P. 10.

opines that Chinna Seppayya Nāyaka might have been a prince when Śivāgrayogin wrote his *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati.*[1] He also refers to Sri S. Somasundara Desikar, a grammarian, who assigns Śivāgrayogin to 1564 A.D. From the verses found in the *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati* quoted above, Somasundara Desikar deduces that the term '*ripu*' indicates the number 6, "*mahīpāla*" denotes number 8, *abdhi* — 4 and "*manthācala*" — 1. Hence the above code words indicate 1486 *Sāka* Year, which may refer to Śivāgrayogin's period. *Sāka* year 1486 corresponds to 1564 A.D.

Anavartam Pillai also quotes Jñānaprakāsar, who considers that among the six commentaries on the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, Śivāgrayogin's commentary on the *Svapakṣa* of *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* is the Second.[2]

V. A. Devasenapathi opines that the referred verses in the *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati* indicates that the work was presented to the scholars of the day for the first time in 1564 A.D.

"It is clear that the three commentators Nirambavalagiar, Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgrayogin lived in the sixteenth century. The exact period of their lives not being known, speculation regarding priority will have but doubtful value."[3]

M. Arunachalam views that as there are clear references to both the kings in the *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati*, there is no doubt regarding Śivāgrayogin's date. He should have flourished in the middle of the 16th century, most probably from 1550 A.D. to 1575 A.D.[4]

Also the episode regarding Śivāgrayogin's dispute with Maṇavāla Māmuni is rejected as false. From the investigation of Śivāgrayogin's date, S. Anavaratam Pillai concludes that if we accept the date given for Maṇavāla Māmuni as 1370-1444, these two could not have been contemporaries. M. Arunachalam also views that Śivāgrayogin's dispute with Maṇavāla Māmuni is unintelligible. Considering all these points, Śivāgrayogin can be assigned to the middle of 16thcentury.

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1. S. Anavaratam Vinayakam Pillai. Śivāgrayogin's *Śiva Neri Prakāśam*, University of Madras, 1936, Introduction, p. 8.
2. *Ibid.* p. 12.
3. V. A. Devasenapati, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, University of Madras, 1966, p. 9.
4. M. Arunachalam, *Tamil Ilakkiya Varalāru* 16th *Century-Part* II, Gandhi Vidyalayam, Mayavaram, 1975, p, 246.

4. OTHER WORKS OF ŚIVĀGRAYOGIN

Conversant with both the Tamil and Sanskrit traditions of Śaiva Siddhānta, Śivāgrayogin wrote a number of books in the form of commentaries and independent treatises.

I. *In Sanskrit*

1. *Kriyādīpikā.* It is also called the *Śivāgrapaddhati.* This clearly states that people belonging to the fourth *varṇa*, who follow the *Śaivāgamas* are also eligible for *Śaivasannyāsa.* This work consists of 8 *paṭalas. Samaya* and *nirvāṇadīkṣā* are dealt with in great detail in this work. Rules and regulations and observances like *snāna, sandhi* and *pūja* for those who are initiated, are clearly elucidated here.

2. *Śaivasannyāsapaddhati* : This work deals with the wider doctrine that all the four *varṇas* are entitled to the *Śaivasannyāsa.* It consists of 8 *paṭalas.* In the opening part, there are verses in praise of the Karnataka king Sadāśivarāya and the Tanjore ruler Chinna Seppaya Acyuta. The book elaborately explains observances like *snāna* for all the *Śaivasannyāsins* belonging to all four *varṇas.*

3. *Vistarabhāṣya* : This is a detailed commentary in Sanskrit on the *Śivajñānabodha.* After explaining the *sūtras* in the brief commentary, (*Saṅgrahabhāṣya*) the author immediately follows it up with his *Vistarabhāṣya* to elaborate certain points in greater detail. In this commentary he has refuted '*Śivasamavāda*'' advocated by Aghora Śivācārya in his commentary on the *Sarvajñānottara.* "Śivāgrayogin's commentary on the Sanskrit version of the *Śivajñānabodha*, however, inclines to accept Śrīkaṇṭha's view of Śiva as not only the *nimittakāraṇa* but also the *upādānakāraṇa* of the world and gives a detailed exposition of the rival point of view expressed in the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* of Umāpati Śivācārya, followed by an elaborate criticism. It is of interest to note that Śivā-

grayogin follows very closely the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya.* The same objections in the same expressions are raised in several places in the *bhāṣya* in such a faithful manner that one can even profitably consult the *Śivāgrabhāṣya* to correct the readings of the text of the *Pauṣkara bhāṣya.* And yet Śivāgrayogin differs from Umāpati Śivācārya's point of view on important matters. Where he so differs he is in agreement with Śrīkaṇṭha".* This commentary is full of profuse quotations from various *Śaivāgamas* and texts and consists approximately of twelve thousand verses.

"Although Śivāgrayogin's profound contribution to the tradition is undisputed, not much, if any, special study has been done on what may be called his *magnum opus*, the *Śivāgrabhāṣya*".*

4. *Śaivaparibhāṣā* : "This valuable manual on the Śaivasiddhānta is comparable to Dharmarāja's *Vedānta-Paribhāṣa* of the *advaita* school and Śrīnivāsa's *Yatīndramatadīpikā* of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* school".* It clearly explains the *siddhānta* doctrines in a simple and brief manner. It consists of five chapters. It deals with the logic and epistemology of the *siddhānta* school. *Pati, paśu* and *pāśa* are clearly explained. *Mokṣa* and its means are analysed in a detailed manner. By means of his argumentation techniques and traditional learning in Sanskrit, Śivāgrayogin is at ease to establish the *siddhānta*, after skilfully refuting the rival views.

II. In Tamil.

1. A Tamil Commentary on the *Sarvajñānottara.* This is not avaitable.
2. A Tamil Commentary on the *Devīkālottara*, which is not available.

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* K. Sivaraman, *Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective*, Motilal Banarasidas, New Delhi. 1972, p. 38.

* Jayendra Soni, *Philosophical Anthropology in Śaiva Siddhānta* Motilal Banarasidas New Delhi, 1989, p. x.

* R. Balasubramanian, *The Śaivaparibhāṣā*, University of Madras, Madras, 1982, p. 3.

3. A Tamil commentary on the *Śrutisūktimālā* of Hara Datta, which again is not available.

4. A Tamil commentary on the *Parapakṣa* and *Svapakṣa* of Arulnandi Śivācāryar's famous work *Śivajñāna-Siddiyār.* Commentary on the *Parapakṣa* is not available.

5. Commentary on the *svapakṣa* of the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* is well-known. The book has been printed in four parts.*

Śivāgrayogin's commentary has come along with five more commentaries of Maraijñāna Deśikar, Jñāna Prakāśar, Śivajñāna Yogi, Nirambavazhakiyar and Subramanya Deśikar. Śivāgrayogin's commentary is the second one chronologically. This is written in Maṇipravāla. The author's deep knowledge of the *Mūlāgamas* like *Kāmikāgama* and *upāgamas* like *Mṛgendra* and *Darśanas* like *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and of Tamil like the *Tevāram* and *Jñānāmṛtam* is revealed throughout the commentory

6. *Śivaneriprakāśam* : It is a Tamil treatise elucidating the *siddhānta* doctrines in 215 verses. It was written at the behest of his lady disciple Svānanda Nāchiar. Śivāgrayogin's disciple Nandi Śivāgrayogin has written a commentary in Maṇipravāla style on this work.

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* Printed at Śivajñāna Bodha Yantra Sālā, Chintadripet, Madras, 1884.

THE ŚIVAJÑĀNABODHASAṄGRAHABHĀṢYA

A BRIEF COMMENTARY ON THE *ŚIVAJÑĀNABODHA*

I. 1 *Introduction*

I.1.1 I offer obeisance to the glorious Cidambaram and with a view to an easy understanding of the beginners, I will comment upon the *Śivajñānabodha* in obedience to the command of my preceptor.

I offer salutations to Viśveśvara the Śivācārya, the venerable Sadāśiva and the lotus-feet of Śivāgrayogin.

Having initially commented briefly, Śivāgra comments upon the twelve aphorisms later elaborately for the pleasure of the learned.

The adorable Nandikeśvara holding the Ganges, sporting matted hair adorned by crescent-moon, having a neck blue in hue, carrying axe, deer, cane-stick and sword, was wearing divine garments and was adorned with divine ornaments. Himself the abode of compassion and looking like another Parameśvara, he circumambulated Lord Śrīkaṇṭha and bowed down twelve times, as a mark of respect. Lord Śrīkaṇṭha the Ganges-bearer was seated in the posture of *Vīrāsana* on the divine throne, under the banyan tree, which was the embodiment of pure *māyā*, in Kailāsa. The Kailāsa, though devoid of shadow as the sun shone below, looked as though it possessed shadows due to the groups of trees, surrounded at their bottom by the reflections of swarms of bees, drawn by the fragrance of various flowers. The Kailāsa, by its extraordinary lustre, made even the bright sun look like the moon for the deer which were jumping up at it with a desire to eat the sprouts of *darbha* grass, grown in the slopes. The mountain, the crest-jewel of Mount Meru, due to excessive transperancy, offered the sight of the nether world and earth, for hosts of gods residing there. Nandikeśvara addressed Lord Śrīkaṇṭha, who was bearing the Ganges, having the moon as the crest-jewel, with masses of brown matted hair, possessing three eyes, gem-studded ear-rings, a neck blue in hue, a white sacred-thread, trident, fire and *mudrās* of *vara* and *vyākhyāna*, a body smeared with ashes, dressed in tiger skin, adorned with divine ornaments, worshipped by Viṣṇu, Brahmā, Indra and groups of all sages, eulogised by the *Vedas*, sixty-four *kalās* and rows of *mātṛkā* syllables in corporeal forms and who was of the form of ultimate Reality, Consciousness and Bliss, thus: "Oh! God of gods! Lord of the world! Omniscient one! O abode of compassion and the quintessence of all *Āgamas*! O master of creation, sustenance and destruction!"

"Oh! Lord whose lotus-feet are worshipped by Brahmā, Indra and Viṣṇu! O benevolent of devotees! O the one subservient to devotees! Reliever of the souls from bondages! Bestower of liberation characterised by non-duality! and the Preceptor of all the worlds! be pleased!"

For the benefit of the individual souls whose power of cognition and conation are obscured by beginningless *mala* and whose minds are agitated by successions of births and deaths and who with short span of life are unable to reflect upon the facts found in many *Vedas*, *Āgamas*, *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, which on the face of it appeared to be mutually contradictory and were unduly elaborate, he asked the following questions.

I.2 *String of Questions*

I.2.1 *Cause of the World*: Oh! revered one! Is the world beginningless or with a beginning? If it has a beginning, is it natural or due to any cause? If it has a cause, is it only caused by time and past actions or by any sentient being? If it has a sentient being as the cause, is that being transmigratory or one that is liberated at the end of every *kalpa*? Or, is that being eternally liberated? If an eternally liberated soul is the cause, then, is it one or plural in number? If it is only one, what evidence is there that it is eternally liberated and also different from Hiraṇyagarbha, and others? What is its definition and what is its name? Even if Hara is accepted as the creator, is the world with or without a material cause? If it has a material cause, then is that a void (*śūnya*) or is it in the form of *paramāṇus*? Or, is that material *pradhāna* or is it mere *māyā*? Or, could that material cause be Īśvara alone, or is it Īśvara associated with *māyā*?

I.2.2 *Creation of World*

Is it the combination (of atoms) or is it new beginning (from *paramāṇu*) or is it of the nature of illusory manifestation, or is it of the nature of modification? Or is it in the form of a group of causes? Or is it of the nature of modes? If it is of the nature of modes, is it under the control of Īśvara, in accordance with past actions, or not in conformity with past actions? Even if the creation is under the control of Īśvara, in accordance with past actions, does Īśvara create the world sportively? Or for the sake of himself? Or for the benefit of others? Even if it is for the benefit of others, does not the creation depend upon instruments or does it depend upon instruments? Even if it is dependent on instruments, which is the instrument? Is it the activity of the body or of senses or of mind or of modes like desire, restlessness and knowledge, that are the attributes of mind? Or is it past actions? Or is it *bindu*? Or is it energy (*śakti*)? Even if energy is the instrument, is she in association with Śiva or is she inherent in Him? Even if she is inherent, is she inert or sentient?

I.2.3 *Individual Soul*

Likewise, about the other category, *viz.*, the individual soul. Is it a non-entity? Or is it the physical body or vital airs, or sense-organs or group of inner faculties, or succession of knowledge, or one different from all these? Even if it is different, is it inert or not? If it is not inert, is it the non-doer or doer? Even if it is the doer, is it of the size of atom, or of middle size or all-pervasive? If the soul is pervasive, is he single or many? If plural in number is he, the knower of only certain things or of all things? If he is the all-knowing, is the propriety of the five *avasthās*, due to the absence of knowledge or false knowledge or latent impressions or indeterminable *avidyā* or *āṇava mala*? Even if *mala* is the cause, is it of the nature of non-substance or substance? Even if it is in the form of a substance, is the relationship of *mala* and the self, conjunction, or different from conjunction? If it is conjunction, is it non-eternal or eternal? Likewise, is *mala* different or same in every person? Even if it is seen alike, is it associated with uniform energy or with variegated energy? If it is united with diverse energy, is it non-eternal or eternal?

I.2.4 *Dependence of the Individual Soul and Īśvara*

Likewise, is the individual soul independent or dependent? If he is dependent, the activity of Īśvara, which directs him, is it in the form of senses, or mere presence only? When indeed it is mere presence, then is this presence, proximity or simply energy or energy invested with the capacity to produce an effect? So also is Śiva of such a description, knowable by the states of the means of knowledge etc., or of the nature of knowledge itself? Even if He is of the nature of knowledge, is He absolutely invisible or realised only through self-knowledge? Even if He is realised by self-knowledge, is He just of the nature of knowledge, or of bliss also? If He is of the nature of bliss, then by whose self-knowledge is He realised? If He is manifested by the self-knowledge of the individual soul, what is the evidence for it? Is it only *Āgamas* or *Pariśeṣa* too?

I.2.5 *Means of Liberation*

In the same manner, what are the definitions for *paśu* and *pāśa*? Likewise, is not there or is there a means for liberation? If there is a means, then is that means only an action, or only knowledge or optionally both, or both action and knowledge put together? Even if it is the combination of both, is the mingling of equal proportions or of the proportion of subordinate and the main? If it is by the main-auxiliary combination, then which is subordinate, knowledge or action? If action is auxiliary is it directly helpful or indirectly helpful?

I.2.6 *The Knowledge Causing Liberation*

Likewise, is the knowledge causing liberation concerned with the difference between the *paśu* and Śiva or with their identity? If it is concerned with their identity, in learning the *Āgamas* which causes that knowledge, are the people in the first three castes only qualified or people of all the four castes too? Even if all the four castes are eligible, then are particularly women, śūdras and brahmins-in-name only qualified, or all, in general? If all of them are qualified, then, as in the case of the followers of the *Veda*, is consecration by initiation peculiar to a given religious tradition included as a condition for eligibility or is it not included? If it be included, and even if only initiated people are qualified, then, are all people eligible, or only certain people who have the descent of divine grace? So also, for hearing the expositions of the doctrines of *Āgamas*, are only people consecreated by initiation in the conventional practice qualified, or even those consecreated by initiation in *nirvāṇa*, too?

I.2.7 *Initiation*

What is the definition of Initiation? How many divisions are there? In which manner, it is helpful? How many sub-divisions are there in *kalā-tattva*, *bhuvana*, *varṇa*, *pada* and *mantra*? Of what nature is purity? How is it that, even when purity is there, there is not the origin of physical bodies, born from the different worlds? What is the definition of path? What is the basis for the paths being called pure, impure and mixed?

I.2.8 *Preceptor*

Is the preceptor, the bestower of emancipation, a special kind of individual soul or is he Śiva? The knowledge which is the means (for liberation), is it only direct realisation or verbal testimony too, born out of the preceptor's teachings? Even if knowledge arising out of verbal testimony is the means, is the final emancipation attained just after the moment it is born or is it interceded by "liberation while-living"? If it is interceded, for one who is liberated-while-living, is there anything to do, or nothing at all? What is the reason for the sustenance of the body of the man who is liberated-while-living? If latent impression is the cause, then how is it averted? If *prārabdha* actions (actions already started functioning) are exhausted by experiencing, how do the future actions cease to take place?

I.2.9 *Liberation*

Is liberation the destruction of the physical body or is it the state of *kaivalya* which consists in the *puruṣa's* (individual soul) abiding in his real nature by the discrimination of *prakṛti* (primal nature)? Or is it a cessation of the stream of knowledge, or is it total destruction of miseries or is it non-rising of miseries? Or, is it a continuous upward movement or the manifestation of eternal bliss or the cessation of *avidyā* which is indefinable or the enjoyment of Sattva or the attainment of the position like that of the lord of *gaṇas* or dissolution in the supreme Self or a position higher than that of Paramaśiva or absorption in Paramaśiva? Is this absorption similar to Śiva, which is caused by one among the following causes either by the transference of Śiva's qualities to him or by the origination of qualities like those of Śiva in him or by possession of Śiva's qualities or by the manifestation of his hidden qualities like omniscience etc.? Or is absorption manifestation, in the form of Paramaśiva?

I.3 *Primary Cause for Doubts*

1.3.1 For direct realisation which causes emancipation, which is the internal and external means? Regarding this, your words have raised doubts in me. Because in some places Brahman and elsewhere *māyā*, is propounded as the material cause. Emancipation is stated as, identity with Śiva and also as absorption in Śiva. Initiation alone is taught as the cause of emancipation but sometimes knowledge is also explained as the cause. The number of *tattvas* in pure path varies as three, four and five. In impure path, *tattvas* are enumerated sometimes in association with *puruṣa-tattva* and sometimes excluding the latter. So also *antahkaraṇa* is said to be four or three. The number of *bhuvanas* varies as two-hundred and twentyfour and as two hundred and thirtysix. Categories differ as three and six. *Pāśa* is enumerated as three-fold, four-fold and five-fold. Finally, path is said to be of two, three and six kinds. Therefore, this doubt should be cleared by expositions of absolute Reality, knowable by people desirous of liberation, after excluding other views enumerated in accordance with respective qualified persons.

I.4 *Introduction to the Scripture*

I.4.1 Lord Nandikeśvara, the most beloved devotee and the best qualified person wanted to confer favour on human beings who had doubts regarding the nature, definition and evidence of *pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa* and emancipation and its means, since they were confused by the contradictory statements of disputants. So, he asked Paramaśiva about the ascertained doctrines of Śaivism by means of questions. God Śrīkaṇṭha, with his heart melted with compassion said thus "Well! your questions are apt. Except for you, nobody is capable of even asking in this manner. Therefore, I will remove your doubts by means of an easy composition expounding the doctrines of the absolute reality." Thus approving his questions and promising to clear away his doubts, Śiva briefly expounded the supplementary principles stated in an array of questions enumerated by him, which had been approved by all *Vedas*, *Āgamas*, *Smṛtis*, *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* and logic. He at first rejected the views narrated in accordance with gods and men, who had the quality of *tamas* predominant in them, and also the views which were not approved by the *Nigamas* adopted by the rival theorists. In order to establish the doctrines of Śaivism, Śiva took the form of a *śākta* and expounded the twelve aphorisms. With the blessings of Śiva, Ananteśa acquired it from him, who also composed the twenty-eight different *Āgamas* like *Kāmika* and others. Nandikeś-vara enunciates the scripture called, "*Śivajñānabodha*" beginning with "As in the form of female, male and neuter principles etc.", which is stated in the *Raurava tantra* and which was taught to him by Ananteśa himself.

I.5 *Lineage of Preceptors*

I.5.1 This lineage of preceptors is called "*mahaugha*". To explain, the descent of this scripture is two fold, namely, *mahaugha* and *prātisamhita*. Of these, in *mahaugha*, the descent of scholars, who have learnt all the twenty-eight *samhitas* one by one, starts from Śrīkaṇṭha. In the sacred *Mālinī vijaya*, it is stated. "Desirous of creating the world, the Lord according to his own will, taught the eight *pudgalas*, who were *Vijñāna kevalas*, even before creation."

So also in the sacred *Mataṅga*, it is told:

"The doctrine of Śaivism which was, at first composed by Lord Sadāśiva in *anuṣṭub* metre in a crore of verses and later stated by the learned Ananta in a lakh of verses, now I am going to summarise and expound them briefly by means of three thousand and five hundred verses in the *Mataṅga*."

The *prātisamhita*-lineage is stated in the sacred *Kiraṇa* in the following manner: "Before creation, each, of the *Śaiva tantras* like *Kāmika* etc. were taught to each of the ten Śivas respectively starting from Praṇava etc. who were created by Sadāśiva himself. Each of the *raudra tantras* like *Vijayā* etc. was explained by them to each of the *trikalās* respectively, who in turn taught them to *anādi rudras*, eighteen in number, who remain below the *sadāśiva tattva*. It was enumerated by them to the Parameśvara and others."

It is said:

"Only after creation, the Lord created ten sons called Śiva and immediately dividing that one knowledge taught each *Āgama* to each person respectively."

The *Kāmika* was taught to the Śiva called 'Praṇava' and '*Yogaja*' was taught to the Śiva called, "Sudhā", *Vijayā* was taught to the *rudra* called Ānādi" and so on. This has been clearly stated by us in the *Śaivasannyāsa-paddhati*, from which further details can be obtained. The adjective at the conclusion namely "The ascertainment of the doctrines of Śaivism" indicates all the concepts enumerated.

I.6 *Statement of Four Principal Elements*

I.6.1 By this adjective, the doctrine of Śaivism is said to be the subject-matter of the *Śivajñānabodha*. From the context, one desirous of that knowledge becomes the qualified aspirant. The definite knowledge forms the immediate result. The expounder and the expounded, and cause and effect etc. are the *sambandhas*, as the case may be. The indirect result in the form of emancipation will be dealt with in the tenth aphorism. By the first two aphorisms of this text, the *svarūpa* and *taṭastha* definitions of Śiva and evidences are explained at first by means of favourable logical inductions and later the answers for the questions occurring before the question of the nature of *aṇu* are enumerated. There, at first, the meaning of the word '*pati*' namely Śiva is proved by inference.

FIRST APHORISM

Since the world is seen to be a product because of being of the nature of he, she and it, there is a creator. He is Lord Hara (Śiva). Destroying all this, He creates this universe from it.

I.7 *Beginning of the Commentary on the First Aphorism*

I.7.1 That which has the same attributes with nouns beginning with the female, male and neuter genders is what is known as "the female, male and neuter principles" (of the opening verse). The word "*ādi*" (beginning with) of the aphorism indicates similarity of attributes because in the world the terms "beginning" "middle" and "end" are used only with reference to objects having similar attributes. Here, the special structure of shapes constitutes the similarity of attributes. In this universe which is of the form of bodies, senses, spheres, and objects of enjoyment, the physical body is predominantly considered to be important because it enters the category of the doer and the enjoyer. That is why the world of bodies is denoted by words in masculine, feminine and neuter genders. Even here, the three-fold enumeration is to be seen as demonstrating difference in configurations. In illustrations like, "give food to Caitra," etc, by the *bahuvrīhi* compound of *tadguṇa* type, all persons, namely Caitra, and persons other than Caitra are also denoted. In "*sarva*" etc. group of words including '*sarva*' is taken into consideration. So also, here, the nature of "having parts", which is common to what is masculine, feminine and neuter and also others is stated. Therefore, the expression "*strī-puṁ*" etc. means, "since it has parts." Or, the meaning could be, "since it has several features such as the masculine, feminine and neuter genders". By means of the following invariable concomitance "whatever is inert and manifold, is an effect" and by the etymological derivation of the word *jagat*, meaning that which "moves" and "perishes", everything beginning from Śiva and ending with the world is said to be an effect. Or a product of an extra-ordinary doer, different from people like us is indicated on the ground of its propriety or compatibility. For example, in the context of bringing water, a pot other than a broken pot is meant by the word, pot. Or the special things like body, sprout etc. alone are meant by the word '*jagat*'. The expression "*kārya darśanāt*" of the aphorism means, because the nature of being a product is seen. The word '*darśana*' is used to point out the validity of the reason. Here the creator is the one who, while knowing the means, and sub-divisions along with the results, is the agent who is desirous of doing, being endowed with the direct knowledge of the material cause. Here singularity of agency is intended to show that such a person who has got that knowledge is only one. By the word 'he' the familiarity in the *Vedas*, *Āgamas*, *Smṛtis*, *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas* is pointed out. "He who is proved by the *Nigama* and *Āgama*" is the meaning.

I.8 *Inference to Īśvara*

I.8.1 The world is a product, because, while being inert, it is manifold or because it consists of objects of different shapes, such as a pot. In the sacred *Pauṣkara* it is said; "This world is an effect because it is made up of parts like pot, etc." Hence all effects, those regarding which there is a dispute, or things like the body, sprout etc. are produced by one who has the necessary activity and a desire to produce a given thing with (a prior acquisition of) the knowledge of the means thereof, its subsidia ries and the resultant effect. Or they are produced by a person who has a direct knowledge of the material-cause the desire to produce and the necessary agency, as they are products like a pot." This is the Inference (to establish the existence) of a creator. So it is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "The world which is the subject of dispute has for its cause a creator who knows the whole world, since it is a product like pot etc. which are established for both of us (to have a creator)." In the sacred *Mṛgendra* too, "Then, cognising that substances like physical bodies possess the attribute of being products, we know through inference that their creator is a special kind of being."

In the*Mataṅga* it is said as follows: "Indeed the universe is born from a cause governed by the power of action, since it is a product like a pot." Once an attribute in the form of the power of action is inferred, then by that, the substance possessing that attribute is inferred. The power of action superintending the cause of the universe, depends upon a sentient being, since it is of the nature of power of action like the power of action involved in the potter's stick etc. It has been said: "The substratum is established through the attribute." By explaining the inference that has product as the *pakṣa* and the state of being created by one desirous of doing after having the direct knowledge as the cause, the inference having material cause as the *pakṣa* is demonstrated. It is thus: "The material cause of the world, *viz.*, *māyā* etc. while being the object of the activities of Īśvara, who has got the direct knowledge and desire to do, stimulates action, since while being inert, it promotes action, like a lump of clay."

It has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Oh; Brahmins ! like a chariot the universe which is inert cannot independently function or desist without the inducement of a sentient being. Here, he who is capable of effecting is called *pati* " Elsewhere also it is said: "*Pati* is proved since he is the inducer of the non-intelligent *māyā* etc. He is thus the omniscient, all-pervasive and eternal creator." Also in the *Parākhya* it is said. "As action is devoid of intelligence, it depends upon someone to unite it (to the souls). He who unites (it) is the great 'Īśvara' since he is independently mighty."

I.8.2 There is no inconsistency with regard to cow's milk oozing (from the udder) to nourish the calf, since that (milk) also depends upon the cow, which is sentient. Nor is there inconsistency in the case of a magnet, as there also it relies upon a conscious being who directs it. Moreover both the illustrations cited above are included as *pakṣa*. It is told in the *Pauṣkara*. "There is no incongruence of the probans, in the case of the milk arisen to feed the calf, because the milk has originated from the sentient cow. If milk results of its own, then it should come from the dead body (of a cow) too. But it does not. Therefore the milk depends upon a sentient being. Nor can the example of magnet prove an inert thing to incite activity, inasmuch as a magnet too depends upon somebody to direct it. Moreover, whatever stimulates action, being inert, is taken as a *pakṣa*. Hence an inert thing depends upon other (sentient) for its activity." Nor is the inference satisfied otherwise by the admission of a liberated one as the creator. It is a contingence of acceptable, as the world is created by a single being who is ever liberated. There will be cumbersomeness, if many recently liberated persons are also accepted as the creators of the world. Since they cannot get deliverance by themselves and as Īsvara has to bestow liberation, Īśvara is estabiished (as the cause of the world).

It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Oh, Brahmins; If you consider the liberated persons as the creators, then is the creator one non-eternally liberated, or one eternally liberated? If the creator is eternally liberated, then in that case, you are trying to prove what has already been proved. If the recently liberated person is the creator, then his creator, who endowed him with release become an already established entity. Otherwise, how can he be delivered? He will always be bound. Never do men attain emancipation by their own ability without lord Śiva's grace, which drives away bondage."

Elsewhere also it has been said: "Hence he who is eternally established should be the creator of this world. If a recently liberated person is said to be the creator, then there will be infinite regress; Or, liberation would be accidental, not being due to any cause."

I.9 *Creatorship of Īśvara who is without a Body*

I.9.1 Now, how can one without a body become a creator? Nor can it be said that just in order to prove his creatorship he should be postulated to possess a body. In admitting his body to be a non-product, then, on this issue itself there will be inconsistency since a body normally consists of parts. But if his body is said to be non-eternal, then there will be infinite regress. Therefore, during the first creation, his agency without possessing body only, should be admitted. It has thus been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "If agency be recognised everywhere for the embodied one (above), since that body too is a product it is pervaded by another agent. His body etc. are in a similar predicament. In this manner everywhere there will be infinite regress. Hence for the first creation, Maheśa free from all adjuncts should alone be recognised to be the agent actively associated with all kinds of energies." But it is not so. Since he is bodiless, it is inferred that he cannot be the creator. Or it is not necessary to have a body in order to become the creator. The second view is not corrcct because you yourself have objected to it whereas the first view contradicts the authority which proves Īśvara (who is having the attributes of ā creator). In spite of it, if in a friendly manner, you ask "How can there be a creator without the body," we reply as follows: "Though devoid of a body other than the body to be created by him, just like a person who controls his own body." In the sacred *Pauṣkara* it is said; "Agency for one, though without a body, (is possible) as in the case of a person directing his own body."

I. 10 *Ascertainment of His Form Constituted by the Mantras*

I. 10. 1 Also because he has a body in the form of *mantras*. It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*. "The Lord's body is not like this (ours); His is constituted of *Śakti*, as it is not originated from *mala*, etc. His bodily form, *viz.*, the head, etc. is constituted of five *mantras*, Īśa, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora, Vāma and Aja, which are useful in the five (cosmic) activities."

I.11 *Another Inference*;

I.11.1 Or, being a product is not having an origination but its becoming accomplished by a certain person. Therefore the inference of effect, which has as its cause an entity having parts, proves the creator also.

In the sacred *Parākhya*, it is said: "Substatial things with different shapes and parts should emerge from an intelligent cause, since they consist ef gross parts. Hence there should be a Īśvara, who is intelligent and well-established." For ease of argument, he is proved as one. Moreover, by accepting him as the single creator of the whole world, his omniscience also becomes established. It has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "He who creates all things is said to be omniscient; because one who knows something with its means, subsidiaries and results, is well-known to be its creator also." Since he is the creator of all things, he is also said to be the lord of sustenance, destruction, concealment and favour. So far, the following views namely the world being eternal, even if non-eternal its being natural, even if the world has a cause, it does not rely on Īśvara, though it is dependent on Īśvara, it is also dependent on Time and *karma*, even when dependent on a sentient being, it depends either on many Īśvaras or Īśvaras in succession; even if dependent on only one Īśvara, the view that creation rests independently on Hiraṇyagarbha and others, stand refuted. From the context it is known that Īśvara alone is the agent of fivefold activity.

I.12 *Taṭastha Definition*

I.12.1 According to the context Śiva's agency in the five kinds of activity is the *taṭasthalakṣaṇa*. The apprehension of over-pervasion in Time, *karma*, individual soul, Hiraṇyagarbha, Viṣṇu and others is set aside for this definition. Nor is this over pervasive in Ananteśa and others since they do not possess unlimited power; nor are they independent doers, being merely commissioned to do so. Also because the term, Īśvara applied to them denotes only the manifestation of Śiva in them, there is no over-pervasion in considering them by the defined term. It may be argued that agency of a single individual cannot be proved on the principle of parsimony only. Since reductions are objected in an inference, and also because the reverse is seen in the case of a palace built by many carpenters, in respect of earth etc. which are similar (to a palace) the agency of many like Hiraṇyagarbha alone becomes appropriate. Therefore, by accepting single creatorship, there is also no invariable concomitance. Apprehending all this the term "he" is used (in the aphorism). Nor can it be said that this inference is independent inasmuch as it is only in favour of the *Nigamas* and *Āgamas*, which speak of a single creator. Hence it is not untenable. Thus from the context, the *Nigama* etc. are alone declared to be valid proofs of knowledge.

I.13 *Validity for Inference*

I.13.1 It may be argued: There is no valid proof of knowledge such as inference, since it is impossible to have invariable concomitance, which is accepted as the cause of inference. Even though, in a few places there is the cognition of appositional reference to the probans and the probandum, in other places, cases of irregularity cannot be averted. Though it (inconsistency) can be removed by logic, since logic is, after all, based on invariable concomitance, there is again the contingence of infinite regress. It is for this reason that the argument of invariable concomitance being grasped by ascertaining the "non-adjunct" character of the cause, also stands refuted. Since for invariable concomitance, there is the condition that it should cover all cases of probans and the probandum, ocular perception of all the individual cases being impossible, it cannot grasp the said invariable concomitance. If invariable concomitance is supposed to derive from inference, there is contingence of infinite regress. By proving the invalidity for inference, verbal testimony too which depends on the former for understanding the syntax also becomes invalid.

I.13.2 It is not so. By not accepting validity for inference there will be the cessation of all activities, because activity is born from the inference of an action which is an object of activity relating to the future. On this objection, there will be no scope for the activity of one in search of fire on a mountain. Since the absence (of fire, for example), is determined by non-apprehension, and as a consequence there is no doubt, it is not proper to argue that activity is caused by doubts. Nor is it proper to say, that since there is the absence of cause for invariable concomitance, inference is not possible. With regard to this case itself, you yourself have refuted your view by the usage of an inferential statement. Also since by logic, inconsistencies are driven away, it is tenable to accept invariable concomitance. As far as logic is concerned, it is employed in cases where there are well established facts without room for any doubt, and also in cases which are either based on contradictions or not based on them. Therefore there is no infinite regress. There is no incongruity for perception, since mind or senses like eye are capable of framing invariable concomitances with regard to future events. Hence inference is a valid proof of knowledge, as there is the possibility for invariable concomitance. Once its validity is proved, then the *Vedas*, and the *Āgamas* which are based on inference for understanding the syntax are also established as valid proofs of knowledge.

I.14 *Validity for the Āgamas*

I.14.1 Let there be vālidity for the *Vedas*, it may be argued, since the *Vedas* are accepted by men of authority which determines it, and since their flawlessness, based upon their superhuman character corroborates it. But unlike the *Vedas*, the *Āgamas* are not accepted (as authority) by great people. Since in the *Āgamas* Śiva is stated to be their author, the *Āgamas* are not free from errors as they do not have superhuman origin. As a result of the absence of determining and corroborating factors, they cannot be, valid like the *Vedas*. Nor they are valid like the *smṛtis* based on the *Vedas*, since these *Āgamas* deal with subjects uncommon to the *Vedas*. The *Āgamas* cannot be valid on the ground of their being based on an extra-ordinary person, because the human intellect cannot reach things beyond the ken of senses and also because as there is scope for confusion among men. In the *Vāsiṣṭhalaiṅga* praising the followers of the *Tantras* at first thus, "They praise the *Pāñcarātra*", their ignorance is also censured as follows "Towards the end of the *yugas*, people of utter ignorance practise." On the other hand invalidity of the *Tantras* alone is assumed on the basis of the following verse, where Gautama, enraged by a wrong accusation cursed the followers of the *Tantras* thus: "Oh! wretched Brahmins! let all of you become initiated in the *Pāñcarātra*, *Kāpāla*, *Kālamukha* and *Śākta*". In the *Padma purāṇa* in the conversation between Vasiṣṭha and Dilīpa at first the praise of the king Citra who was interested in the path of the *Veda*, is found thus — "Once upon a time, there was a king by name Citra in the Drāviḍa country", and it also ends with his befall to hell, since he abandoned the Vedic path and followed the *Saiva Tantras* after conversing with an athiest thus "attaining the gruesome hell, which is of the nature of miseries and death." Thus in the *vāsiṣṭhalaiṅga* it is said "Formerly Śāṇḍilya, who was impetuous, always wantonly comitting sins like union with others wives, worshipped Vāsudeva in an improper way." Thus beginning, it ends with the befall of Sāṇḍilya, the follower of the *Pāñcarātra* to hell in the following manner: 'Oh! brahmin! Thus ordered by Yama, the messengers of Yama pushed the utmost sinner to hell for many years." Hence there can be no validity for the *Agama*. Or let there be validity. Even then, all persons are not eligible for it, but only those accursed and deprived of the opportunity to study the *Vedas*.

In the *Kūrmapurāṇa* it is said: "All approaching only Lord Śaṅkara and Viṣṇu" thus beginning, it is explained in the end that the *Tantras* are composed by Lord Śaṅkara and Mādhava for the maintenance of those persons, who were deprived of their occupation of performing sacrifices by the curse of the six sages, thus — "In the *Kaliyuga* they swerve from the path of the *Veda*". Hence the *Āgāmas* are not means of valid knowledge in so for as the means of prosperity regarding non-terrestrial matters are concerned.

I.14.2 Let it not be so, since like the *Vedas* it is composed by an extra-ordinary person, and hence, its validity can be accounted for. To explain: In spite of the *Vedas* being eternal and devoid of faults, the *Vedas* are not valid proofs, inasmuch as the letters comprising them are only non-eternal by way of their apparent origin and disappearance. Even if it is admitted that letters are eternal, since their order is non-eternal, the *Vedas*, which constitute such letters in sequence, are not eternal. Therefore, the *Vedas* can be a valid proof only by virtue of its being composed by Paramaśiva who is the utmost well wisher. There is not the fallacy of inter-dependence between the vedas and Īśvara, because their actions are different. The *Vedas* reveal Śiva, but Śiva is the originator of the *Vedas*. Still it may be argued that there is inter-dependence between the evidence of the *Vedas* and the ascertainment of Īśvara. Once the validity of the *Vedas* is determined, then by that, Īśvara can be established, likewise, only when Īśvara is established, the *Vedas* composed by him can be determined attain validity. But it is not so. Since the *Vedas* are accepted and followed by great scholars, the authority of the *Vedas* can be determined. This can be accounted for later; otherwise, there will be the fallacy of inter-dependence for you too, by reason of their being composed by Īśvara, in the case of the validity of the *Vedas* and the state of their being not composed by any person. Even the state of being not composed by any person, has to be established by the *Veda* whose validity is proved, and the validity of the *Veda* can be proved only when the state of their not being composed by any person is ascertained.

Therefore the *Vedas* are valid proof since they are composed by Śiva. There is nothing wrong in accepting validity for the *Āgamas* too, in the same manner, as they too are composed by Him.

I. 15 *Validity for All Systems*

I.15.1 In the same manner, it may be argued that there is validity even for the Lokāyata and other systems because they are also composed by Śiva. It is not so because their validity is accepted by different types of qualified aspirants.

It is said in the *Skāndapurāṇa*: Oh! great sages! Now I am going to expound the validity of different systems. Listen to it attentively. The all-knowing Śaṅkara himself briefly composed the following different works namely thc *Vedas*, all *Śāstras*, *Purāṇas*, *Bhārata*, limbs of the *Veda*, the *Upa-vedas*, *Āgamas* like the *Kāmika*, *Kāpāla*, *Lākula* and also their divisions like *Pāśupata*, *Soma*, *Bhairava* and others and hundreds of their sub-divisions and also thousands of the *Āgamas* on Viṣṇu, Brahmā and the *Āgamas* of Buddhism and Jainism, Lokāyata, *tarka* (logic) which is elaborate, *Mīmāṁsā* which is profound, Sāṇkhya and Yoga, and also other *Śāstras*. With the blessinge of Śiva, gods like, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others, Siddhas, Vidyādharas, Yakṣas, Rākṣasas, sages, human beings and eminent brahmins wrote those doctrines, sometimes briefly and sometimes elaborately, taught to them by wise persons, according to the difference in nature of qualified persons, and not for a single individual. Hence these systems should not be refuted by logic by learned people.

In the *Bhārata*, too, it is said thus: "*Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Pāñcarātra*, *Vedas*, *Pāśupata* — these are extra-ordinary valid proofs: They should not be refuted by reasons."

I.15.2 Nor may it be asked how validity is tenable for conflicting texts? The contradiction is done away by fixing a limit for matters to be performed, by persons of different qualifications. Moreover, it is proper that in respect of contradiction of facts, the weaker is sublated by the stronger. Nor may it be argued that because all systems are equal as all of them are enumerated by Īśvara, how can it be said that one system is strong, and another weak. Though enunciated by Śiva, systems like the *Vāma*, which are outside the realm of the *Vedas* and the *Śaivāgamas*, are not valid although they are meant for different eligible persons. It is but proper that weakness and strength of a system is based upon the comparative reliability of their secondary authors. Indeed, where these secondary composers expound the theory contradicting the principles enumerated by Śiva either briefly or elaborately, then their expositions are said to be based on ignorance. Where there is no conflict, all of them are to be taken as valid. Nor may it be argued, that the *Vāma* and others are valid, since they are not composed by secondary authors.

Lord Śiva himself has said like this: "Other *śāstras*, too, which are prevalent in this world, and which are in conflict with the teachings of the *Veda*, have been declared by me alone, for the sake of deluding; (these are): *Vāma*, *Pāśupata*, *Lākula* and *Bhairava*. These, it has been said, should not be resorted to, as also what else is outside the *Veda*." Thus in the *Kūrmapurāṇa* it is stated that the *Vāma* etc. should not be followed. In this manner, in the case of other systems which are not directly composed by Śiva but have secondary authorship, their invalidity can be decided whenever there is contradiction to the *Vedas* and *Śaivāgamas*, being traceable to the erroneous conclusions of those authors; otherwise their validity is vouchsafed. There is no sublation for the *Vedas* and *Śaivāgamas* on any ground. Even if there are apparent contradictions, these can be reconciled by examining the initial and final portions of texts so that they are neither mutually conflicting nor inwardly conflicting. Thus there is no sublation for each of them (*i e.* the *Vedas* and the *Śaivāgamas*). The difference between the two consists in this:— For the one (*Veda*) all the three castes are qualified, whereas for the other (*Śaivāgamas*), the fourth caste, too, is qualified.

I. 15 3 It may be argued that the *Āgamas* may become valid on the ground of their being composed by Lord Śiva, only if there is the acceptance by great men as a supporting evidence. However, such a thing does not exist at all. The reply is as follows: Because in worshipping and installing "Śiva," all great men are freely engaged without any break. Even in initiation, Śveta, Upamanyu and others are said to have been accepted. As in *brahmavidyā*, only a few people among the present generation are found to adopt these *Āgamas* due to the absence of the ripening of *mala*. It is clearly seen that the fall of Citra and Śaṇḍilya in hell is not because of their following the *Tantras*, but due to their giving up the path of the *Veda*. The statement of the *Kūrmapurāṇa*, too, refers to the *Vāma* and other systems which are outside the realm of the *Vedas*. As for the following aphorisms found in the *Brahmasūtra* (comprising four chapters) of the revered Sage Vyāsa, *viz*., "If it be said that in some recensions of the *Vedas* that which is inferred (the *pradhāna*) is also mentioned. (we say) no, because (the word "*avyakta*" occuring in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*) is mentioned in a simile referring to the body (means the body itself and not the *pradhāna*)," (I.4.1) and beginning with "that which is inferred (by the Sāṅkhyas, *pradhāna*) cannot be the cause (of the world) because it is not possible to account for the design or orderly arrangement (found in the creation (II.2.1), and ending with the aphorism, "the system of the Lord must be disregarded, on account of inappropriateness" (II.2.35), the validity for the *Āgamas* like Sāṅkhya are refuted. Even here, the refutation is only with regard to topics which are contradictory to the *Vedas* but not with regard to practices. Even there the doctrine of the *Śaivāgamas* are not refuted as (the refutation) is not found at all. As for the aphorism "The system of the Lord must be disregarded on account of inappropriateeess" (II.2.35) either one section of the Śaiva siddhāntins who consider Īśvara as the efficient cause alone or the familiar Pāśupatas may be taken as refuted by it. Thus there is no contradiction whatsoever.

I.16 *Validity of the Āgamas regarding the Entities Already Established*

I.16.1 Let there be validity for the *Āgamas*, it may be argued, but the validity can be in respect of instructing actions only, and not of established entities or things. The activities of a doer, which are the means of understanding the meaning of words, concern only "something to be done" (*kārya*). Since such a grasping of the meaning of words is not possible in the case of "already existing entities" (*siddha*), the *Āgamas* which deal with the latter, cannot be valid. It is not so, since only with regard to actions it is possible to determine the meanings of words from activities. But in cases like 'pot,' the meaning cannot be understood by any other valid proof of knowledge, except verbal testimony which alone is capable of determining the meaning of a word. In illustrations like "a son is born to you," in spite of it being an established concept, the meaning is also understood.

According to our system, *pramāṇa* (valid proof of knowledge) is *pramā* (valid knowledge) itself which is in the form of power of consciousness delimited by respective meanings of words. Delimitation by meaning is the meaning remaining in the mode of intellect devoid of doubts, etc. It is said thus: "The power of consciousness devoid of doubts etc. is said to be the valid proof of knowledge." The definition, "that which is a means to correct knowledge is a valid proof of knowledge" (*pramāṇa*) is not correct, because it is over-pervasive in the case of lamps, etc.

It is said: "It may be argued, how something which is a means to correct knowledge, cannot be a valid proof of knowledge. The reply is that if it is not so, then there is the contingence of mind, lamp, eye (sense-organs) etc. also becoming valid proof of knowledge." As a means (*sādhana*) is only of the nature of a thing to be known, it is untenable to state it as a valid proof. It has also been said: "That thing which is to be proved, is not a valid proof, since the former is proved by the latter."

I.16.2 There, the validity displaying objects is comprehended by the self-illumining knowledge. The real nature, remaining in the mode of intellect is revealed by mind, as the former is self-luminous. Self-lumination is of the nature of being apprehended by worldly perception itself which has for its object the substratum of knowledge, during the absence of sublation. This is not impossible, since it is proved only by its causal aggregate. Indeed, when existing knowledge is revealed, it is revealed only along with an object. Since an object is either an attribute or a substantive or their relationship, even their understanding becomes necessary. This mode of correct knowledge is not due to causal aggregate of knowledge only. If so, even misapprehension will become correct knowledge. But it is due to its being associated with (conducive) attributes. Here, the attribute is the contact of the senses with major aspects of an object, as the case be. The mode of correct knowledge is threefold namely, perception inference and verbal testimony. *Anupramāṇas*, (subsidiary means) which are their instruments are also called perception, inference and verbal testimony.

I 16.3 Of these, perception is of three kinds, dependent on senses, on mind and not dependent on senses and mind. So it is said, "Perception is threefold: dependent on the senses, the internal organ, and intelligence." The perception, not dependent on senses and mind, is of the nature of illumining consciousness. It is also twofold namely, *svaaṁvedyam* and *svasaṁvedanam*. Of these, self- knowledge is called *svasaṁvedanam*. Knowledge of Śiva is *svasaṁvedyam*. Perception depending on mind is also of two kinds, *viz*. the knowledge of Yogins and of wordly pleasures etc. The knowledge of Yogins is the direct realisation of the past, present and future. The knowledge of mundane pleasures is the recollection of experiences of pleasures and miseries.

I.16.4 Inference is the cognition of a mediate object through a probans. Probans is that which consists of invariable concomitance and subjectness. Invariable concomitance is the co-existence of the probans with the probandum in all cases. Probans is of three kinds, namely the barely co-present, barely co-absent and the co-present cum-co-absent. Their suitable names themselves provide their definitions.

I.16.5 The statement of a trustworthy person is verbal testimony. Statement is a sentence possessing expectancy, etc. Expectancy is the usage of words along with case-terminations, etc, helpful in forming syntactical connection of words. A sentence can be constituted by a person only if he has the knowledge of this expectancy. Compatibility is only the absence of certitude that there is no syntactical relation (between the meanings of two words). Even illustrations like "he moistens with fire " will also be compatible, when seen from surface. Illustrations like "he drenches with water" will also be incompatible, if there is perplexity regarding the syntactical relation. The mere existence of compatibillity is enough to constitute a sentence. Juxtaposition consists in the auditory perception of words without lapse of time. This is also useful like compatibility. Other valid proofs like *Arthāpatti*, *Upamāna* etc are to be seen as included in the above testimonies.

I.17 *Commentary for the Remaining Part of the Aphorism*

I.17.1 It may be argued, that how, notwithstanding all this, that the word '*eva*' is used to indicate that such a person is Śiva only. Since Nārāyaṇa and Hiraṇyagarbha are also of that nature and they are stated as the cause for creation by the Śrutis. Hence the definition will be satisfied otherwise by the admission of Nārāyaṇa and Hiraṇyagarbha, and it is also overpervasive in their case. To avoid this, it is stated thus: "he, taking this". Here the word '*hṛtvā*' denotes a single agency since the word ends with the past participle '*tvā*', according to the grammatical rule, "Prior action of the same doer of two actions." In respect of the context, the word '*etat*' (this) refers to the world. The word 'creation' is indicative of sustenance, destruction and other activities also. By the etymological and conventional derivations the word '*Hara*' denotes Śiva, the destroyer. The word '*prabhu*' means one who is capable of generating, *viz.*, *Maheśa*, the creator of the world.

I.17.2 It is explained thus: There is the great destruction namely deluge established by the *Nigamas*, the *Āgamas* and Inference. During that time he who is the destroyer alone is approved by all to be the Lord of creation and other activities also. This is so, because the one who destroys must be possessing a clear and unimpeded power of knowledge and action, suitable therefor and such a one is also referred to by a word special and unique to himself (*viz.*, HARA). This is in accordance with all scriptures which have uniformity of view and with the section called *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa*, of the *Brahmasūtra* (I.1.5). Such a person could be Śiva only. The *Skāndapurāṇa* passage beginning with — "Once gods like Viṣṇu" which corroborates the *Atharvaśikhopaniṣad*, the text of the *Liṅgapurāṇa* "Gods themselves asked him" which substantiates the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, the passage found in the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, "Īśvara is the sentient creator," and a host of other texts are all in support of what has been stated *viz.*, that then (at the time of cosmic deludge) Hara alone is the one answering to that description (*i.e.* destruction of the cosmos). Hiraṇyagarbha and Nārāyaṇa cannot be stated to be so, because there is no evidence to that effect. Even in places where both of them are stated as destroyers, only Śiva who is governing them is intended to be the destroyer. Or they could be the destroyers only during the intermediate but not ultimate deluge. Taking all this for granted the author employs the word "*asmāt*" (from this). Śiva alone is the destroyer. 'Hara' means destroyer. He alone is the creator. This being an aphorism, another interpretation is also intended.

I.17.3 It may be explained thus. Because Śiva accomplishes the five cosmic functions such as creation and sustenance equally, it may be argued, "How is that he is called by the word 'Hara' which specifies only the act of destruction?" Anticipating this, it is said, "taking." Here the past participle denotes the first action. The meaning is explained in the following manner. Destruction takes place first, followed by creation. There is no creation for a thing which is not destroyed and which is without latent impressions, because an effect from something non-existent is denied. There is no hard and fast rule that destruction is to be preceded by creation. This is so because even *prāgabhāva* (prior non-existence), *paramāṇu*, *śyāmikā*, *māyā* and the association with *mala,* which are not created, also are accepted to have destruction. Therefore, primarily "destruction" alone is referred to in the aphorism. Thus for example, a person is referred to as the *sattra*-sacrificer, because of the importance attached to the *sattra*-sacrifice, although he would have performed many sacrifices like *agniṣṭoma* and others. Likewise, a village is called "*dīkṣitas*' village" or "Scholars' village" since the village is inhaebited predominantly by *dīkṣitas* and scholars. Similarly though Śiva is endowed with five kinds of activity, because of the prominence of destruction, the name 'Hara' becomes quite appropriate and significant.

I.17.4 It may be argued that it is conflicting to say that "he creates this," because by pointing out an already existing entity (*viz.* the universe) as 'this', it is unintelligible to speak about its creation subsequently, as "he creates." While pointing out a thing to be created as "he creates," it is not proper to point out an already existing thing as "this," because creation is not possible for an already existing thing. Thus the statement "he creates this world" becomes contradictory Not so; there is nothing contradictory because creation is accepted as the manifestation of an entity which is in the form of latent impression, into one with a gross form.

Thus ends the brief commentary on the First Aphorism.

II

II.1 *Beginning of the Brief Commentary on the Second Aphorism*

II.1.1 From the first aphorism, it is understood that Śiva is the single agent of this entire world which is characterised by creation, sustenance and destruction in their full magnitude, and that He alone is the ultimate Reality. But even then, because world is a product, it may be argued, that it requires like an agent, a material cause also. Hence the material cause should be definitely be stated. If it is the eternal and independent *pradhāna*, then like the ultimacy of Śiva, it will also become another ultimate reality. Moreover, Śiva will be rendered to the state of a child due to the absence of any purpose in the creation of the world. Further, he will turn out to be partial and cruel, effecting too little or excessive pleasure and pain. Thus refuting a successicn of doubts mainly by the second aphorism, the views of the Ārambhavādins (Naiyāyikas) are also rejected secondarily.

SECOND APHORISM

The primal being while being different from the selves, is inseparable in the form of identity from the selves. He causes them to undergo transmigration in accordance with their past actions, by means of his conscious force, which is under his control.

II.I.2 There, at first, from the following quotation from the *Vāyupurāṇa* "Then from Śiva endowed with power" and from the following quotation from the *Acintyāgama* "movable and immovable are born from him", by the scriptural use of ablative case in the sense of *prakṛti* (original source or ablation) and also by supporting the view that all knowledge is derived from the knowledge of Śiva, it is understood that Śiva alone is the material cause. Keeping this in mind, the commentator explicitly states his view through valid reasons that material cause is of the form of modes, which is distinct from the view of other schools of thought. He also rejects the views of the Nyāya, Bauddha and Sāṅkhya systems. This is explained by the first quarter of the second aphorism along with the following word (of the second quarter) as follows.— "The agent, being different but being same in the form of identiy." Here the word "from the world" (*jagataḥ*) is drawn from the preceding aphorism. This word (*jagat*) is also interpreted with an ablative case-suffix.

II.1.3 In this connection, the Vaiśeṣikas and others, who are the Ārambhavadins opine that between the material cause and effect there is the relation of *samavāya* (Inherence) which involves total difference. The Bauddhas speak of their total identity, as according to them a product is the combination of atoms, which is the cause. Therefore, for them, the state of being a product is the state of being a material cause. Both these views are not possible. In illustrations like "earthern pot," we see coordinate predication and verbal reference (to both earth and pot, the material and the effect). The earthern pot is thus different with respect to pot and mat which are mutually different and with respect to pot itself, which is identical. As such, between the material cause and its product, there is difference as well as identity. Hence according to one sect of the followers of our doctrine, material cause is that which has both difference and identity with an effect. It has been said at first "different and same" (in the second aphorism). But, according to us, even this is not primary and important. This is so because difference and identity, which mean existence and absence, which are mutually contradictory, cannot remain in the same locus. When there is another way of explaining, even trying to rectify the contradiction, being invalid, is not proper. Thus for us, difference (between the material cause and its product) alone is primary.

II.1.4 Absenee of difference however, is not same as "*abheda*" (identity). *Abheda* is that which is of the form of identity with *bheda*, which has '*vyāpti*' as the synonym, which is characterized by *bheda* and which is capable of being named with *bheda* in respect of having the same appositional designation. Hence it is said thus: "Being different but same in the form of identity." Here the term '*vyāpti*' indicates "being characterised by some distinction." It has been said by the revered Śrīkaṇṭha in the commentary on the aphorism *tadananyatvam*. (*Brahmasūtra*) while at first refuting the total difference, total identity, and primary difference-cum-identity for a material cause and effect, as follows:— "But we speak of "*ananyatva*" as the difference characterized by non-difference, with regard to a cause and effect."

II.1.5 Material cause, it may be argued, is not difference and identity only, because there will be the contingence of a substantive becoming material-cause for an attribute and an individual becoming material-cause for generality. Nor is this contingence acceptable. Because they (the attribute and substantive) are born simultaneously and generality is eternal. As such there is no order of their existing before and after. Also because it is opposed to the settled dogma (*siddhānta*), the aphorism uses the word, *kartā* (agent). Here in this definition only "effecting an action" should be introduced. The term '*kartā*' (creator) is contextually meant. But the word '*vyāpti*' is again repeated. Its repetition denotes continuation. Likewise, the word '*jagat*' which is repeated, is changed as having the Locative case suffix. In this manner, Śiva is the material cause, and in the world Śiva is constantly present throughout — in the form of existence in all products, indicated by expressions like 'pot is' 'mat is', just as in a pot, clay is constantly present throughout. Thus since, Śiva is proved by the *Vedas* as the material cause of the world, the present aphorism provides the logical argument for the same.

II.1.6 Moreover the views of the Bauddhas and Ārambhavādins are refuted by the terms '*anya*' (different) and '*ananya*' (not different) respectively. The suffix '*śatṛ*' in the word "*san*", which is repeated, points out the denominator, as it is said in the grammatical aphorism "the suffix '*śatṛ*' denotes an action whether it is a denominator or a cause." Like a word ending in 'locative absolute,' in (the term) *anyassan ananyaḥ*' though there is difference in time (between a cause and an effect), the non-different (*ananya*) cause is taken in association with a different (*anya*) cause. Thus the view of modification is rejected. Modification is the attainment of a diffetent form by giving up its former form. In modification, the former state is not found in the effect, *e.g.*, in the state of curd, the form of milk is not found. Hence by the word '*san*,' the view of modification is refuted. There, because the reason for rejecting the first two views is clear and explained here and there, ignoring it, the reason for rejecting modification is stated as '*vyāptitaḥ*.' Because in products like pot, clay is present constantly throughout, the type of modification where the former form is given up is not possible. But in accordance with the axiom '*paṭakuṭī*,' only mode is the effect, which is stated in the following manner. The view about modification, stated as follows: "Modification is either the state of being different in reality, or the attainment of a different effect, which has general or special or similar attributes pertaining to the material cause," is not refuted by this: it will be rejected later.

II.1.7 It is true that everywhere it is not possible to refute the *ārambha* and modification, as in the case of a cloth which is originated from many threads, and of curd which exists only after the loss of the state of milk, both are necessary. Yet here, their indispensability is being rejected. Therefore, according to the context, here and there, either mode or modification or *ārambha* are accepted. *Māyā*, too, controlled by Īśvara is the material cause of the world, since it is established by many valid proofs of knowledge, as in "He the King of *Bindu* is the material cause." That is why it is not separately mentioned here. Like threads in a cloth, Śiva is the material cause of the world. Either Śiva is the substratum of *māyā*, that has got identity with the world or the world has become identified with *māyā*, for which Śiva is the material cause. The scriptural passage on immutability aims at refuting the direct identification (of Śiva with *māyā*). Therefore, there is no conflict with it.

II.1.8 Or, in order to refute the people who speak of Śiva as only the efficient cause, it is said as "*ananyassan*" (being non-different). The creator who is not different, effectuates transmigration, providing body, senses etc. When the counter-positive of "*ananya*" (not different) is analysed, body and senses which are "*anya*" (different) (hence *pratiyogin* of *ananya*) alone constitute the objects of creation. Or the term "*vyāptitaḥ*" establishes the counter-positive. It means because it is pervasive (of effect). Here the material cause is, that which produces, while not being different from the product or that which is pervaded by the product. Thus the nature of material cause (for Śiva) is proved. If it is objected as to how is '*ananyatva*' (the state of not being different), possible, then, it is said "due to *vyāpti*" (invariable concomitance). It means, because he is the agent for the action of *vyāpti*. Thus, '*vyāpakatvāt*' (because he is of the nature of pervader) is finalised as the *hetu* (reason). Invariable concomitance in the form of pervasion is (explained) thus — wherever there is *vyāpya* (the pervaded thing) there is the presence of *vyāpaka* (pervader). In some cases, this invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is useful in bestowing stability for *vyāpya*, and in other cases it is useful in forming a *vyāpya* (middle term). For example, in the case of clay, *vyāpti* is useful in the origin of a pot out of clay. With regard to space, it is useful for its existence.

It has been said: "The existence of a substance in other place (outside its realm) is always erroneous. The necessary condition for *vyāpti* is that, while pervading the substance it either generates it or provides its stability." This *vyāpti* is of two kinds: one is merely the proximity, and other is disposition in itself. It is said: "It (*vyāpti*) is of two kinds: one is proximity and other is disposition in itself" Here, though *vyāpti* alone is not the cause for *anya* (different) and *ananya* (non-different) because there is inconsistency in space, even then from the strength of the context, in this case, only the second kind of *vyāpti* is established as appropriate.

II.1.9 Therefore, the agent who has disposition in Himself is not different from the product (effect) like clay. There is also no inconclusiveness for *hetu*. The statement "just like a pot which is pervaded by clay, this world is pervaded by Him alone" explains that *vyāpti* is of the form of disposition in oneself, and this fact is propounded in the *vedas*, *Āgamas* and *purāṇas*. Further its propriety is established by way of illustration also. Hence the scriptural usage of Ablative case, the scriptural passage "of the resolve to become many" and the special mention of appositional designation are all proper. Some others who consider Śiva as only the efficient cause, state non-difference for cases, where there is absolute difference, as in the following illustration "This water is salty" where only through pervasion, non-difference is mentioned secondarily. This way of framing non-difference through pervasion is untenable because it contradicts the already enumerated texts of the *vedas* and reasoning. There will also be the contingence of *lakṣaṇa* (secondary sense) for the term '*ananya*', which is explained by the Vedic passage denoting appositonal designation as '*ananya*', since it pervades a product, although it is verily different from it. According to our view, the term '*anyassan*' (being different) is not without purpose. It is employed to refute the erroneous view of total non-difference (between the material cause and its effect).

II.1.10 In this manner, it is to be understood that the views of accepting *prakṛti*, *paramāṇus*, non-entity (void) and combination of *paramāṇus* as the material cause are refuted. Even though Śiva is the material cause, the view of the total difference accepted by Naiyāyikas is also refuted. Even the view of illusory manifestation is refuted, because a product is, after all, proved by the *Vedas* and other valid means like perception. In this manner, even the *karaṇa* (means) is also not independent. Only the cognative and conative energy inherent in Īśvara, and dependent on him are accepted as the *karaṇas*. So as to ward off the aforesaid error, the expression "*Ājñāyāsamavetayā*" has been used. The word "*ājñayā*" means "*śaktyā*", "*śamavetayā*" means, by that which is dependent. Or the word "*śamavetayā*" is used to preclude the power to receive (*parigrahaśakti*) (from others) Or, to remove the apprehension that there may be mutability for creatorship either by modification or by actions like throwing upward (*utkṣepaṇa*), it is said — '*ājñayā*'. Either by modification or actions like throwing up (a thing), nothing is generated anew. Therefore there is no mutability (for the creator). Further, it should not be thought that there is no proof for the existence of such an energy, because the Inference regarding the existence of Īśvara is the proof therefor.

II.2 *Elucidation of Niṣkala and Others*

II 2.1 This energy is only one, because there is no proof for its divisions. The differences like *Īśāna* (and *Tatpuruṣa*) are caused by the difference in actions. It is said: "The *śakti* of Śiva is one, but it becomes manifold due to different adjuncts" Like difference in *śakti*, the differences employed by *śakti* to accomplish are also due to adjuncts. In this manner, for one, there are nine divisions like Śiva etc.

II.2.2 *Niṣkalas* are of four types namely *śiva*, *śakti*, *nāda* and *bindu*. *Sadāśiva* is *sakalaniṣkala* *Sakalas* have divisions called *Maheśvara*, *Rudra*, *Viṣṇu* and *Brahmā*. In this manner, for *śakti* alone, there are divisions like *Śāntyatīta*, *Śānti*, *Vidyā*, *Nivṛtti*, *Manonmaṇī*, *Maheśvarī*, *Umā*, *Lakṣmī* and *Vāṇī*.

It is said in the *Suprabheda*: "His body is to be known as threefold primarily, *viz*., *Niṣkala*, *Sakalākala* and *Sakala*. *Niṣkala* and *Sakala* are of four divisions each. *Sakalaniṣkala* is only one (thus). It is said to be nine-fold in the following manner: *Śāntyatīta* is originated from the one-thousandth portion of *Śiva-tattva*.

Parāśakti is the synonym for it. *Śakti* is evolved from the one-thousandth portion of that (*Śāntyatīta*). *Śānti* is the synonym for it. *Nādamūrti* is born from the one-thousandth portion of that (*Śakti*), *Vidyā* is said to be its synonym.

Bindu-tattva is produced out of the one-tenth portion of that (*Nāda*). *Nivṛtti* is the synonym for it. Thus the *Śiva-tattva*, *Niṣkala* is said to be four-fold. Out of the one-tenth portion of the *Niṣkala* emerges the *tattva* called '*Sada*'. The primary *Śakti*, *Manonmaṇī* is to its left side. Like the burning capacity of fire, *Śakti* is the inherent and essential character of the Lord. As is *Sadāśiva* described, so is the *Īśvara-tattva* stated. Like *Manonmaṇī*, *Īśvarī-tattva* is also explained.

Rudra is born from one-thousandth portion of *Īśvara*. He is with four arms and three eyes. His head is adorned with the crescent moon. The Lord is as lustrous as lightning. He holds axe and deer. He is complete with all limbs and adorned with all ornaments. To his left side is Goddess Umā, endowed with all beauty. Viṣṇu is said to be from one-millionth portion of that Īśvara. He is black in hue, with red eyes and he wields conch and discus. He wears a yellow silk and is with Śrī and Bhūmi. Brahmā is also born from one-millionth portion of Īśvara. He has four arms, four faces and he wears matted hair and a diadem, a water-pitcher and a rosary and is of yellow colour and with beautiful eyes. He is with Sāvitrī."

II.2.3 In this context, the Pāśupatas come out with the following argument: If Śiva has created the world, since He has all his desires fulfilled, is it merely for fun, like the sport of a child, or is it for the benefit of others? In reply to this, they state that the world is created only as a sport, because even bushy growth etc. which are not fit for enjoyment are also seen. Īśvara will then be on par with a lunatic, and the *Vedas* which are His words, will be considered purposeless. Averting this, it is stated "causing the transmigration of individual souls." By means of the derivation of object (*karma*) and instrument (*karaṇa*), *viz*. "that which is attained well," and "that which is attained well by this" respectively, the *tattvas* starting from Śiva and ending with the Earth, and also enjoyable loci like body and *Bhuvana*. which constitute the *tattvas* are all intended here. Of these the pure *tattvas* are five in number and the impure are thirty-one. Pure *tattvas* are products of *Kuṇḍalinī*. Others are products of *Mohinī*.

II.3 *Discussion about Kuṇḍalinī*

II.3.1 *Kuṇḍalinī* is that *Śakti*, associated with which Śiva becomes the material cause for *śuddha-tattvas* and *śuddhaśabda* (pure sound). It is said in the *Ratnatraya*:— "*Bindu* is that from which the pure path is born, by which it is sustained, and into which it is dissolved. It is called *Paranāda*. It is the cause for *Nāda*, *Bindu* and *varṇa* (letters.)"

This *Kuṇḍalinī* is established on several grounds such as giving space to the persons in pure path, and as a material cause for *Kalās* like *Nivṛtti* etc, and for the pure sound, which is fourfold like *Parā* etc. That Pure sound, is the cause for the determinate knowledge of Ananteśa is inferred in the bodies of Ananteśa, the creator of impure path, in the bodies of *Aṇu* and *sadāśiva* and in the *Mantras* who remain in the pure path and *Bhuvana* etc. which are the instruments for their enjoyment.

II.4 *Analysis of* Śiva-*tattva*s

II.4.1 *Śiva-tattva* is the first *vṛtti* of *Kuṇḍalinī*. It is called '*Nāda*' and is in the form of meaning. It is also the locus for *Indhikā* and *Kalā* which are the material causes for the mode of speech called *Sūkṣma*, which is the *śakti* of Īśvara and which manifests the great, greater and greatest effulgence of consciousness of an aspirant of deliverance, and for the extinguisher of *mala*, which engages a person in activity. According to some, *Śiva-tattva* is the modification (*pariṇāma*) of *Kuṇḍalinī*. It is not so, because *pariṇāma* means the obtaining of a different form after giving up the former form. In the present context there is no such *pariṇāma*, as the former form is not given up. In case *pariṇāma* is defined as merely attaining a new form, in such a way that it is not contradictory to *vṛtti*, then let this be the definition for *vṛtti* too, which is not opposed (to *pariṇāma*) because this kind of definition for *pariṇāma* is common for both *vṛtti* and its rival *pariṇāma*.

II.4.2 *Śakti-tattva* which is called *Bindu*, is the *vṛtti* of *Śiva-tattva*. It is the locus for *Īśvara-śakti* called as *Nivṛtti*, *Pratiṣṭhā*, *Vidyā* and *Śānti*, due to respective functions of a sentient being performed through the mode of speech called *Paśyantī*, such as cessation of *Saṁsāra*, prevention of the function contrary to *Nivartana*, realisation and abatement of all miseries. Some people call it the second *vṛtti* of *Kuṇḍalinī* itself. Thus another view stating it to be the third *vṛtti* of *Kuṇḍalinī* is also to be seen subsequently.

II-4-3 *Sadāśivatattva* is the product of *Śaktitattva.* It is the base for the mode of speech celled '*Madhyamā.* It is also the cause for *tanu* and *bhuvana* of *Praṇava* and others which are responsible for divisions of *Tantras* like *Kāmika* etc. and of persons having *sāmīpya mukti. Īśvara-tattva* is the product of *Sadāśiva-tattva.* It bestows *tanu* and *bhuvana* for Ananteśa and others and also for others who have attained his rank by worshipping him.

II-4-4 *Vidyā-tattva* is the product of *Īśvara-tattva.* It is the base for the mode of speech called '*vaikharī*'. It is also the cause for *tanu* and *bhuvana* for seven crores of *Mantras*, lords of *Gaṇas*, lords of the quarters, Indra and *Vidyārājñī.* Others explain the designation of *Śiva-tattva* etc. in accordance with the controllers of different spheres. When the supreme soul is endowed only with cognative power, then he is called '*Śiva*'. The *tattva* governed by him is also called '*Śiva*'. When he has got only conative power, then he is called '*Śakti*' and the *tattva* controlled by him is also called '*Śakti*'. When he has got cognative and conative powers in equal proportions, then he is called '*Sadāśiva*' and the *tattva* under him is also called '*Sadāśiva*'. When conative power is in a high proportion, then he is called *Īśvara* and the *tattva* ruled by him is also called '*Īśvara*'. When the power of cognition is high, then he is called '*vidyā*' and the *tattva* directed by him is also called '*vidyā*'.

II.4.5 That (*Śakti*) is called *Mohinī* associated with which Śiva becomes the material cause for things beginning with *Kalā* and ending with *avani* (earth). It is established as the material cause for the subtle and gross bodies starting from *Kalā* and ending with earth, before creation. It is said in the sacred *pauṣkara*: "For these souls whose bodies have been resolved at the deluge and who yet possess *karma*, *māyā* is the cause of bodies etc. subtle and gross, at the beginning of the day (in the first creation). Substances beginning with *Kalā* and ending with earth — which are at first joined together — are divided like branches, leaves and fruits (all latent) in a seed." It is also established as being the base for *karmas* during deluge.

II.4.6 *Kalā-tattva* is the product of impure *māyā* and it is capable of revealing conative power. It is also proved by the following inference: "Extinction of *mala* in the form of ignorance which obscures conative power, depends upon illumining substances, because ignorance can be removed." Since conative power is manifested through it, it is also correlated as a causal agent.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The conative power of the individual self is eternal and pervasive like that of Īśvara. Because it is concealed by ignorance, it does not reveal objects without the grace (of the Lord). The *tattva* which is illumining and the bestower of the grace is called *Kalā*. Hara disturbs *māyā* and makes it fit for activities. Indeed it (the *tattva*) is very eminent. By that similar to a bright lamp, a portion of the intelligence of an individual self which is covered, is illumined, after dispelling pitch darkness. Oh! Brahmin! these two are found, mingled in the self. They are said to be correlated with a creature as agent for action and enjoyment."

II.4.7 *Vidyā-tattva* is the manifester of cognition and conation and is the product of *Kalā-tattva*. It is the means for the apprehension of cognition. It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "In this manner, the manifested energy of conation, by itself unable to see, depends upon the grace of mind, which is desirous of knowing things, and perceives object through the eyes. Hence, for the above reason the Lord stimulated *Kalā*, which is capable of producing, and created the tattva called '*vidyā*' which is the instrument of the supreme self. By that (*tattva*) which is effulgent and which endows cognative energy, a person understands all objects, which are revealed by all instruments of action."

II.4.8 *Rāga-tattva* is the manifester of the energy of *icchā*. It either results from *Kalā*, or it generates attachment, which is an attribute of the intellect. It has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The manifested power of intelligence, though percie-

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ving things, does not desire, because it is devoid of desires. Therefore, only for that, the Lord created the *rāga-tattva*, which generates desires. Captivated by it, a man desires even for the enjoyment of the filthy (objects) and indulges in it. Although enjoying, he does not desist from it."

In the sacred *Pauṣkara*, too, it is said: "Then being impelled by *vidyā* and *kalā*, desires arise from *kalā*, causing immediate activity in souls. No soul is indeed seen to enjoy, without desiring. Because of being attached to enjoyments by *rāga*, the soul becomes capable of enjoying objects of enjoyment "

II.4 9. *Kāla* (Time) is born from māyā and is comprehensible through *lava*, *truṭi*, etc. In the sacred *Mṛgendra* it has been said: "*Kāla* is the meaning of the word like *truṭi* etc., and is born from *māyā*. It incites the individual soul that is bound according to his past actions, till he is released." But,. according to the logicians, "Time is one, eternal and it is the basis for everything; it is the originator of all actions." It is not acceptable (for us). If it be the case, then there will be the contingence of non-establishment for it. It is tenable that the time can effectuate actions, only if it has manifold adjuncts, because products generated in a given point of time are not produced at other times.

II.4.10 *Niyati* is the *tattva*, which causes regulation in the form of dissociating a person, who wants to enjoy the results of merits accrued by others, from the latter's merits, and associating a person, who does not want to experience the results of demerits acquired by that person, with his own demerits. It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "When for the person who through the functioning of *kalā*, *vidyā*, etc. has set out on enjoyment, there is the contingence of the flinching of the fruit (by another) in respect of the fruit acquired (by himself). In order to stop that, there sets out this *Niyati*, in the Śaiva teaching. It also, forcibly links to enjoyment even those who do not desire it. Here it links them only to those (enjoyments) earned by others."

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "Whatever remains there besides *karma* which regulates the enjoyment of all *tattvas*, is also rooted in *karma*. If *karma* alone bestows results, then the physical bodies will become useless. Therefore, for endowing enjoyments on individuals, *karma* depends upon physical bodies. Hence, *karma* relying upon *Niyati* is the controller."

II.4.11 *Puṁs-tattva* is the cause of the enjoyment of *prakṛti* and it is produced by the group of five starting with *kalā*. Because *karma* and the five namely *kalā* etc. are equipped as the causes for other things, this *puṁs-tattva* is established by the effect of enjoyment, which is not effected by *karma* and the five namely *kalā* etc. There are others who opine that *Puṁs-tattva* is only the soul along with the five namely *kalā* etc. Its inclusion among *tattvas* according to them, is secondary. But it is not so, because when there is the possibility of its being primary, as declared before, secondariness (for it) should not be adhered to. *Prakṛti-tattva* is the primary material cause for things beginning with three *guṇas* and ending with earth, or it forms the material cause for different qualities arising from the three *guṇas*. The Śāṅkhyas speak of *prakṛti* as same as the *guṇas* in a state of equilibrium. Therefore, *prakṛti* is not the material cause of *guṇas*, as it is totally non-different from *guṇas*. Because *guṇas* are the primal cause, they alone are *prakṛti*. But this is not tenable because *guṇas* are products. Being non-intelligent and manifold, they cannot be the primal cause, It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra* "The view of the Sāṅkhya school is unreal, since an effect is considered as the cause."

In the sacred *Pauṣkara*, too, it is said: "*Sages*: *Guṇas* alone in a state of equipoise are said to be *prakṛti*. Then how can *prakṛti* be said to form the material cause? *Īśvara*: In the śaiva teaching, state of equipoise of the *guṇas* is not *prakṛti*. Since *guṇas*, Oh Sages! are non-intelligent and manifold, they are recognised to have a cause, and that is named *prakṛti*."

II.4.12 *Guṇa-tattva* has intellect as the material cause, or it is the equipoise of manifold *guṇas*. *Sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the *guṇas* which cause knowledge, activity and slothfulnees. Because these three *guṇas* collectively generate action, these are brought under a single *tattva*. Their existence can be proved since they are efficacious of pleasure, pain and delusion. It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: Hence *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the *guṇas* that have intellect as the material cause. Their modes like brightness etc. are very well-known. *Guṇas* are three (in number). But the *tattva* is one, conjointly of the three *guṇas*. Enumeration of them as one at a time is determined by the preponderence of the (particular) mode."

II.4.13 Intellect is the functionary of determination, or it is directly enjoyable. Things like sandal are indirectly enjoyable, since they are mainfested by the mode of intellect. It is not impossible for intellect to be directly enjoyable, since it is of the nature of happiness etc. and as attached towards objects.

It is said by the revered *Sadyojyotiṣpāda* thus: "Intellect in the form of objects and of the nature of happiness is directly enjoyable." There are eight *bhāvas* (modifications) like *dharma* (merit) etc. for it. These are denoted by the word '*bhāva*', since they manifest the intellect which is the locus for them (*bhāvas*). Or they establish intellect by inference. It is said: "They are called *bhāvas*, since they form the intellect." Of these, the four like dharma etc. belong to the quality of *sattva*; *rāga* belongs to the quality of *rajas*; and others belong to the quality of *tamas*.

It has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The qualities of intellect namely merit, knowledge, detachment and well-being are the *sāttvika bhāvas*. Reverse of these *bhāvas* excluding *rāga* are the *tāmasa-bhāvas*." Thus the four-fold conceptions of success, contentment, inability and delusion are also the attributes of intellect only. Of these, success is eightfold Contentment is of nine kinds. Inability is of twentyeight types and delusion is fivefold. Collectively *pratyayas* (conceptions) are fifty in number. It has been said by *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*: "Delusion is fivefold. Inability caused by defect of senses, is of twentyeight kinds. Contentment is of nine types and success is eightfold."

II.4.14 Of these, assumption etc. are called *siddhis*. It is said: "*Sidddis* (success) are of eight kinds namely, assumption, speech, learning, the three removers of miseries, attainment of friends and munificence". *Prakṛti* etc. are called *tuṣṭis* (contentment). It has been stated thus— "The four belonging to the physical body namely, *prakṛti*, condition, time and fortune, and the five externals arising out of withdrawal from objects, constitute the nine *tuṣṭis*." By 'Inability' is meant the absence of the eleven sense-organs, and *siddhis* and *tuṣṭis*. It is said: "The defect of the eleven sense-organs and of intellect; and the reverse of *tuṣṭis* and *siddhis* — which are seventeen in number — is said to be Inability." *Avidyā*, existence, passion, hatred and adherence to life are called reverses. This intellect is proved by the faculty of determination, which cannot be established by any other means.

II.4.15 *Ahaṅkāra* is the *tattva*, which is either caused by the intellect, or which causes the senses (to act). This is inferred by the determining factor in the form of 'I' and which cannot be proved by any other means. *Ahaṅkāra* is also inferred from zeal which is the cause for the activities of vital airs.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*:— "Then from intellect which is one of the manifested things, ego, which is an instrument for intelligence arose. Through its activity the five vital airs belonging to the body set to work." *Ahaṅkāra*, too, is threefold like *sāttvika* etc. *Sāttvika* and others (i.e., *rājasa* and *tāmasa*) are named in the following order as *taijasa*, *vaikārika* and *bhūtādi* (respectively). It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*:— "Hence for establishing other things, the lord dragged out from his energy the three branches, which have the predominance of *sattva* etc and which are called *taijasa*, *vaikṛta* and *bhūtādi* (Respectively)."

In the sacred *Pauṣkara* also it is said: "It is said to be of three kinds. First of these is *taijasa*; *vaikārika* is the second and *bhūtādi* is the next. That part which excels with the quality of *sattva* is called *taijasa*; with the quality of *rajas* (in predominance, it) is called *vaikṛta* and with the quality of *tamas* (in preponderance, it) is called *bhūtādi*."

II.4.16 *Manas* is either of the nature of decision and option or the cause of cognition of colour etc. in sequence. Or, mind is associated with the presence of eye etc. in sequence.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "Mind is the inducer of senses, swift-mover and the substrate of decision." Similarly, in the sacred *Pauṣkara*, it has been said: "The cognition which is present in men in the form of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa*, is not a product of individuation, nor of the intellect, because of the difference of (their) functions. That (cognition) is admitted to belong to the *manas* alone in this *Tantra* which is an ocean of release; When an object is cognised by the sense of sight, that which makes the object come into the sphere of the intellect is said to be the *manas*."

Because *vikalpa*, which is of the nature of doubts and *saṅkalpa* which is of the nature of determinate knowledge and which grasps the forms of adjective and noun are proved only by mind, it is pointed out that these are the proofs for mind. In the same manner, the sequence of knowledge is also a proof for the (existence of) mind.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgenda*: "In spite of the close proximity of the self, senses and their (respective) objects, all the senses do not function (without the mind). Hence from Inference it is understood that there is mind which effects activities. *Saṅkalpa* which is totally different from the modes enumerated in, other *tattvas*, relies upon the mind as its origin, since it only remains behind. Knowledge is arrived in the order of sequence because of the contact of mind and senses. If it (mind) does not function quickly, then knowledge will not be revealed simaltaneously." In this manner, knowledge too, which makes one pronounce a word (in relation to a particular individual) although some other individual belonging to the same generality (*jāti*) is seen there, which is outside the scope of the word that is pronounced, also proves the existence of mind.

It has been said: "Further, when after having experienced (used) the word 'cow' in respect of a particular individual possessing dewlap etc. the word 'cow' is pronounced when again there is seen something similar to that (former individual), the cause of that in the *Tantra* is said to be *manas*, the cause of *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa* cognition." In this manner, after establishing the substrate (mind), its non-pervasiveness can also be proved.

II.4.17 Organs are the *tattvas* arising from *ahaṅkāra* which does not possess the quality of *tamas*. They are of two kinds — organs of sense and organs of action. Of these, the organs of sense arise from *sāttvika* individuation, since they are of the nature of illumination. They are also of two kinds, internal and external. Mind is the internal. External organs are of five kinds such as ear etc. The organs of actions arise from *rājasa*-individuation, because they are of the nature of generating action.

They are also of five kinds like speech etc. *Tanmātra* is what is originated from *tāmasa ahaṅkāra*, because it is devoid of luminosity etc. It is also of five kinds as *śabdatānmātra*, etc.

It has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "From the *taijasa-ahaṅkāra* arise the *manas* and the organs of sense. The five organs of action arise from the *vaikṛta-ahaṅkāra* and the host of *tanmātras* arises from the *bhūtādi-ahaṅkāra*."

II.4.18 Of these, senses like ear etc. apprehend sound, touch, colour, taste and smell They are established as instruments for respective perceptual knowledges. Nor is it satisfied otherwise by the admission of orifice of the ear etc. which are considered to be the loci (of the sense of hearing etc.). The fact that senses are different from the loci of the senses is established by the following reasons. Because in some cases where, though the locus itself which is accepted as the sense-organ is present, the objects are not percieved. Also this is in conformity with the factor that senses are effective only by reaching the object. Because these senses have different functions, only when perceptual knpwledge arises, their difference (in function) is proved. Some are of the view that they are caused by the five elements since they apprehend respective qualities of objects It is untenable. Since the eye can perceive blue colour which is a quality of earth, this order of apprehending the respective qualities of the Elements is ruled out. Hence they arise only from *ahaṅkāra*.

It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*:— "The organs of sense are said to be five alone, viz., the sense of hearing, the sense of touch, the sense of sight, the sense of taste and the sense of smell, these are well-known, and they are established even on the ground of having perceptible objects. Hence no arguments are urged; they arise from *sāttvika* individuation. That the organs of action are different from their loci is proved from the fact that though in cases where the locus itself which is accepted as the sense-organ is present, actions like speech are not found."

In the sacred *Mṛgendra* it is said:— "Organs of action like speech etc. are different from their locus because though the locus of the (organ of action) is present, actions are not found."

II.4.19 *Tanmātras* are the source for the elements. *Tanmātra* of sound is the cause for Ether, and touch-*tanmātra* for Air. Thus, it is to be seen that colour-*tanmātra* etc. is the cause for Fire etc. It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Since the aggregate to Elements possesses qualities ascertainable by external sense-organs, in the perception of those like us, it is settled that they have causes. That which is their cause, Oh! sages, is the aggregate of *tanmātras*. Since sound, etc. have distinctions, they (the distinctions) must have an antecedent generality; and that generality too should be understood to be a *tanmatra*. The aggregate of *tanmātras* has one, two, three, four and five qualities. Hence it is that Elements are conjoined with qualities (each) in sequence (having more than what preceded it in the series)."

II.4.20 Elements are those which are capable of being apprehended by sense-organs. They begin from Ether and end with Earth. Ether is that which is devoid of touch and which has the gross sound as its adjunct. Air etc. are excluded by the term "devoid of touch". *Kuṇḍalini* is excluded by the term "gross". This Ether is proved because it has material cause as sound, which is different from the sound inherent in the earth etc. Air is the substratum of sound and touch only. Nor it can be said that it is impossible for sound to be the quality of wind, since sound is apprehended by ear. When the sound '*śaka-śaka*' in the wind for instance, is apprehended, there is no sublation, and hence there is no contradiction. This is also perceived by the sense of touch by the experience "I touch air" and also by the inference of perception, which is connected with direct touch. Its proof is also found from evidence like stillness and tremor. It has a lukewarm touch and it is *pākaja*. Fire is either the locus for hot touch,or that which is originated by the *tanmātra* of colour. Its colour is shining white. Water is either the substratum of cold touch, or that which is caused by the *tanmātra* of taste. Its colour is white only. Sweetness is its taste. Earth is caused by the *tanmātra* of smell. Here all colours like blue and yellow exist. Its taste are sweet and the like. Its touch is luke warm and it is *pākaja*. Giving space, blowing out, flaming, melting and solidity are respectively the modes of these elements.

II.4.21 It has been said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The five elements are Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth. They possess qualities beginning with sound and increasing one by one, they have functions like giving space etc. Blowing about, giving space, flaming, assembling and solidity are the modes of Air, Ether, Fire, Water and Earth respectively. Thus sound is in all the five elements. Touch is in the four (elements), luke-warm in Earth and Air, cold in Water and hot in Fire. Colour is in three (elements); shining-white in Fire, white in Water and multifarious colours like white in Earth. Taste is in two Elements; sweetness in Water and six tastes like sweetness etc. in Earth. Smell, fragrant and bad is in earth. Thus the wise people say."

In the sacred *Pauṣkara* also it is said: "And form these five *tanmātras* arise the gross elements in sequence, under the name of Ether, Air, Fire, Water and Earth. That on the existence of which there is the function of motion for human beings, as the cause of that (motion) Oh Sages! Ether is recognised, If that, which is called space did not exist, wherein would creature move? Creatures are not indeed seen to move in the middle of the earth; hence Ether is to be admitted as the cause of what is called space. Further, sounds high (and low), since they are qualities, require a possessor of (these) qualities; and the possessor of these qualities is said to be Ether; and this is super-sensible for human beinga; The origination of Air, etc. is related in sequence as Air, Fire, Water and Earth. Air arises from the *tanmātra* of touch and is of the nature of gatherer; it helps as the cause of such functions as going up; it exists in the bodies of all creatures in ten forms, under the names of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna* and so on. Fire arises from the *tanmātra* of colour and it is characterised by cooking. It exists, in three forms in the world, under the names *gārhapatya*, etc. *Śaivāgni* (the *Śaiva* fire) is different from these and exists within bodies; whatever is eaten by people in the world is digested by this (fire) alone. Therefore this fire is of greatest help to all creatures. Water arises from the *tanmātra* of taste; its function is holding (things) together; the things of this world are stable only because of water. Earth since it is by itself of the nature of dust, is firm only because of this (water). Earth arises from the *tanmātra* of odour; its function is to support. Air does not arise from ether, nor does Fire arise from Air; nor Water from Fire, nor the Earth from that (Water), for there is seen an excess of qualities (in each succeeding element). It stands to reason that the effects attach to them from the causes and do not arise (in the effects) of themselves. If the order of creation were (as alleged here), then

Ether should have five qualities. Therefore the five beginning with Ether originate from the five *tanmātras*."

II.4.22 These *tattvas* are twofold; gross and subtle. The gross *tattvas* are the cause for *bhuvana*. Subtle *tattvas* are found in every individual. The effects produced by these tattvas are three-fold; ordinary, extra- ordinary and both. Of these, *bhuvana* etc. are ordinary. Physical bodies like eight *purīs* are extra-ordinary.

It is said: "The group of *tattvas* starting from Earth and ending with *kalā*, found in every person, moves about by itself in all bodies of this *bhuvana* due to past actions." Elsewhere also it is said— "This *tattva*, which is a means for actions of individuals and which is found in each person starting from *māyā* and ending with Earth, is inferred from the differences in enjoyments." Gross bodies are of both the natures. These are called by the name *saṁsṛti* (transmigration).

II.4.23. By the term '*puṁ*' all *aṇus* (creatures) are denoted. It does not merely denote the *puruṣa-tattva* from which all *aṇus* have evolved Otherwise, the adjective "*bhuvana*", which is said to include *vijñāna* and *pralaya kalas*, even though they do not possess physical bodies, will be without any purpose. Therefore, the Lord creates *tanu* (bodies) *karaṇa* (instruments) and *bhuvana* (world) for the enjoyment of the individual souls. Neither He creates without any purpose, nor does He create for His sole benefit. Here (in the aphorism) by the plural word "*puṁsām*" (of men), their plurality is taught. By this, the view that the individual self is single in number is refuted. If it be the case (*i.e* if they are not plural) then there will be the incogngruity for the factor that simultaneously, when one enjoys pleasure, another experiences misery. Also there will not be any settled rule in respect of a thing which is experienced by a person, since only that person alone recollects it.

It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "When a person has got the desire to eat, another has got the desire to go. Hence it stands that consciousness is of different nature (since it pertains to different persons)."

II.4.24 As regards the doubt whether Lord Śiva makes a person enjoy a thing in conformity with his past actions or without any reference to past actions, it is explained in the following manner. He apportions a thing not in accordance with the past actions (of a man). Otherwise there will be conflict with (His) independence, which is proved by many *pramāṇas*. Also it is heard that even great sinners like Caṇḍa had attained meritorious worlds due to the will of 'Śiva'. Yet, to refute the contingence of partiality and cruelty for 'Śiva', it is said "in conformity with past actions". Conformity with past actions does not mean transgressing them. There is no diminution of independence in respect of *karmas* since they are helpful. If *karma* is resorted to assist, like the stick of a potter, then there is no deprivation of independence. Otherwise even according to your view, there will not be the dependence of one's will. With respect to Caṇḍa, Īśa and others, the killing of a brahmin and father can not be counted as great sins, since there is the restraint that regarding certain things, only certain people are eligible and in other places there is no restriction. *E.g.* the killing of his mother by Paraśurāma, the son of Jamadagni the second drinking of liquor for a (drunkard as an expiatory rite.

It is said in the *Suprabhedā*: A man should worship the one Lord Virūpākṣa (Śiva), even by cutting, piercing or killing of beings. He is not tainted with sins."

It is stated in the *Sūtasamhita*, third canto, about the importance of sacrifice. "Oh! men of good austerities! these *karmas* which are held as sins, become completely holy when performed as an adoration of the Lord. This is but true undoubtedly. As a big fire makes dry the wet fuel and burns it, even so, sin done for the sake of Lord becomes pure and produces knowledge". Or in order to refute the argument that out of compassion for all people only happiness should have been created, it is said "in accordance with one's *karma*." The idea is that even the bestowing of miseries on a person in conformity with merits and demerits performed by that person is quite befitting.

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Second Aphorism.

III

III.1 *Beginning of the brief Commentary on the Third Aphorism*

III.1.1 In the previous aphorism, it is stated that Lord Śiva causes transmigration for men (*puṁsām*). In this connection there arises a doubt as to who is that '*pumān*' for whom the "*samsṛti*" starting from Śiva and ending with earth takes place. The following two aphorisms elucidate how he becomes fit for experiencing the enjoyments which is going to take place at a different time and different place, starting from Śiva and ending with earth, and how he is non-different from Śiva — which fact will be stated (later) by means of refuting the following schools of thought such as those who regard *soul* as a non-entity and those who regard soul as identical with the body, the senses, the mind, the vital airs and momentary cognition. The subsequent two *sūtras* teach that a person who is different from the views mentioned above is of the nature of self-effulgent knowledge. Though endowed with all-pervasive cognative and conative energies, his energies being obscured by egoism, he becomes dependent and remains within the five states (*avasthās*).

THIRD APHORISM

As it experiences the state of "void" (in statements like "I do not know"), as it constantly (speaks of) "my body", as it knows of the happenings in the dream when the senses are inactive, as it has no experience in sound sleep, and as it becomes conscious when caused to know, there exists a self in the body.

III 1.2 "As it negates" — the knowledge that there is nothing. Because of the preponderance of the nature of "myself" — the nature of "myself" — this my body, the conception of the difference between the body and the self; the preponderence of that ("this my body") — execess, prominence and prevalence. Because of the knowledge during the cessation of senses — of the senses — of the external organs like eye etc., cessation is dream. Understanding even there — knowledge is experienced. "During sleep" — as there is no enjoyment; that which is enjoyed is enjoyment — intellect. During sound sleep, as there is the absence of enjoyment by the mind. Here the word 'sleep' indicates the fourth state and the state beyond that. The word 'enjoyment' is indicative of mind and vital airs. During waking state, as it becomes conscious — while awaking — after waking, it is conscious. The term '*asti*' (*is*) aims at excluding non-existence; it denotes constant existence at all time. The word '*tanu*' denotes the group of body, senses, mind, etc. Accordingly the self is that which remains as the controller of the aggregate of body, senses and mind which are governed. And the self is not of the nature of (one's own) body, senses and mind. Existence, exclusion of the non-existence and constancy, culminate in the proof the five. In this connection the five reasonings stated are related suitably. Or in the next *sūtra*, it is clearly proved that the self is different from the mind. The term '*api*' (in the next *sūtra*) denotes being different from mind associated with the senses. In the same manner, these two proofs in the next *sūtra* are also included here (in this *sūtra*). Thus, with regard to the term '*tanu*' here, only the body is meant. The two proofs are indicated by the word '*asti*'. Therefore, here also the meaning is as before. It is explained thus: Because non-existence is understood and because self is the one who understands it, self is not non-existent.

III.1.3 It is explained further, thus: Even for those who consider non-entity as the basic factor, unless it is indicated by somebody in the form, "your pot is non-existent," there will be the contingence of invalidity. Therefore, one who acknowledges it should be accepted. He is also not non-existent, as there is no proof for it. A person who understands then the things of the past by *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) cannot comprehend the non-existence of himself because there is conflict with action in one's self like, "Now I am not existent." Or, is there the knowledge of non-entity or not? If it is not there, then there will be the contingence of its invalidity. Therefore, it should be accepted that the knowledge of non-entity is there. The knowledge of non-entity cannot be non-existent because in that case, there will be the contingence of invalidity for non-entity. The knowledge should be accepted as existing, since non-existence is not proved by a non-existent entity. It (the knowledge which points out non-existence) only is acclaimed as the self '*ātmā*,' by us.

III.1.4 On the other hand *Cārvākas* state that only the body is the self. Their argument is as follows — what is the proof for the existence of the soul which is different from the body? It is not perception because the soul is not perceptible. The conception "my body" is intelligible like "my self". Nor is there inference because of the absence of probans. If self is postulated as the locus for consciousness, then it (the above inference) is satisfied otherwise by the acceptance of body.

III.1.5 The body etc. which activates, it may be argued, is induced into activity by another factor which controls it, because it (body) is inert *e.g.* a potter's stick. This is the proof.

It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara* thus: "The body etc. which are active are always controlled by intelligence, since of themselves they are devoid of activity, being inert, like pot, etc. He who causes the activity is said to be the soul." Here, "that which is controlled by another" is the probandum. "The intelligent" is the final intended factor. Otherwise there will be the contingence of non-establishment of the probandum. There will also be the contingence of illustration like pot which is controlled by body etc. becoming untenable. That is why, the probandum which is only the controller like "He who controls" is taken into account and its culmination is stated as the intelligent one, he who is the soul.

III.1.6. It is not so. Because the definition that "inertness is the state of being devoid of intelligence" is not agreeable to us There will also be the contingence of accepting the body as the self by defining inertness as the locus of the quality of intelligence inherent in itself. Though intelligence is said to be the quality. of the inert, it is not found in pot and other things. Since things are of various natures, and the elements are only modified in the form as body and others, it is but proper to say that consciousness is found there. Extra-ordinary powers are seen in gems and *mantras*, while they are not seen in other things. Otherwise like the existence of intelligence delimited by body etc, there will be the contingence of it even when delimited by pot etc. Therefore it is proper that body only is the locus for intelligence. This only proves the invalidity of inertness.

The following argument is found mentioned in the sacred *Pauṣkara*. "From a cause of a particular nature, a contrary effect does not arise. How can consciousness which is contrary (to the cause) arise from the inert body," stands refuted. There is not the contingence of consciousness (of body), during the state of death also. Hence in the sacred *Mṛgendra* it is said: "For which reason, even when the dead body is there, there is no conscioueness." This statement is quite reasonable. Even for you, also, there will be the contingence of the existence of consciousness from a dead body out of which the soul had gone. If it is said that due to the absence of vital airs which is cooperative. the conscioueness is not found in a dead body, then the argument is common for both of us.

III.1.7 Body is not the locus for conscioueness, it may be argued, because it is either enjoyable or mutable *e g.* a pot. Hence a thing other then the body is to be admitted as the locus of consciousness.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra* — 'If pot etc. are said to be sentient, they can never be so (sentient) because they are enjoyable and mutable. Pot etc. devoid of intelligence are seen enjoyable and mutable. This (the body) is also like this " It is not so, we say in reply—because here the state of being devoid of senses constitutes the *upādhi* (adjunct). Nor is it other than the *pakṣa* (subject) since hands etc. which are different from senses will be included, and hence the validity of the inference cannot be established. Therefore only the body is the soul and there is no other things. In order to refute this it is said in the aphorism "as the soul constently (speaks of) 'my body'. Body cannot be the soul because it speaks constantly of "my body".

III.1.8 In the following illustration, "I am the man", it may be argued that there is the conception of the self identified with the body. Then, how can the distinction (between self and body) be proved with a notion of difference, since there is no determining factor. Anticipating this objection, it is said in the aphorism, "constantly". Like the perception cited above, there are numerous illustrations in inference and in the *Āgamas* which prove the difference between the soul and the body, and hence there is the preponderance of that conception. In the same manner, because there is conflict with that powerful perception, there is no perception of non-difference. Even if there is such a reference to non-difference, it is only secondary.

Even if it is found, it should be known as delusion. It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Therefore usages like 'I am fat should be understood to be like the head of Rāhu." The illustration of "Rāhu's head" is only for pointing out its figurative nautre.

III.1.9 Moreover, the expression "as it negates" is repeated. By this, the inference, too, is made out. It is as follows. "As it negates" means, "since one can decide through the inference that body is not the locus for the quality of consciousness." The term 'no, therefore' (*neti*) remains in the intellect, which causes to utter that word. Therefore it is deemed to be established. The following is the inference in question. "Consciousness is not the special quality of the body because even when a conflicting quality does not arise, it (consciousness) is destroyed positively like the colour of a pot (co-present illustration) and negatively like the colour of the body (co-absent illustration)." Nor can it be said that the destruction of knowledge is not established, because during the state of death, though the body is still present, consciousness is not found in it. Because consciousness is an attribute helpful for the activities of the body, there is no non-establishment of the probans.

It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*. "Further, when one is the attribute of another, it is destroyed by the destruction of the latter (substrate). Or else, O twice born ones! because of the existence of an opposed quality, why then does the body still exist at death while consciousness is not admitted to exist in it? That in whose presence or absence the body is active or non-active, that is said to be consciousness. It is different from the body."

III.1.10 Or it is explained in this manner. A doubt arises regarding a person who has the same features with another person, who was seen before. By going near that person and after examining him, the contention that both are different persons is confirmed by the following statement. "He who was seen by me in Ujjain before, is not the same person, whom I see now here in Vārāṇasī." If the body is supposed to possess only the quality of consciousness, then because of its difference due to growth and decay, the difference of the present condition of the body from the previous condition cannot be determined. Difference or non-difference comprehended by a person cannot be determined by another. The affirmative expression "No, therefore" (*neti*) is indicative of remembrance which is the counter-correlate of things, causing the (knowledge of) difference between one thing and another and recognition, rising from remembrance. If body is considered to be the soul, then these two will not occur.

It has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Further, since there is difference of the body in infancy, youth and old age, how can there be remembrance of what was done in infancy? But one does recollect in the form, 'This is that girl, who was formerly enjoyed by me.' Therefore the contention that the body is the soul is perceptually refuted." Here the expression "perceptually refuted" is explained in this manner. If body is said to be the soul, then the untenability for the perception of the nature of percieving a thing which is either different or non-different from a thing already seen is refuted. It may be argued that the term "*adhyakṣanirākṛtaḥ*" has to be interpreted as "refuted by direct perception," because here the perception, which differentiates the soul abiding in the body is not referred to.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "Then (if body and soul are said to be same) remembrance will not occur. Nor can it be said that remembrance does not exist because it is clearly experienced. Therefore the person who remembers is the one different from the body."

Here in order to explain the fact that if the self is not accepted as different from body, then remembrance will not occur. The statement, "Then there will not be remembrance" is made in the verse (quoted above). Thus the contingence of acceptance derived from the above statement should not be anticipated. Since remembrance is universally well-known it is acknowledged by the expression: "Nor can it be said that remembrance does not exist." Nor is it intelligible to say that inference is no valid proof, because it has been proved in the First Aphorism itself.

III.1.11 The term "*akṣa*" (senses) has been used in the *sūtra* to refute the vīew that senses constitute the soul. Senses are not the soul since the cessation of senses is a matter of experience. In the dream, soul does exist in the form of self-consciousness and the locus of knowledge, for there are such statements as "I see an elephant." Nor can it be said that during the state of dream senses are present because the *Smṛtis* and the *Āgamas* teach their absence then (in dream). Or, while senses like eye cease to exist, their respective actions are absent because they are understood; *i e.* the self reflects upon the objects percieved by the senses. Since the recollection of the form "I, who saw the pot with my sense of sight, now in the state of blindness, touch that same (pot)" asserts that the knower is constantly present through the two stages, the fact that the knower is different from the senses is established. Or the expression means, "because the cessation of senses is known." It is not possible to know the destruction of oneself by one's own self. This is so because one does not exist during the destrucsion of one's own self,

III.1.12 The *sūtra* uses the word "*svāpa*" (sleep) to reject the view that either intellect or mind or vital airs constitute the soul. Intellect is not the soul because of the absence of "experience" in sleep. Intellect, mind and vital airs are not the soul. This is the final conclusion because they (intellect, mind and vital breath) are not found in sleep, in the fourth stage and the stage beyond *turīya* respectively. Here also, their absence then (in sleep etc,) is understood from the *Smṛtis* and the *Āgamas*. Or to reject the view that vital airs constitute the soul, it is said; "because there is no experience during sleep." Here the absence is of both enjoyment and knowledge. Sometimes by explaining their co-absence (in sleep) and co-presence (in dream and waking), it is said that they are incidental. If experience and knowledge are said to be the qualities of vital airs, then like touch, which is present in them they should remain as long as the substance remains. This is because of the condition that the particular quality of air should remain as long as the substance remains. Even with regard to the rejection of mind as the soul, the expression "*netitaḥ*" (since it negates) should be repeated and related. They are proved as instruments only, through the proof of the substrate. Therefore, the absence of cognisership is ascertained for the *karaṇas* (instruments). Since their purpose is fulfilled only by the action of the sequential generation of knowledge there is no proof for their cognisership.

It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Intellect and other instruments do not constitute the soul because they do not function in the same way as the soul. They are established on the ground that they are the causes for other actions. If they are said to be the cogniser, then you are trying to prove an impossible thing."

III.1.13 To refute the contention that the stream of cognition is the soul, the aphorism uses the word "*bodha*" (knowledge). Since a knower should exist so long as there is knowledge, it should be conceded that the soul exists constantly through all time. Soul does exist forever. Mere momentary cognition is not the soul, because after waking one thinks about the remainder of an action performed before waking. If a stream of cognition or momentary cognition is supposed to be the soul then because there is interruption during sleep in the former succession, there will be difference between the (former) succession and the (latter) succession, emerging after waking as it is a different succession. Because they are two different successions, there will not be recollection which is possible only when there is the unity of succession of cognitions. Even if it is admitted that there is no interruption of the former succession in sleep, there is total interruption of former succession, at least when the body is destroyed. Otherwise an infant will not remember such experiences as are helpful for its activities like drinking mother's milk etc. in the previous birth. This is also because of the difference in successions between an experiencer and the one who remembers. According to the Naiyāyikas the soul is inert but it is not acceptable to us, because the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* expound the soul as of the nature of consciousness. Nor is the soul non-doer as accepted by the Sāṅkhyas because the injunctions speak of him as the doer.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*: "The soul is not non-pervasive, nor momentary, nor unitary, nor inert by nature, nor non-agent. He is associated with the intelligence which is non-different from itself since on the destruction of the bonds, he is declared to attain *Śivatva* (the status of Śiva or Śiva-hood)."

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Third Aphorism.

IV

IV.I Beginning of the Brief Commentary on the Fourth Aphorism

IV.1.1 Mind and others are not said to be the soul because they are not constantly present throughout all the states. It may be argued that because there is no proof, soul is also not there in the five states. Anticipating this view, the constant presence of the soul throughout the five states is explained.

FOURTH APHORISM

The self although different from the mind is still assosted with it like a king with his ministers. His power of cognition and conation are obscured by *mala*. Therefore, he has five states (of consciousness).

IV.1.2 Here, because a single soul is constantly present throughout the five states namely waking, dream, sleep, the fourth state and the state beyond the fourth, it is understood to be different from the mind. By the following illustration "I-who was poor yesterday, am rich today" by means of the recognition of the same soul which is constantly present throughout all the states, the self's constant presence in the five states can be understood. The following is the anticipated cause: "since there is no experience during sleep." Because formerly, the reason for the existence of the soul during sleep had not been stated, the cause for the existence of it in other states should also be included (in the above cause), accordingly. The mention of five states, indicates the special body which exists even after death.

IV.1.3 It may be argued that the soul does not experience the five states. It is explained thus: "His unlimited power of cognition and conation during release is proved by the *Āgamas*. Neither that energy is generated only then, nor is it tenable to say that the energy of Īśvara is transferred to him. If so, then there will be the contingence of non-eternity for energy in the form of liberation. Also the contention of the origin of energy (at that time) will be refuted later (by us). Therefore, omniscience etc. should be accepted for the *aṇu* (individual soul). If in this manner, he being omniscient, independent and with all his desires fulfilled, how can he experience the five states, depending on some one else? Or how can he experience miseries only as stated before?" Anticipating these questions, the aphorism uses the expression, "power of cognition and conation being obscured by "*mala*." One whose own power of cognition and conation are obscured by *mala* is said to be so. Though the use of *bahuvrīhi* compound itself denotes that the power of cognition and conation belong to one's own self, the employment of the word '*sva*' (one's own) is to avert the *bahuvrīhi* of the instrumental case. Or the word '*sva*' serves to indicate that the self is capable of experiencing his own enjoyment which is none other than the ultimate bliss. The resolution (of the compound) is as follows: "One whose power of cognition and conation are obscured by "*mala*". Or the term '*sva*' teaches the difference of nature between the cognitive and conative energies. In spite of his being an *aṇu*, his powers of cognition and conation are obscured. Since his power is obscured, he has only limited knowledge. He is dependent on others and all his desires are not fulfilled. Therefore, his experience of the five states is quite intelligible.

IV.1.4 His experience in the five states, it may be argued, is totally impossible because he is similar to a stone, since his cognitive and conative energies are completely obscured. This is analogous to the plight of a person running out of fear from a scorpion falling at the mouth of a snake Anticipating this, the aphorism uses the word "associated with" (*anvita*) When the question of counter-correlate (of *anvita*) is asked, mind and others become related. That is to say, he is associated with mind etc. This may be explained as follows: By means of mind that has modified into the mode of the form of pot etc., the *mala* of the soul is destroyed little by little at certain times and he experiences such and such objects then. This is how the states of wakefulness etc. can be accounted for. Though the word '*aṇu*' is present in the verse, the mention of the word '*ātman*' again is to illucidate its pervasiveness through etymology. Because everywhere the effects of the soul are comprehended, it is to be taken as pervasive. By this, the view of Rāmānuja that the soul is atomic in size, and the contention of the Digambaras that the soul is of the size of the body are refuted. If the soul is atomic in size, then the experience of pleasure and pain throughout the whole body is untenable. If the soul is of the size of the body, then due to its being non-eternal, there will be the contingence of the deprivation of what is done, and the securing of what is not done by a particular soul. Since the word "*tanau*" is used in the aphorism, the existence of thc soul in the body only may be doubted and objected to. But this usage is explained on the ground that the function of the soul is seen only when it is present in the body.

IV.2 *A Different Explanation*

IV.2.1 Or, the fourth aphorism can be explained independently of the third aphorism. During the state of release, it may be argued, one hears about the omniscience and omnipotence of the soul. It is not proper to say that it (the power of cognition and conation) has originated during that time, because of the contingence of their becoming non-eternal. Therefore it has to be admitted that even during the stage of transmigration, knowledge is innate in him. If so, how can one account for the state of waking etc. in his case? Since the soul is always omniscient, the states of dream etc. which are of the nature of knowledge of objects in the modes of mind which form, during the absence of actions like taking etc., and the absence of knowledge of objects cognised through eyes etc. are not intelligible. Therefore, how are the five states to be understood in his case? Anticipating this it is said: 'the soul' (*ātman*). Thus, "The soul with its power of cognition and conation obscured by *mala*" constitutes one unitary sentence. The adjoining statement "Therefore, he remains in the five states" constitutes another sentence. "The word therefore (*ataḥ*) then means, because his cognitive and conative powers are obscured, he abides in the five states."

IV.2.2 This is the idea: Even though the cognitive and conative powers of the soul concerning all objects are innate, they are obscured by *mala* and have to be conceived as almost not existing at all. When eyes etc. come into contact with objects, through *kalā* etc. a portion of *mala* is drivan away and when hands etc. come into contact with actions like taking, then the knowledge of the objects and actions like taking (respectively) occur. This is (called) the waking state. When these are absent, the dream state is said to set in. The cause for waking state is given thus: "associated with" (*anvita*). Because mind etc. are in this context, the meaning is "he is associated with them (mind etc.)" Associated with mind and a few others, he attains the waking state. Being dissociated from some of them, he attains dream state.

Here the illustration is that of a minister and a king (*mantri-bhūpa*). The compound drops the middle word ("associated with"—*yukta*) in the following manner "a king associated with a minister." "Minister and king" (the words *associated with* are dropped). The interpretation like "minister and king" is not proper. The term 'minister' implies umbrella, *cāmara*, betel-bearer and other. Thus a king attains the state (of a king) by the presence of all parapharnalia like ministers and others and even when bereft of some of them he attains different states. Soul is also like this. To refute the apprehension that the soul is not existent without the mind, like a king without the minister, the difference (between the soul and the mind) mentioned in the third aphorism is again repeated: "different from mind also." The word '*api*' is in the sense of 'also'. The difference of this (soul) is seen from the expression "from mind." Because the term '*api*' (also) is joined with mind, the soul is understood to be different from sense-organs and vital airs also.

IV.2.3 The five states are waking, dream, sleep, *turīya* and the state beyond *turīya*, during which the soul is in the place of eye etc. So it is declared: "For all persons, when the soul remains in the position of eye, it is said to be in the waking state. When it is in neck, it is dream. When in the place of heart, it is sleep; when in navel, it is *turīya*; and when in the bladder, it is the state beyond *turīya*." Of these, waking state is the collection of the group of five *viz.* sense organs like ear etc., organs of action like mouth etc., the five modes of action like sound etc., functions like speech etc., five *upa prāṇas* like *nāga* etc., five vital airs like *prāṇa* etc. and the five like mind etc. Dream is the above (state) minus the group of ten senses (five organs of action and five organs of knowledge). *Suṣupti* (sleep) is the collection of *kṣetrajña* (self), *citta* (consciousness) and vital airs. *Turīya* is (the collection of) *kṣetrajña* (self) and the vital airs. The state where the *kṣetrajña* (self) alone abides is *turīyātīta*.

It has been said: "The waking state is characterised by the functions of ear, tongue, sound, speeh, *Nāga*, *Prāṇa*, mind and others. Dream constitutes twenty-five like sound etc. *Suṣupti* consists of *kṣertrajña* (self), *citta* (consciousness) and vital airs. In the *turīya*, *citta* is excluded. In the *turiyātīta* state, *kṣetrajña* is devoid of all things." By the term '*kṣetrajña*' the *tattva* (real nature) of soul is stated. What has been stated so far, is the collection of five states of lower level. Another set of five states like *Nirmalajāgrat* etc. are of higher level and they will be explained in the eighth aphorism.

Even ears etc. are reckoned *thus*: "Ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose are the sense-organs. Mouth, hand, foot, generative organ and anus are organs of action. Speech, taking, going, excretion and sensual pleasure are their modes. *Nāga*, *Kūrma*, *Kṛkara*, *Devadatta* and *Dhanañjaya*, *Prāṇa*, *Apāna*, *Samāna*, *Udāna* and *Vyāna* are the vital airs. Sound, touch, colour, taste and smell are their modes. Mind, egotism, intellect, and *citta* are *kṣetrajña*."

IV.2.4 What is the proof, it may be argued, for the existence of *mala*? The statement "I am ignorant" is not the proof, because it is concerned with the absence of knowledge. Nor is inference the proof, because of the absence of probans. The dependence of an individual self (*paśu*), it may be argued, is based on some other thing because it is not innate like the red colour of a pot. Thers is not the fallacy of unfoundedness of reason here, because "dependence" of the *paśu* is not found during the state of release.

It is said in the sacred *Mṛgendra*. "What is the basis for its (soul's) dependence during the state of bondage? If it is said to be natural, then the word "released" will not be applicable to the released souls."

In this manner, attachment to enjoyments which are impure, impermanent and connected with miseries, should be based on something because it is incidental *e.g.* a pot. Being the cause for the pursuit of such an enjoyment, and on the strength of the middle term present in the subject, *mala* becomes established. Nor is the inference satisfied other-wise by the acceptance of *rāga-tattva*. Since *rāga-tattva* does not generate desire in released persons who are faultless, it depends upon faults. Therefore faults are of the nature of *mala* and *mala* is proved (as the basis for involvement) without any conflict with *rāga-tattva*.

It has been said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Moreover, if there is no *mala*, then what is the cause for the attachment of souls to enjoyments? If adherence to enjoyments is seen even in people devoid of *mala*, then it should be found even among the released. It may be asked, "When *rāga* exists as the cause of (the experience of) attachment, what is the need for *mala*?' It is true. *Rāga* exists as the cause of that; but it can do nothing in the case of the pure. If, even in the pure it could exist for the sake of attachment, it should exist in the released too, since there is no distinction. But neither thc released nor Śiva is ever attached to enjoyments." Therefore, because of dependence on attachment to enjoyment, *mala* can be proved.

Let it not be so; because dependence is based on *karma*. *karma* is therefore accepted as the cause. Attachment to enjoyment can also be due to false knowledge, and therefore false knowledge is also accepted as its cause. The following inferential statement of co-absence found in the sacred *Pauṣkara* constitutes the proof (in the existence of *mala*). "The soul is enveloped by *mala*, for, being omniscient (by nature) he is yet parviscient. He would not be parviscient even, if like Śiva, he be not enveloped in *mala* here. Thus the soul is certainly enveloped in *mala*."

Here, the word, '*sarvajñatva*' is not without any purpose. Hence it cannot be said that only by the use of the term "*kiñcijñatva*" the inert and Īśvara are both excluded. Even if the word "*sarvajñatva*" does not avert inconsistency and is not included in the probans, '*kiñcijñatva*' is possible only by the origin of knowledge of certain things, caused by the knowledge of those particular things. The probans will not be effective with regard to the probandum "being obscured by *mala*." The purpose of the word '*sarvajñatva*' in the *hetu* is to avert the above apprehension. Hence the invariable concomitance of co-absence by excluding that (*malāvṛtatva*) is explained as follows: "He who is not a person of limited knowledge is such a person." But this argument is not tenable because the probandum "obscured by *mala*" is not established and hence the invariable concomitance of co-absence is impossible. Because limited knowledge can be accounted for by the obstruction of real knowledge by false knowledge and *karma*, the word '*malāvṛtatva*' (being obscured by *mala*) becomes purposeless. Even the *Āgamas* are not valid proof

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because words used in them like "*Tamas*, *Nīhāra* and *Añjana*" denote only things concerned with *karma* and false knowledge. Therefore, there is no proof for the existence of *mala.*

IV.2.5 But this is not so. The following is the inferential statement: "Soul is the one whose omniscience is obscured by something, because he possesses limited knowledge." The term '*mala*' is established by the strength of the middle term present in the subject. Therefore, there is no unfoundedness for the probandum. Nor is the inference satisfied otherwise by the admission of false knowledge etc. for, false knowledge does not reveal the real nature of a thing. For that it (false-knowledge) depends on covering, like the membrane for the eye. False knowledge is occasional and during its absence, every object should become manifested.

So it is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "Nor is this an erroneous cognition, since this too does not arise of itself. There does not arise the cognition of nacre-silver in the absence of the film (obscuring the ego). Further, is this erroneous cognition either adventitious or otherwise? If adventitious, it could never be the sublator of *citśakti*, and if non-adventitious, it could not be erroneous cognition at all."

Since the past actions have a beginning, it is improper to state them as obscuring the luminosity of the self, which is beginningless. Even if the past actions are said to be beginningless in succession, and thus they are the cause for enjoyment, it is untenable to accept them as obscuring the enjoyments of the nature of knowledge. Past actions, which lie in the intellect, which is the product of *māyā-tattva*, are absent in the *bhuvanas* existing before *māyā* Therefore past actions cannot obscure them. And since past actions are determined only as the cause for enjoyment by generating them, they are proved as the cause. If they are accepted as the cause for obscuration also, then there will be the contingence of the blending of the *tattvas*.

It is said in the sacred *Pauṣkara*: "O twice-born ones! the sublation of knowledge is not possible even through *karma*; for, it is something brought about by man and is settled to be instrumental (to his welfare unlike the obscuring impurity). Further, how can that which is the cause of enjoyment alone be the sublator of enjoyments? Since enjoyment is of the nature of knowledge, there is no obscuration of the latter by the former. *Karma* is of the nature of merit and demerit, and those two exist in the intellect. Since they do not pervade above that (intellect), how can they serve as bonds throughout? Further, they function in respect of activity for enjoyment; how could they function in respect of obscuration? For if a thing engaged in a certain activity, is said to be the cause of another, then the blending of *tattvas* is prevented by the difference in effects. Therefore, it is settled that in no way is *karma* the sublator of *citśakti.*" Therefore, inference is tenable since it has dependence as the probans. Nor is the inference satisfied otherwise with *karma* because it is not found in things before *māyā*, and it cannot be the cause for dependence. In this manner, there is no conflict in establishing *mala* as the cause for attachment to enjoyments. Since erroneous cognition, too, has been explained as relying upon a covering, it cannot be admitted as the cause.

IV.2.6 Its (*mala's*) relationship with the soul is not *samavāya* (inherence). If so, then there will be the contingence of identity. Nor is the relationship one of *āvāraka* (the obscurer) because that too is based on another relationship. Hence, by way of elimination, only *saṁyoga* is to be understood as the relationship. As *mala* has *saṁyoga*, it is a substance. As it is capable of obscuring the all-pervasive soul, it (*mala*) is also pervasive. Because there is prolixity in admitting *mala* as manifold, it is admitted as one. Thus it cannot be said that by the release of an individual, all are simultaneously released. When *mala's* energy in obscuring the effulgence of such and such a soul is destroyed, then there will be release for such and such a person. As a matter of fact, in the tenth aphorism it will be stated that due to the destruction of *saṁyoga* of the soul with *mala*, a person becomes released. The *saṁyoga* of *mala* and the soul is *anādi* (beginningless) because *karma* is not accepted as the cause for *mala*. Nor is it proper to say that their dissociation is impossible. Because there is no proof for it, and as concealment will not be intelligible without *saṁyoga*, *saṁyoga* is tenable. Nor can it be said that *mala* is not destroyed as it is beginningless. Though it is beginningless, when there are the necessary accessories for its destruction, its destruction becomes possible. The concealment of the *cit-prakāśa* by *mala* is only the obstruction of revealing the effects of the *cit*.

Therefore *mala* is established as one, eternal, with manifold energies and as the basis for enjoyment and dependence.

In the *Siddhānta-sārāvali* of Trilocana Śivācārya, it is said: "*Nīhāra* (*mala*) is beginningless, one, connate to humanity like verdigris in copper, possesses many *śaktis* each of which perish at the termination of its function, and while each obscures the cognition of one individual it is denotable, purifiable and cognisable. It is dependent on enjoyership; and the union of this with *karma* etc. is produced by the Lord's *rodhayitrī śakti* — (impeding energy)."

Or, because this self undergoes the five states by remaining in mind etc., being different from them, he is liable to birth with his energies of cognition and conation obscured by *mala*. The word '*ataḥ*' (therefore) in the prior explanation denotes the ablative sense, meaning "causal correlation." But here it means "the one which reminds" (*jñāpaka*).

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Fourth Aphorism.

V

V.1 *Beginning of the Brief Commentary on the Fifth Aphorism*

V.1.1 It has so far been established that among his five kinds of activity, namely creation, sustenance, destruction, concealment and grace, Śiva is the agent for creation, sustenance and destruction. Now it will be proved that He is the agent for concealment also.

FIFTH APHORISM

The sense-organs perceive their objects through (the will of the) self, and not by themselves. The (individual) self also perceives the objects (being induced to activity) by Śambhu. If Śiva is said to be mutable, it is not so. Like a magnet stimulating an iron-filing, Śambhu (remaining changeless) controls the individual self.

V.1.2 In this connection, at first, it is seen in the world, that an agent engaging stick etc. is a sentient being possessing body and sense-organs. In the same manner, Madhva and others, and a section of the Śaivasiddhāntins state that the agent controlling the *jīvas* (indivldual selves) should also have bodies and sense-organs. There, with an intention of stating that Śiva is the controller of *jīvas* though He is without body and senses, in accordance with the scriptures stating that He is bodiless, at first, the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) with regard to *aṇus*, who induces the body and senses, is refuted as inconsistent. For that purpose, by the statement "Senses percieve the objects through the self," the probans is refuted as not established. *Akṣas*, that is, the senses, only when directed by the individuals can percieve the objects Because they are inanimate, they by themselves do not cognise objects. Nor do these senses rely upon other senses for their activity because of infinite regress. In this manner, there is inconsistency in the invariable concomitance shown in the *prima facie* argument.

V.1.3 Here the term '*akṣa*' (sense-organ) indicates the gross body, too. Just as a soul induces the sense-organs to activity without relying upon other sense-organs, in the same manner Lord Śiva, too, who possesses manifold energies induces a person to activity without the need of sense-organs. That is why it is said — "he is also (induced), by Lord Śambhu." Though induced by Lord Śambhu, who is devoid of sense-organs, a person experiences all objects which are non-eternal, impure and of the nature of misery. Though he is sentient, he is similar to an insentient entity because of his energy of consciousness being obscured by *mala* like the eye-sight obscured by the cataract. Hence the following statement: "An individual advances towards objects being governed by somebody, because he is not independent like a blind man." That controller who is independent is Lord Śambhu only. If we accept dependence for Him too, there will be infinite regress. If it is proved that a person who possesses sense-organs, can induce activity, then there will be inconsistency with regard to the sense-organs. Nor is there no determining factor as to the contents in the world, that a person endowed with senses engages in the activities connected with a chisel, etc. and a person devoid of (other set of) senses engages in the activities of the senses. For the sake of parsimony, a person who controls is postulated as devoid of sense-organs, etc. Hence it is established that a person who controls can be devoid of sense-organs.

Nor may it be said that there is unfoundedness of the probens, namely, dependence, in the individual because, in the previous aphorism, the following experession "his conative and cognitive energies obstructed by *mala*" explains his non-independence. In order to establish the probans, here the agency for concealment is stated as a discontinuation of the context, though this should have been told in the preceding aphorism itself, while stating the agency for creation, sustenance and destruction. It may be argued thus: "Let there be no body for Śiva for inducing the individual selves to activities. In spite of it, like the activity favourable in moving a chisel in the upward motion noticed in Devadatta, for Śiva also a favourable function for inducing the individual selves to activities should be accepted. Without an activity helpful for the functioning of an object, indeed, nothing is seen to be the cause for its own functioning. In that case, there will be the contingence of mutability for Śiva." Anticipating this, it is said: "that mutable." The purpose of the word '*tat*' (that) is to state other sentence. Or, it is used in the sense of '*tarhi*' (if it is so). Though, in accordance with the '*nirvikāra*' (immutable) scriptures, Śiva is understood as the controller, it may be argued that He becomes mutable by not having a favourable action. Since in the world it is not seen like that, immutability taught by the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas* becomes impossible. But in some places, without functioning, just by proximity alone, the stimulation of a person to activity by another is also seen.

V.1.4 Because the scriptural passage speaking of immutability is possible through the above illustration, the aforesaid error will not occur. Hence it is said "like a magnet, the iron filings." Just as a magnet, a peculiar kind of stone, makes an iron-piece move by its mere proximity without itself functioning, so also Śiva leads an individual. The potential (*liṅ*) in "*nayet*" is used in the sense of possibility. Or, in the prior aphorism, *mala* is proved as the cause for dependence. Now only that dependence is explained by the word "*vidanti*" in the aphorism.

V.1.5 Dependence is the state of functioning under the control of another. Activities are of two kinds: those which relate to an external factor, and those to an internal factor. There the first (external) type is the scope of action seen in stick, etc. The second is seen in the range of the organs. There the activity of a stick etc. is preceded by the activities related to the sense-organs. For a person who has closed his eyes, there is not the activity relating to stick, etc. without the prior knowledge of stick. etc. Therefore. in order to prove the dependence of the activities of sense-organs on others, it is at first stated that "senses reveal." Although a person perceives the objects through the senses, the senses are not perceived by him. Even then the senses perceive and generate knowledge. Just as "fuel cooks" and "sword cuts", an instrument is figuratively used as the subject (doer). To the objection, "How do they originate knowledge," it is answered "being controlled by a person." Though the term '*nītāni*' is not heard, from the second line, the word '*nayet*' supplies '*nītāni*', by the force of expression. Senses employed and activated by men produce knowledge, not by themselves. Because they are inanimate, advance by themselves is impossible. Thus establishing the activities of the sense-organs, the dependence of the activity is explained as follows: "He is also, by Śambhu." Only being controlled by Śambhu, he leads (the senses).

V.1.6 It may be argued: It is but proper that the activities of sense-organs depend on a sentient being because sense-organs are inanimate, but the activities of an individual, too do not depend on a sentient being, as there is no proof for it and due to the contingence of infinite regress. It is not so. As for the dependence of a sentient, there is evidence, from the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas.* Also because of the following inference, "The activity of a man lying within the sphere of sense-organs is dependent on another, because it is the activity of a transmigratory person." In this manner, it may be argued that there will be mutability for Śiva also who effects activity in a sentient being. If during the time of activity, some attribute relying on it and favourable for activity is not originated, since there will be no difference from the state of having no activity, there will be the contingence of the activity not being produced. That substance in which an attribute which is produced is related through inherence (*samavāya*) is called "mutable." Nor is this contingence acceptable, because it contradicts the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas* which explain the absence of the activity of Śambhu. Keeping all this in mind it is said, "that, mutable." '*Tat*' (that) means '*tarhi*' (in that case). The meaning is as follows: "In case Śambhu is accepted as the one who effects activity in a sentient being."

V.1.7 Refutation of the aforesaid objection is as follows: "it is not so." Just as a magnet, though changeless, "leads," *i.e.*, stimulates an iron-filing by its mere proximity, in the same manner, Lord Śiva, though Himself changeless, stimulates activity by proximity only. The expression "like a magnet" is derived by the strength of the accusative case-ending (found in "like an iron filing"). Nor can it be said that proximity is impossible, on the ground that the nature of proximity is only the power of accomplishing an action. Nor is the illustration (of magnet) untenable, on the ground that there is mutability in the form of action in itself for a magnet. Because it is seen that although there is no movement in a magnet, it attracts a near-by iron-filing towards it. Or the sense-organs led, being associated with the objects, by an individual, do comprehend and not by themselves. Because they are insentient, sense-organs by themselves cannot associate with the objects. An individual, too, being associated with sense-organs by Śambhu perceives (the objects).

Of his own accord, he is not associated by the sense-organs because before the association, there is the absence of knowledge generated from senses which is favourable for activity, and hence he is like an insentient entity. Nor the senses get themselves associatad with an individual, because they are insentient. If Śambhu is admitted to be producing that relationship with senses, forever, then to avoid that contingency, one has to accept that He possesses a specific form for the time being alone. This will also result in His mutability. Anticipating this, it is said thus: "if mutable." This view is refuted thus: "like a magnet." Just as a magnet though changeless draws an iron-filing, in the same manner, Śambhu, though changeless, associates a person with senses by His mere proximity, which is of the nature of a special power in combination with instruments.

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Fifth Aphorism.

VI

VI.1 *Brief Commentary on the Sixth Aphorism*

VI.1.1 Formerly, the definition of Śiva through his own nature, valid proof for it and the *taṭastha* definition are stated by the first and second aphorisms. In order to experience the results of transmigration as stated before, and to attain the fruit of liberation in the form of manifestation of Śiva and non-difference with Śiva which will be stated later, the nature of *paśu* and its testimony are explained by the third and fourth aphorisms. From the context, by stating that the primal being causes the individual self with his power of cognition and conation obscured by *mala*, to undergo transmigration in accordance with his past deeds, the nature of *pāśa* (bondage) and its proof are propounded as an object deserving abandonment. Some of the concepts in conflict with them (already narrated) are refuted. Now, in connection with the following apprehension "what is the definition for the essential nature of Śiva and what are the essential and *taṭastha* definitions for *paśu* and *pāśa*," it is answered: "the great Īśvara is the one who is unintelligible for those who are bound" The following passages are from the *Acintyāgama* "Neither perception, nor inference, nor verbal testimony can reveal Śaṅkara," "which supreme bliss is knowledge" and "the highest light which can be known by Himself alone." In accordance with them, Śiva is known to be of the nature of supreme bliss, intelligence and self-luminosity and as one who is uncognisable by *paśu*, *pāśa* and the testimonies of knowledge. Because He is the final goal for the individual self and due to his relationship with the self, He is realised by self-knowledge. Therefore being of the form of self-manifest bliss constitutes the essential definition of Śiva. Continuous experience (enjoyment) of sentient and non-sentient things is the *taṭastha* definition for *paśu*. The definition of *paśu* through its own nature, is, to be different from both sentient and non-sentient things. The *taṭastha* definition for *pāśa* also is the nature of "being known". The definition of *pāśa* through its own nature is absolute inertness. *Pāśa* is totally different from *paśu* which is defined in two ways. Considering the definition of these, in this manner, the commentator explains the definitions of *paśu* and Śiva directly, and the definition of *pāśa* indirectly in the sixth and seventh aphorisms respectively.

SIXTH APHORISM

If He be unknowable, He becomes non-existent. If He is the object of knowledge, then He becomes inert. The Lord is neither. So the wise experience (the blissful) nature of Him.

VI.1.2 Regarding this the Naiyāyikas say as follows: "Śiva is not of the nature of knowledge; nor is He noncognisable by various valid proofs of knowledge. But He is contrary to these." By the following passage in the *Āgama*, "Śiva is known from the *Śaivāgama*." He is revealed by the *Nigama*, the *Āgama* and inference. By the following *smṛti*, "Intelligible only by the *Śruti*" and "Intelligible only by meditation," it is heard that Lord Śiva is directly knowable by the *Śrutis*. This view is refuted as follows: "If He is comprehensible, He becomes inert." If the nature of Lord Śambhu is directly comprehensible either by the mode of the mind (which is inert) born out of valid proofs, or by the power of intelligence manifested by it (mode), and if He (Śambhu) is revealed as different from *paśu*, then He becomes inert. By compatibility and juxtaposition, inertness is to be understood for Śambhu alone. This is so because objects — which are of that nature (comprehensible and knowable by valid proofs), and which are of the form of body, instruments (sense-organs), world and enjoyable things — are all definitely inert, because of the term "inert" and because they are enumerated along with world, etc. Even though there is no difference between the meaning of the word 'inert' (*jaḍa*) and its causal factors, *viz.*, the state of being revealed by mode (of intellect) or by power of intelligence manifested by a mode, the acquired factor is inertness which is either of the form of not illumining by itself or of the form of the insentient. Though for others (Naiyāyikas) procuring it is a contingence of acceptable, its acceptance is contradictory to many proofs like the text "revealed by one's self etc."

VI.1.3 It may be argued, that if Īśvara is said to be non-comprehensible by valid proofs or by mode, then what is the purpose of the passages in the *Nigamas*, the *Āgamas* and inference, relating to Īśvara? Nor are they useful in revealing the self-luminosity. Because that form is not something that is to be produced. Therefore, because they are useful only for producing the mode concerned with power of intelligence, the nature of Śiva should be accepted as being revealed by modes only. Because in the *Āgamas* it is stated that Śiva is knowable by inference, this will be contrary to the settled dogma, it may be contended. But the purpose of the *Āgamas* is fulfilled by producing mode, revealing the creatorship of the world etc.

Nor can it be said that, in this manner, the creatorship of the world etc. alone is the manifested nature of Śiva. Because for creatorship etc., which is revealed by the power of intelligence, it is proper, that even that *prakāśa* (manifestation) is revealed by the mode of intellect. Nor can it be said that the nature of Śiva is effected even in places outside the realm of inference. This is a contingence of the acceptable, because even on the basis of one's lack of knowledge of the Lord being the creator etc. of the world, the statement. "I do not know the creator" etc. can be accounted for. Or they (the passages in the *Āgamas* quoted) are useful in succession as a cause for driving away *mala* which impedes the self-knowledge revealed by them. Therefore only in the *Āgamas*, the term "knowable by them" is proper. Nor it is contrary to the settled dogma. Because by the following passage, "Neither perception, nor inference nor verbal testimony reveals the nature of Lord Śaṅkara," the direct comprehension by the *Śruti* etc. is denied, and the already stated comprehension in succession alone becomes the established principle. That is why there is no absence of testimonies. Hence the form of Lord Śiva is not comprehensible by modes of valid means.

VI.1.4 It may be argued further: Let it be so. This does not establish His self-luminosity, because there will be the contingence of self-luminosity for non-existent things also, as they are (also) unknowable by valid proofs. To avert this apprehension, the clause "while being the object of consciousness" is added. A non-existent thing is not an object of self-consciousness, and hence there is not the contingence of self-luminosity for it. Intending to state this, the Siddhāntin also adds two clauses to another confutation uttered by the followers of the old school of Prābhākaras. The clause, "by its existence, it is also the cause for its own perception," should be added. A non-existent thing is excluded from the scope because it cannot be the cause for its own perception. Here the clause "being the object of self-consciousness" is not added. Such a thing is unintelligible because there will be no difference between the object and its subject. Due to its equality (in the aspect of consciousness) with the consciousness of *jīva*, *Śiva-svarūpacaitanya* does not become the object of the consciousness of *jīva*. A light is not seen to be the object of another light. This view is refuted as follows: "If he is non-comprehensible, then he will become non-existent."

VI.1.5 If Lord Śiva, who is non-comprehensible by modes of proofs like "this" is also not the object of self-knowledge, then He will be unreal like the horn of a man because such an entity proves its non-existence only. By the following (already) stated clause, "Through its own existence, it becomes the cause for its perception," its difference from the non-existent entities is not proved. The (already) stated cause for its perception is impossible, as self-knowledge is not the object. Indeed always there is no perception of a pot, if it is not an object of perception. The unintelligibility of the nature of object will be refuted later by proving that both of them (consciousness of *jīva* and Śiva) are not the same.

VI.1 6 Here, like the explanation, "one who is born again (*prati bhavati*) is a *pratibhū*", the etymological derivation for "*Śambhu*", as *śam* (happy), *bhavati* (state of being) that is "*Śambhu*" (one whose nature is bliss) is also possible. By the term *Śambhu*, the blissful nature of Śiva is stated. Or, *Śambhu* is one from whom empirical happiness arises, like sparks from fire. Or He who is the '*bhū*' origin for happiness like fire for spark, is "*śambhu*". By this the immeasurably blissful nature of Śiva is also conveyed. His being the origin is because of His effecting the manifestation. The word "*sataḥ*" (of one who exists) should be added here with the term '*Śambhu*'. By this, the term will be included in the definition. The intended etymological derivation of this term '*Śambhu*' should definitely be kept in mind here. When the counter-positive of the term '*rūpa*' (nature) is expected to be fulfilled, then the word 'Śiva' which is continued from the previous aphorism is changed to the genitive case suffix The blissful nature of Śiva should be definitely propounded in order to establish the manifestation of Śiva which will be enumerated as the final goal, and to avert over-pervasiveness for knowledge of objects in the definition. Hence considering the stated blissful nature as being established, its being enjoyed by the released souls is conveyed by the expression, "wise people experience (*viduḥ*)." Therefore "this" (the nature of Śambhu) is different from the eternal *śambhu*. That is to say, while being different from inertness in the form of being comprehensible by modes of proofs, the nature (form) of Śiva is to be known. So it is said: "the form of Śambhu should be known to be different from that."

VI.1.7 If so, it may be asked as to by whom is that form (Śiva's form) to be known, so that there is self-luminosity as contended by you. Moreover, as there is the absence of happiness, which is to be enjoyed, its being the object of knowledge till the enjoyments should be accepted. Anticipating this doubt, and declaring that bliss, which is of the nature of Śiva, is the final goal of human endeavour, and that liberated souls alone experience it, the expression "the wise experience," is used in the aphorism. "*Budhas*" are the wise whose *malas* are driven away by real knowledge and who have perfect insight due to the grace of Śiva. "*viduḥ*" means "enjoy." Though the root "*vid*" means generally to 'know', here its sense is that of experiencing something which is in common with the pleasant, as well as the unpleasant.

VI.1.8 Here the proofs for the blissful nature and self-illumining knowledge of Śiva and the enjoyment of that by the released, may be stated as follows: In the *Acintyāgama* it is said thus: "The great Lord is supremely luminous, the one who is known by (self-knowledge) himself. He is of the form of knowledge. This alone is the bliss of Brahman. From this is born the movable and immovable. From happiness the world of movable and immovable entities is born. It attains happiness from that blissful nature of Śiva. Release is that which lays within bliss. But some say, it is bliss alone"

In the *Sarvajñānottara*, it is stated thus: "The attributeless is inconceivable and hence such a thing is devoid of cause and illustration. That bliss is to be known as the highest, eternal and matchless." In the *Jñānatilaka* it is declared: "The pleasing happiness and gratifying *sambhogas* in this world are momentary and vain. Wise people do not indulge in them. Only in liberation, there is consistent and eternal bliss."

But in the *Ratnatraya* it is said: "It is taught by *Vedānta* and the other *Kulāmnāyas*. Those who are deprived of happiness say that *cit* constitutes bliss. The huge depth of the great ocean of consciousness can be known only by wise, only if they are not thrown out, while plunging into the current of bliss." Thus from the context, with mockery, Śiva is said to be of the nature of knowledge alone and not of blitsful nature. If this is contrary to the basic *Āgamas*, this should not be accepted at all.

VI.1.9 Though the term '*ānanda*' in the *Āgama* is explained as denoting '*pūrṇa*' (completness) according to etymological derivation, such an interpretation is baseless. Since the term "*ānanda*" is popularly known as happiness, there is no proof for its meaning as "*pūrṇa*" (complete); also in some places the term '*sukha*' (happiness) is used. Moreover, if the term '*ānanda*' is taken to mean 'totality', then stating its difference from the worldly happiness will be improper. That is why while explaining the following statement in the *Pūjāstava*, "knowledge of the nature of bliss," it is stated thus: "By this, the view of those who consider *mokṣa* as the absence of happiness and misery, is rejected."

VI.1.10 Nor can it be argued as to how the happiness of some one (Śiva) is enjoyed by another (*jīva*) because such a factor is unknown, and also because both of them are the same. Regarding factors known by the *Āgamas*, there is no room for logic. Since he (*jīva*) is only the enjoyer of that, his being alike to the eternal effulgence of Śiva in the form of consciousness to Śiva is not accepted. Thus here also, the word "comprehensible," should be associated (with *jīva*). As for the counter-correlate, (*pratiyogin*), the state of experiencing the entire inert universe becomes the counter-correlate of *paśu*. Hence from the context, total inertness is understood. In this manner, the nature of experiencing total sentient and non-sentient things constitutes the *taṭastha* definition for *paśu*. The *svarūpa* definition is different from these two: This is like the light of the eye which is different from the two, namely, brightness of the sun and darkness, but which grasps both of them. The *svarūpa* definition of *pati* is "the nature of eternal consciousness and supreme bliss," and being known by one's own self and not known separately and not known by different valid proofs.

By the argument: "If comprehensible, he will become inert," for the remaining *pāśa*, knowableness as the *tāṭastha* definition and total inertness as *svarūpa* definition are also derived. Hence, in this manner, the natures of *Pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*, are comparable to the brightness of the sun, pot etc. and eye. It is also established that categories are threefold namely those with total consciousness, those which are inert and those which are different from both of these.

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Sixth Aphorism.

VII

VII.1 *Beginning of the Commentary on the Seventh Aphorism*

Establishing the existence of *paśu*, who is different from *Pati* and *pāśa* through the inference of elimination.

VII.1.1 Formerly categories were established as threefold. In this connection, the Śaivite non-dualist states thus: Categories are totally either of the nature of intelligence or non intelligence, because there is the absence of *paśu* who is different from *Pati*, who is of the nature of absolute bliss and intelligence. Because he (*paśu*) is of that form (of Śiva), *paśu* is not different from Śiva as his enjoyer as mentioned before. Because in the Śruti, *paśu* is said to be totally non-dual from *Pati*, it is impossible for him to be the enjoyer. Anticipating this, it has been already stated that *jīva* is the enjoyer in accordance with the *Āgamas*. Here in the seventh aphorism, it is also taught by the inference of elimination.

SEVENTH APHORISM

In the presence of the *cit* (intelligence) there will not be *acit* (non-intelligence). But both of them, cannot mutually know and experience each other. He who knows (and also experiences) the world and Śiva is the individual self. He is different from both of them.

VII.1.2 In this connection, the inference is stated as follows: "The blissful nature of Śiva is to be enjoyed by somebody, because it is the ultimate goal of man. That which is not known is not the supreme goal of a man. Hence that which is not known is not the final goal of a man." There is no non-establishment of the probans. The manifestation of the blissful nature of Śiva is stated as the absolute goal of man, then and there, in the *Āgamas*. Therefore, His (Śiva's) nature is fit to be enjoyed by the *jīvātmā* (individual self) because it is a substance which is incomprehensible by an inert thing (other than a sentient being). Also because while being non-enjoyable by an inert thing (other than a sentient being), it is fit to be enjoyed (*e.g.*) the universe. In the aphorism it is stated as follows: "He who knows the universe and Śiva, is the individual self." Here the expression, ' He who knows Śiva", points out the probandum of a general inference. The following expression "He who is the individual self" points out the probandum of the inference of elimination. As the probans is clear, it is not expressed. Here the employment of the word '*prapañca*' (universe) is to point out the probandum in the illustration. Just as the individual self enjoys the universe, it also enjoys Śiva. Or, it is for stating the definition of the individual self, who is of the nature of enjoyer of both Śiva and *prapañca*. Here also the root "*vid*" is extended, so as to mean "to enjoy", as mentioned earlier.

VII.1.3 Not being enjoyed by another (inert thing), it may be argued, is not established in the case of Śiva. Let the universe be the enjoyer of Śiva. Then, the adjectival clause in the probans becomes unestablished. Moreover, even in the universe, there is the defect of proof, because it is possible only for Śiva to enjoy it. Anticipating this, by means of bold-assertion and following other systems, it is stated that there is absolutely no co-presence for universe and Śiva as for consciousness and inertia and as between light and darkness. Such being the case, where is the possibility of both enjoying each other, by which the stated defect will take place? So the following statement is made — "In the presence of consciousness, there is no *acit*." In the presence of Śiva of the nature of consciousness, the inert universe of the nature of darkness does not exist at all. Indeed in the presence of the light of the sun, darkness does not exist. It is for this reason that some are of the view that Brahman is that which exists beyond the mutable world and even beyond the heaven, which is the third world. Therefore, there is not at all the possibility for both of them to enjoy each other. Then, it may be argued, is it the settled dogma? If this be the case, (then) for Śiva the state of being the material cause for the world and the state of pervasion will be contradictory. This has been already stated. Therefore, the co-presence of both, should be accepted by you. It is with this intention that the question is asked "*kintu*". Here, the term '*kintu*' (but) is employed in the sense of questioning by connecting a contradictory fact, stated formerly. The term '*kintu*' is commented in this manner, in many places such as in the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* by the author of the *Tattvadīpikā* conveying the sense of interrogation and connecting a contrary fact stated earlier.

VII.1.4 Here the final dogma is as follows: "Let it be so. But even then, there is no mutual enjoyership. Therefore, it is said, "Both mutually do not know each other." Here also the root '*vid*', as in the former case is extended to mean "enjoying." The inert universe does not know the nature of Śiva because it is inert. Neither Śiva who is of the nature of consciousness enjoys the universe because all his desires are fulfilled and hence there is no possibility of experiencing the enjoyments, constituted by pleasant and unpleasant things. Therefore, the above mentioned defect will not occur. Or, the expression "In the presence of *cit*, there is no *acit*" means that in the presence of Śiva of the nature of consciousness, who is the eternal knower of all things, without any doubt and error, the universe which is *acit*, projected by Him, who is the creator of illusion, does not exist. That is to say the universe is equal to *asat* (a non-existent entity). It does not delude its own product (effect). Indeed as an elephant, projected by a magician, who is a conjurer, deludes the assembly; the same elephant does not delude the magician. Therefore, Śiva of the nature of intelligence, who is like the magician, who creates illusion, does not experience happiness and sorrow, accrued from the universe, or He is not like the assembly who thinks it to be real, without knowing that it is only an illusion. In the second way of commenting the root "*vid*" means "definite knowledge."

VII.1.5 It has been stated many times, it may be argued, that there is untenability for the nature of its content because both of them are similar or one. Therefore, it is stated "different from them." Though the individual self is of the nature of luminosity and he is the enjoyer, as established by valid proofs of knowledge, it is postulated that it is different, when compared to the luminosity of Śiva. By this, there is no contingence of total inertness for him because he is difierent from the inert universe as an enjoyer of it. Just as the brilliance of the eye is different from the light of the sun and the pot, and yet the eye comprehends both of them. Similarly he is different from both of them, and yet knows and experiences both of them. That is why, in the *Āgamas*, in many places, the individual self and Lord Śiva are explained as being similar to the brilliance of the eye and sun respectively. Nor, in this manner, there is contradiction with the *Śrutis* and the *Āgamas* which expound "*ananyatva*" (identity) with Śiva. Because of this difference (*bheda*), there is no contradiction with identity, which will be taught later. Therefore, the threefold definitions for *paśu*, *Pati*, and *pāśa* are well-established.

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Seventh Aphorism.

VIII

VIII.1 *Beginning of the Brief Commentary on the Eighth Aphorism*

VIII.1.1 In this manner, the proof and two-fold definitions (namely *svarūpa* and *taṭastha*) for *Pati* (Śiva), *paśu* and *pāśa* are expounded as to the questions of their proof, nature, definition, inference, means and results. Some useful logical inductions were also stated. Now, what is the means for attaining Śiva of that nature (as already stated)? Anticipating this, the nature of release is generally described and the pure path is also explained. The direct means for attaining that (release) is knowledge alone, which is of the nature of identity with Śiva. This knowledge, which is arrived at through actions like *dīkṣā* etc., drives away *asambhāvana* (incomprehensibleness) due to the expositions of the preceptor while explaining the convictions of the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas* with reasons and illustrations suitable for the respective eligible persons. Though actions like *dikṣā* pertaining to the *Āgamas*, and *garbhādhāna* and pilgrimage to Vārāṇasī taught in the *Vedas* are stated as a means for attaining release, in the eighth aphorism, it is taught that they are means to release only through knowledge, after examining (i) the nature of results accruing from them, and (ii) various passages which negate their state of being the direct means for release.

EIGHTH APHORISM

A perfected self being taught by the preceptor thus — "Being brought up in the company with the savage senses, you are not aware (of your true nature)." He then leaves these and attains that abode, being non-different.

VIII.1.2 Here, "the one who is taught, attains that position" is the meaning. Here, by the word '*bodhita*' (one who is taught) by the meaning of the participle (*kta*), he is known as the subject of the meaning of the primary root, because he is connected as the object of the function effected by the causal form. The subject of the primary root becomes object in the causal form of the root. Therefore, the meaning "being taught" is derived. Without him, the understanding of the object will not be finalised. Also according to the Naiyāyika that without which the understanding is not filled up, is also understood as part of the term. He "attains that position". Although, the nature of Śiva is eternally established and identified with the individual self, and is eternally of the state of attainment, even then because of the testimonies, the blissful nature of Śiva, appears, as if it has not been obtained formerly, and as though it is obtained afresh after being released from ignorance. This is due to the rise of awareness like a necklace (lying) in the neck, which fact has been forgotten and then "found." Here also it is stated thus — "thus attains." Therefore the expression "the knower attains that position," is generally explained. Knowledge is said to be the cause of attaining the nature of Śiva for the following reasons; because of the axiom that where an already existing object which is forgotten and obtained later is regarded as acquired newly; because teaching (*bodhana*) is said to be the means for liberation; because a knower is said to attain that position; also because it is in tune with the maxim which relates the means with the end; also because the one who is mentioned as the subject of knowledge is taught to be as the one who attains liberation.

VIII.1.3 In conformity with the following axiom "all sentences are with accurate determination," knowledge alone is said to be the cause for it. Thus restriction to it (knowledge) only is understood. Quoting the following passages — "only *dīkṣā* releases (a person) and leads him to the abode of Śiva" (from the *Āgama*); "without knowledge, all creatures are released in this Prayāga" (from the *Smṛti*) some state that actions like *dīkṣā* as told in the *Āgama* and a dip at Prayāga and pilgrimage undertaken to Vārāṇasī as told in the *Veda* — alone are the means to release. Some people state that though knowledge is explained as the means of liberation it is only subordinate to actions. There are others who state that because both action and knowledge are said to be means to it and because there is no determining factor, both knowledge and actions have either equal importance or knowledge is subordinate to actions or actions are subordinate to knowledge and (hence, any way) both knowledge and action are means to it. There are still others who state by performing only obligatory and occasional rites and by avoiding optional and prohibitory actions the future merits and demerits will not arise. There is the absence of valid proof for the *sañcita* actions. Even if *sañcita* is there, it is annihilated either by residing in holy places like Kāśī, or by performing purificatory actions, or by subjecting the body to a special kind of treatment through the practice of *yoga. Prārabhda* actions are annihilated by experiencing them alone. In this way, when all actions are annihilated, one gets release. Also there are others who view as follows: "Neither action, nor knowledge is the means." All these schools of thought are refuted by setting forth the accurate determination for knowledge only.

VIII.1.4 This is the idea: Without rending asunder the *mala*, that form cannot be attained. Without knowledge, which is of the form of brightness, it is impossible to split it (*mala*) which is of the form of darkness. Indeed, without light, the external darkness is not dispersed even by hundreds of scriptures. Therefore, considering the nature of results (of actions) and the corroborative statements with respect to the Vedic *homas*, *dīkṣā* and Tāntric actions, the *Jñānatilaka* states as follows: "That position which is peaceful and without decay does not depend on any substratum and it is not for them (performers of actions)." Since it is explained that all actions are not entries to release, and since they are denied the status of means to release, they cannot be the direct means to release. Those passages which speak of them as means to release, in view of the sublating passage quoted above, must be understood as forming the means only through knowledge. This is so because actions remove impediments in the path of knowledge.

VIII.1.5 As for the statement that "both action and knowledge are not means for release," it is sublated by proofs which mention knowledge and action as the means. Moreover, release is not the annihilation of the *prārabdha* and *sañcita* actions alone as stated by the opponent, because the annihilation of actions by itself is not the goal of a man. But it (the goal) is only the manifestation of Śiva, preceded by eradicating *mala*, after examining the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas*. This manifestation of Śiva is not possible without knowledge. This had already been stated.

VIII.1.6 Moreover, though sin is removed by the performance of obligatory and occasional rites, as it is unavoidable to incur demerit again by the killing of germs and insects in the process of gathering chips of wood (*samit*) etc. for those rites, annihilation of all actions becomes an impossibility. It has been said in the *Jñānatilaka*: "Demerit arises (even) from the performance of righteous acts." Therefore, since all actions cannot be annihilated, how can there be release, as desired by you? The passages in the *Sarvajñānottara* is authority for all the factors stated above. That knowledge forms the cause for attaining release is stated therein, as follows: "He who becomes the most exalted and realises the true nature of the self, is released effortlessly, in whatever situation he may find himself." In denying action as the cause for release, the following passage forms the proof: "Neither gods nor scriptures, nor sacrifices accompanied by lavish gifts of fee do ever offer solace to the living beings immersed in the ocean of transmigration and seek refuge. Except for the knowledge of the self, no one can give them refuge."

VIII.1.7 In this manner, in texts like the *Jñānatilaka* it is clearly shown by means of reasoning that *dīkṣā* and others in particular cannot be the means to emancipation. There, in the same text there is found the teaching of those very things as a means to release but this is to be understood as meant for the sake of the dullards. The following passage from the *Devīkālottara* mentions them as the means through knowledge: "the performance of action, meant for generating knowledge is called *caryā*."

VIII.1.8 In this manner, knowledge is said to be the means for the attainment of reality. Regarding the form of knowledge, it is said that knowledge concerning the difference between Śiva and *paśu* as the controller and the controlled constitutes the means for release. It is not the knowledge of non-difference with Śiva. This is so because non-difierence which is contradictory to perception etc. is an impossibility, and the *Āgamas*, concerning it are merely secondary, say some people. Again there are others who state that, *upāsana* of the form of non-difference, in which an individual superimposes the nature of Śiva in himself is the means for release. But such a thing is not possible because by the following passage in the *Sarvajñānottara*, the view that the knowledge of difference is the means of liberation, is refuted. The passage in question is: "I am an individual self. Śiva, the supreme Self, is different. He who, out of delusion, thinks like this will not attain the nature of Śiva." Non-duality should always be recollected in the form "He who is Śiva is same as myself." Knowledge of the form of identity with Śiva as stated in this passage, is the means for release. There again only real knowledge constitutes the means for release but not *Upāsanā* of the form of superimposed identity, deliberately conceived by the intellect. The text, "I am Śiva, without doubt", teaches about the ultimate reality. Hence it is said, "taught to be non-different." That is, taught in the form of non-difference, and not in the form of difference and also not in the form of superimposed identity, conceived by the mind.

VIII.1.9 Taking into consideration the expectancy regarding the counter-correlative of the word '*ananyatva*' (being non-different) used in the aphorism, also on the basis of proximity, Lord Śiva, indicated by the word '*guru*' (preceptor) alone becomes relevant here. Here by the word *ananyatva*, the absolute identity of an individual self with Śiva, is not intended, as in the case of a mirror and the image of face reflected in it or in that of water and the reflected image of the sun. or in that of the ether delimited by a pot and the vast ether free from delimitation. Such a conception (of total identity) is contradictory to our basic view, and it has been rejected in several places in the *Āgamas*, with a view to distinguish between the states of bondage and liberation. Nor can a near-absolute-identity be postulated here as between gold and a diadem (made of it), or between a serpent and its coils or between a particular state and a substance remaining in that state. This is so because conditions of contraction and expansion cannot apply to them (Śiva and the individual). Nor can this absolute identity be treated as secondary, since there is between them absolute difference as in the case of Time and Space. Such a position is also contradictory to the declarations of the *Sarvajñānottara* which has the support of many logical inductions, explaining non-duality, by refuting first their difference. Therefore, the actual truth is that there is non-difference between them, which is characterised by a very subtle difference.

VIII.1.10 Here also, *ananyatva* is neither non-difference involving absolute difference, as in the case of clay and pot, nor superimposed non-difference while there is absolute difference as between a word and its meaning. As in the above cases, here one cannot remain without the other, because the scriptures teach "*ananyatva*" as eternal. But in the present context by the term "*ananyatva*" is intended either non-difference involving a minute difference, or non-difference qualified with a difference, or a kind of non-difference subsisting between a quality and its substance or between light and its substratum. Thus, in order to resolve the (apparent) contradictions between difference, non-difference and difference cum non-difference mentioned in the scriptures, Sage *Vyāsa* states thus: "But on account of both (difference and non-difference) being taught (by the *Śruti*), (the relation of the highest Brahman to the individual soul has to be viewed) like that of snake to its coils."

"Or like (the relation of) light and its substratum on account of both being luminous."

"Or the relation between the two (*jīva* and the Brahman) is as given before."

By means of the illustrations given in the three aphorisms, namely, snake and its coil, light and it substratum and an object and its image, the central illustration is not contrary even to a man of a general or broad outlook. Hence this view is preferable. This appears to be the intended idea of Lord Śiva.

VIII.1.11 Because it is unavoidable for an individual self to be free from inertness and mutability, it may be argued, non-difference with Śiva, who is of the nature of self-luminosity, intelligence and bliss, is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible to accept the *Āgamas* as conveying that point (non-difference). Anticipating this, it is stated in the *sūtra* that for that purpose, Śiva alone in the form of an instructor should be approached, by the word "*guruṇā*", meaning, "by the teacher." Although non-difference is understood by the sentence quoted already which teaches non-difference, yet it cannot be decisively determind due to the impossibility of comprehension. Without the teaching of the preceptor providing reasonings and illustrations it is not possible to determine the correct import (*i.e.*, nondifference). That is to say that by that passage (teaching non-difference), one cannot understand non-difference straight away, with all doubts of impossibility cleared. In other words, it means that firm comprehension (of the truth) bereft of all apprehension of improbability will dawn upon a person only through (the instruction of) a spiritual teacher. The exact method of instruction to be adopted by the teacher and which is the means of removing such ideas of improbability (of non-difference) is referred to in the aphorism by the words, "remaining with." "The inertness which is seen is not your nature. But it is the nature of the *pāśa*. It is seen in you also because you are (closely associated) with the sense-organs, like the redness of the *japā* flower seen (reflected) in a crystal. Your original form is only the pervasive consciousness which of course, is non-different from Śiva, and this (fact) is not understood by you because it is obscured by the inertness and other qualities which are superimposed by the proximity of adjuncts like sense-organs. This is similar to the clarity of the crystal being superimposed by the redness of the hibiscus. Therefore non-difference with Śiva is not impossible." The word '*iti*' is used in the sense of 'in this way' (*prakāra*). In this way, being instructed by the expositions of the preceptor which explain the intelligible factors of the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas*, and "after wards, leaving the sense-organs etc. you will attain that state (of Śivahood)." It is this teaching of the preceptor that is enjoined by the rules of the *adhyayana*. "Till that time, hearing etc. should be done." This particular text which enjoins hearing does not talk about it (the teaching of the preceptor). But it is not an error. Nor is the apprehension of non-utility for it (the teaching of the preceptor).

VIII.1.12 The term "*vyādha*' employed in the compound "*indriya-vyādhaiḥ*" implies and indicates a special episode, which asserts and confirms the possibility of all the factors enumerated above. It is as follows: A prince was left with the family of hunters due to some reason, like Karna, as soon as he was born. He was brought up by the hunters like their own son. Being given food and clothes he dwelled with them. Thinking himself to be a hunter, he was ignorant about the fact that he was a prince. Later when that particular condition (under which he was left with the hunter) was removed, his father came to the forest under the pretext of hunting and spoke to him as follows: "You are not a hunter, but my son; you are a prince. Due to a certain circumstance you were left with the group of hunters by me. Therefore, thinking yourself to be a hunter, you became ignorant about your real identity as a prince. So you tell these people about it and come to the kingdom, my place." Thus instructed by his father that prince went to his place, leaving the hunters behind. In the same manner an individual self, remaining with the sense-organs from the beginning of transmigration, considers himself to be of the nature of those sense-organs and does not realise his own nature of the form of nondifference with Śiva. Later, when the *mala* of the past actions gets ripened through the grace of Śiva in the form of a preceptor as stated earlier and when instructed by Him as being non-different from Him in the form "I am only yourself", he leaves the sense-organs, which are capable of captivating and attains that position (of non-difference with Śiva).

VIII.1.13 In this dense-forest of six roads (*i e.* worldly existence), the sense-organs entice and generate in the *jīvas*, a taste for objects of enjoyment like sound (and touch), by luring them away from their natural object of enjoyment, *viz.*, the bliss of the Supreme Lord, Śiva. This is like hunters enticing ferocious animals (like lions and tigers) and creating in them a taste for a different kind of food such as smaller animals (like goat and sheep). That is why here the senses are figuratively called "hunters." Here though objects which are intimately connected with the senseorgans in accomplishing enjoyments are present, their abandonment is prescribed. By this, the abandonment of other things is also implied from the context. This abandonment is not due to the absence of other things. To explain: Only when the sense-organs are present, sound etc., and the gross elements become purposeful. This takes us back to the subtle elements which form the cause in bringing about the gross elements, become purposeful. This goes back to egotism (*ahaṅkāra*) which is called '*bhūtādi*' which is helpful in originating them. At its back is *buddhi* (intellect) which through its capacity to form different modes of objects becomes helpful in making the sense-organs capable of grasping the objects. Behind this is mind which becomes useful in causing intellect. The three *guṇas* are useful in giving rise to different qualities. *Prakṛti* or primal nature is useful in endowing the individual with enjoyership. *Puruṣa* becomes relevant forming as the one indulging in enjoyments. At its back is *rāga* because it forms an object of enjoyment. Then time becomes relevant as the factor regulating that enjoyment. *Niyati* becomes purposeful in manifesting cognitive and connative energies. *Kalā* is significant in giving rise to happiness and misery. *Vidyā* then becomes relevant by deluding (men) through objects. *Kārya-māyā* becomes useful in stimulating this (*vidyā*) and responsible for the non-comprehension of things beginning from *vidyā-tattva* and ending with Śiva. (Finally) *māyā* becomes relevant in generating the *bhuvana* (world) etc., which are the means of enjoyment, for the *tattvas* starting from Śiva and ending with *vidyā*. It is quite evident from the context that once the sense-organs are eliminated (conquered) all other things also (automatically) become elimianted.

VIII.1.14 To explain: For the sense-organs which depend upon the gross body, unless the locus is eliminated, they cannot actually be eliminated. Therefore, elimination of the gross body is implied from the context itself. The abandonment of this constitutes the abandonment of the "sheath of *anna*". By abandoning the gross body, objects of enjoyment like sound, qualities and the gross elements are also understood to be given up. By this, elimination of the *tanmātras*, which are useful in causing them (the gross elements) is also a matter of course. This leads to the giving up of *ahaṅkāra* which is helpful for them (*tanmātras*). By this vital airs which function under the control of *ahaṅkāra* also become eliminated. This is what is called the elimination of the "sheath of vital airs" (*prāṇamayakośa*). By the elimination of sense-organs and their objects, mind which is responsible for grasping the objects through the control of sense-organs is also eliminated. This is what is known as the abandonment of the "sheath of mind" (*manomayakośa*).

VIII.1.15 Also by the elimination of mind, intellect, which comprehends things desired by the mind is also, abandoned. Through its abandonment, qualities which generate it is also given up. Giving up qualities, leads to the giving up of its cause, *prakṛti* (primal nature). By the abandonment of sense-organs etc., the *puruṣa-tattva* which effects enjoyer-ship, which in turn results in (the *jīva's*) transmigration is also abandoned in the sequel. Through the abandonment of objects of enjoyment *rāga*, which causes attachment in them is given up. *Kalā* which delimits this enjoyment and *niyati* too which controls that enjoyment are given up. By the elimination of intellect, *vidyā*, which is an instrument in comprehending it, becomes eliminated. When *vidyā* is eliminated, there is no duty to be performed. *Kalā*, which manifests cognitive and connative energies is also eliminated. By the abandonment of effects like *kalā*, *māyā*, their cause is also abandoned. Since things beginning from *vidyā* and ending with Śiva are induced by *kalā*, by the abandonment of *kalā*, they can also be abandoned. The giving up of *bindu* alone is called the giving up of the "sheath of *vijñāna*". The abandonment of *nāda* alone is termed the abandonment of the "sheath of Ānanda". In this way, it is to be seen that advice to give up the sense-organs actually results in, and implies the giving up of all other things.

VIII.1.16 In this manner, by the abandonment of gross body, *sakalāvastha* (the state of *sakala*) ceases to exist. Then, he (the *jīva*) stands enveloped only by ignorance, like an eye in the midst of darkness. This state is called *kevala*. Then, through the grace of the preceptor, knowledge of Śiva, like fire churned out of sticks becomes manifested in the manner to be described shortly. By that, the obscuring *mala* in the form of darkness also becomes extinguished. This state is proclaimed as the pure (*śuddha*) state. Thus, eliminating the adjunct by the elimination of the five causes such as *Brahmā*, etc., which induce that adjunct one experiences in oneself Śiva, who is of the nature of knowledge and bliss. Remaining in this state if one realises the self in himself as a consequence of the removal of the adjunct, then that state is known as *nirmalajāgrat*. But if one remembers his adjunct, and if one is not aware of the cessation of the adjunct and then realises the self, its real form then it is called *Nirmala-svapna*. If one does not know his own self as the cogniser but merely as an object of knowledge, like the eye which does not know the sun etc., and thus knows Śiva merely as an object of knowledge, then that state is called *nirmalasuṣupti*. When by abandoning both cognition and connation, only the Almighty Śiva is comprehended, then it is called *nirmalaturīya*. When one remains in the unitary, non-dual and absolute form of the supreme Śiva Himself characterised by Existence, knowledge and Bliss, then it is termed *nirmalaturīyātītam*. So it has been said: "When the soul knows its objects through the organs, external and internal, that is the waking state. Dream state is the knowledge relating to psychoses present in the internal organ (mind). 'Sleep' is that state which is higher than it and is marked by cognition which is devoid of the sense of body, organs and modes. The fourth state is beyond all expression and marked by the cognition of one's own consciousness when the body and the senses have become quiescent. Then the (state) beyond that is the dawn of the nature of 'Śiva'.

VIII.1.17 Thus remaining, at the exhaustion of the *prārabdha*-experience, he attains that position, in such a way that he is not different from that position itself. The above meaning should be understood by repeating the term "*ananya*" once again. These five states should be known as having the following places (of origin) — *viz*, heart, throat, palate, middle of eye-brows and the *brahmarandhra* respectively. Here, the corrobrative statement on liberation, which will be quoted later, is as follows: "becoming identical with Śiva." In the expression "*tatpadam*" "that position," which is in accordance with the above statement, the term '*tat*' (that) speaks of liberation, which is of the nature of Śiva, by referring to the preceptor who is contextual here. This indicates that the nature of Śiva (as belonging to a *jīva*) is manifested by the preceptor.

It has been said: "Then the learned man, who is always fearless, doubtless and desireless, becomes enthusiastic in acquiring knowledge. He becomes attentive and free from worry. Being pure and overwhelmed with compassion, he offers (fearlessness) refuge to all beings." This passage from the *Devīkālottara* enumerates the qualities of a qualified person. These qualified persons are of three kinds namely, *vijñānākalas*, *pralayākala* and *sakala*. *Vijñānākalas* are those who are, devoid of *karmas* and impure *māyā* but are united to *mala*. They are Ananteśvara and others, who reside in the pure *māyā-tattaa*. *Pralayākalas* are those who have the effects of *māyā* under their control, but are united with *mala* and *karmas*. They are the hundred Rudras and others who govern Dikpālas. *Sakalas* are also under the control of the effects of *māyā*, and are united with *mala* and *karmas*. They are Indra and others. Of these. as the inner controller without assuming a body, Śiva teaches the *vijñānakalas* directly who are the controllers of *māyā*. For persons of the middling type of eligibility, namely the *pralayākalas*, Śiva instructs them after assuming either a *śākta* form or a *baindava* form. Through manifestation in the form of preceptors, He teaches the *sakalas*. This is the difference (from others). So it has been said - "he is to be graced in three ways."

VIII.1.18 It may now be argued: If knowledge is the means for the attainment (of that state) then, since initiation and *saṁskāras* like the *garbhādhāna* do not have that knowledge as their result, although they are enjoined as the means there of, the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas* which speak of them will become invalid. Further, while there is the presence of the *sañcitakarma*, which have been proved by other *Śāstras* as impediments, how can that knowledge arise from the instructions of the preceptor? Anticipating this, it has been stated at the outset, "He removes the *sañcita* through initiation". In accordance with statements like this, since initation can destory all the *sañcita-karmas* which impede knowledge, it constitutes the means for the attainment of that (state of Śiva) through knowledge in this very birth. So, the aforesaid error will not accrue. So it is stated — "the fortunate one" (*dhanya*). Here one who after the fruition of *mala*, *karmasāmya* and *śaktinipāta* has burnt out all his *sañcitakarmas*, which impede knowledge, through the *Nirvāṇadīkṣā* by Śiva, is called the 'fortunate one'. Here the syntactical connection is that at first one becomes "fortunate" and then he will be taught later (by the Lord). And it is not that one is taught at first and that later he becomes fortunate and attains that position. If it be so, then it will be contrary to declarations that *karmas* like initiation form a means to knowledge.

VIII.1.19 The order (of events) is as follows: At first, one belonging to the first three castes, a *Śūdra* who has qualities like not drinking liquor etc., and an *anuloma*, who is a *savarṇa*, have *malapāka*, *karmrsāmya* and *śaktinipāta* in slow and slower proportions. Due to the grace of God or by the instruction of his father and others, he develops interests in knowing about bliss. He becomes detached by noticing the objects of the world to be defective. But with a view to attain that knowledge in full, he approaches a spiritual preceptor, who knows the meaning of *caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga* and *jñāna*, who is endowed with qualities like compassion etc., who is possessed of knowledge, high lineage and proper age, who is superior in caste and *āśrama* (compared to the disciple) and who has the nature of Śiva manifested in himself.

VIII.1.20 The preceptor, on his part, knows his eligibility through characteristics like *mandabhakti* and initiates him through the *samayadīkṣā* and the *viśeṣadīkṣās*, so as to make him eligible to study the scriptures (Āgamas) which teach about the highest good (*śreyas*), to know their meaning and to practise (what he has thus learnt). He, being thus initiated by the two *dīkṣās*, learns the *Āgamas* according to the procedure. Due to the grace of God, he attains a very powerful *śaktinipāta* etc. He then realises that for a specially qualified person who has been blessed by the *caryā* and *kriyā* methods, and for one who has developed detachment (from worldly objects), the knowledge of oneness with Śiva alone forms the means of liberation. This knowledge he acquires just in a very general manner. With the help of the reasoning mentioned above, and also himself considering that such a knowledge is probable, he becomes desirous later on to have a very firm conviction about it. Then he humbly approaches the same preceptor (who had initiated him earlier), or another qualified teacher with presents etc. That teacher too, considers him to be an eminently qualified person, and as one who, by his great devotion is endowed with great *mala pāka*, *karmasāmya* and powerful *śaktinipāta* etc. He then initiates him with *nirvāṇadīkṣā* for wiping out his *sañcita karmas* which impede real knowledge. Then, for removing his apprehensions of "*asambhāvana*" (improbability of the truth learnt) he instructs him logical propositions, such as "*sthitvā*" etc. (this eighth *sūtra*). His doubts of improbability driven away by the teacher's expositions, statements of the *Āgamas* and logical arguments, he understands his own non-difference from Śiva and ultimately attains that very position.

VIII.1.21 By this declaration that actions are helpful for release through knowledge, the following view of some is rejected: "Acts, either directly or indirectly do not form means to release, and since these declarations mention the results also with reference to each act individually, they do not speak of liberation as the ultimate result, there being no expectancy for it and that these declarations are merely corroborative or eulogistic passages (*arthavādas*)." This is so because the results of acts can be twofold and there is no deciding factor (in favour of one). Therefore, according to the axiom of *saṁyoga* and *pṛthaktva*, as in the case of the injunction involving "*dadhi*" where two sentences are made out, acts can be said to have two kinds of results also.

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Eighth Aphorsim.

IX

IX.1 *Beginning of the Brief Commentary on the Ninth Aphorism.*

IX.1.1 The determinate notion of non-difference with Śiva, which has to be accomplished by investigation in the form of the exposition of the preceptor, is said to be the means for attaining "that state" (of Śivahood), by means of the following passage. "Taught by the teacher, he attains that state." This determinate knowledge however, is not the direct means thereof. If that be the case, as bodiless beatitude (*videhakaivalya*) is attained immediately after the knowledge of verbal testimony, then, statements which speak about the sequence of reflection, meditation, direct realisation and liberation while-living etc., become contradictory. Extinction of *mala* in the form of ignorance is also impossible through mere verbal testimony without the attainment of direct realisation. Nor is such a phenomenon seen anywhere. Nevertheless, it constitutes the indirect means. This has been stated by the author, who mentions the other means also as follows.

NINTH APHORISM

A person of spiritual vision directly realises in his own self the Lord with the aid of the "eye of consciousness". After abandoning the mirage of obscurity and attaining the shade of the "feet" of Śiva the wise man should contemplate on the *mantra* consisting of five syllables.

IX.1.2 Here in accordance with the texts, "one should always think of non-differenee in the form "He who is Śiva, is my own self" and "one becomes liberated through meditation and knowledge," profound meditation in the feeling of non-difference, forms the means for relase. Therefore, it is said that it should be implemented, by the word "*sudhīḥ*". In this context it has to be known that *Sakalas* are of three kinds, namely, *Sāṁsiddhikas*, *Prākṛtas* and *Vainayikas*. Because the Sāṁsiddhikas remember their past births, they already have the real knowledge and hence they do not stand in need of any instruction. The Prākṛtas do not have any doubts of improbability (*asambhāvāna*) because of great maturity. Their '*asambhāvana*' is dispelled either merely by the preceptor's expositons or just by the vision of Śiva, or by Śiva's instructions in a dream. So reflection (*manana*) etc. is not necessary for them. Since the Vainayikas do not possess great maturity, for the removal of '*asambhāvana*', they will have to practise 'reflection' (*manana*) etc. It is only with respect to them that the words "*sudhīh*" etc. are addressed. In casese where profound meditation is not sufficient for direct realisation, being blocked by some special impediments, it has to be understood that such a person attains meritorious worlds through the path of light, etc.

IX.1.3 "*Sudhīḥ*" (wise man) is one who meditates continuously with concentration, being seated in a secluded place. "That he practises profound meditation" is the meaning. Meditation is indicative of reflection also. This also does not form the direct means, like verbal testimony because of the aforesaid reasons. On the strength of the following passage, "After seeing the formless, ultimate bliss, he enjoys the ultimate bliss himself," only direct realisation forms its direct means, since such a thing is quite possible and probable. Regarding profound meditation it is said as follows: "With the thought of non-duality, one sees oneself in all beings, as entering into all and as dwelling in all bodies. There is no doubt about this." From scriptural passages such as these, we understand that concentration of mind can produce direct realisation which consists in removing the defects in a man such as vascillation of the mind. This is understood through the principles of agreement and difference, even in our practical experience as when by concentration of the mind some persons are able to "see" garden which are far off and things subtle, and also "see" the deceased children, and so on. All this is implied in the expression "seeing the Lord Īśa in one's own self." Seeing, directly realising, the Lord in himself means, as himself. The direct realisation mentioned here does not result merely from the words of the *Āgamas* quoted so far, because their nature is to produce indirect knowledge only. It cannot be attained from both the *Āgamas* and mind together, because both of them produce mutually contradictory effects, they cannot produce a single effect, by mutual co-operation.

IX.1.4 Even in the case of the sentence "You are the tenth," the immediate knowledge of being the tenth is produced later only through the eye but not through the sentence. Otherwise even for inference, there will be the contingence of giving rise to perceptual knowledge. Even the (direct) realisation of the *sixth note* (*Ṣaḍja*), etc. of the musical symphony, takes place only through the ear assisted by the latent impression caused by the practice of the Science of Music. It is not even effected by the mind which is infused by profound meditation, as in the case of the direct visualisation of the deceased children etc. Because, if it is caused by *bhāvanā* (repeated thinking), it turns out to be invalid, like that (visualisation of the deceased). On the other hand, it is the direct realisation of one's own self. It is this idea which is implied by the expression, "through the eye of consciousness." It is no argument to say that because the realisation of one's own self is always present, a manifested self can remove the *mala*. It may further be argued that since realisation of one's self is same as the extinction of *mala*, there is the (error of) mutual dependence. But it is not so. The extinction of *mala* is possible by the direct realisation of oneself through self-knowledge assisted by the maturity of the impressions of hearing, meditation and profound meditation. Alternately self-realisation can be explained as, clarity which is contemporaneous with the extinction of *mala*. This self-realisation occurs by the grace of the preceptor. It may be asked how can such a vision of manifestation which does not exist prior to the extinction of *mala*, be a cause for it. This is quite possible because although it has no anterior existence, it still has the capacity to give rise to realisation, as in the case of a lamp which dispels darkness although it was not there before. As a matter of fact the lamp is not there prior to the removal of darkness. If that were so then darkness and lamp will have to be co-existent. Therefore, firm verbal knowledge, reflection and deep meditation and direct vision are said to be the means in the order of realisation (one leading to the other).

IX.1.5 The means having been stated in this manner, what remains left out is the result. Now by the present aphorism and the succeeding one it is taught that emancipation, which is the manifestation of the pervasive and unitary bliss of Śiva and extinction of *mala*, forms the result of knowledge. Even there, liberation while living is taught by the remainder of this aphorism, and liberation after giving up the body is stated in the following aphorism. Though by the sentence "he attains that state," the result in the form of attaining the nature of Śiva had already been stated in general, yet it may be apprehended that the desired result of a *Puruṣa* is not primarily the attainment of such a state because of the fact that he is always pervasive, he has always attained it and he is verily of that nature. The reply to this is that by the term "*prāpnoti*" (he attains), we do not intend the attainment of such a position in the primary sense. But it is only a secondary attainment (as it were), accomplished by the removal of the obscuring agent, as in the case of a person who (erroneously) thinks he/she has lost a necklace or gold, having totally forgotten it (that it is around his/her own neck). The expression "removing the obscuring agent," is thus explained by the commentator to convey the idea intended by him. Hence there is no repetition (of ideas) here.

IX.1.6 Here the term "*āvṛti*" means the *mala* causing obscurity. It alone is the mirage in the hot summer, since it causes miseries in the transmigratory existence. In many places, there is another reading, *viz*., "*vṛtti-marīcikām*" (mirage of modes). Even there, the term '*vṛtti*' (mode) establishes through secondary import, *mala* which is the cause for *saṁsāra*, which is the primary sense of the word *vṛtti*. Because it should be given up, being the cause of misery, its abandonment itself forms the human end. Also it is pointed out that it should be positively removed, as it is responsible for excessive misery. Like bliss and the absence of misery, removal of the cause of misery also, by itself forms the human end. In the world removal of serpents, thorn etc., and in the *Vedas*, annihilation of sins by atonements are, by themselves, understood as human end. This (*mala*) is to be certainly removed by the wise, since it shrouds the intense bliss and causes all undesirable thinge like hell, etc. Otherwise (if one does not remove the *mala*) one destroys oneself. (This is the idea of the passage under discussion).

IX.1.7 Here by the term '*tyaktvā*' (abandoning) is meant a special kind of giving up, but not destruction. As *mala* is unitary if it is destroyed, then by the liberation of a single person, all persons will become liberated. Also if it is not destroyed, there will not be the contingence of obscurity, since then even the obscuring power belonging to each individual will itself get destroyed. This is what some people say. But, as a matter of fact, it is not proper to say that *mala* does not obscure because what is destroyed is only its conjunction with such an individual, and also that the conjunction will not take place again.

As there is the absence of other acts which cause conjunction, and also because Śiva is by nature opposed to ignorance, and since the self which which has attained identity with Śiva, shrouding by *mala* is certainly impossible. Even in our world of experience, the exterior darkness is only removed but not destoyed by sunlight, etc. That is why, instead of saying "*hatvā*" (having destroyed) the word "*tyaktvā*" (giving up) is used so as to emphasise that it is removed but not eliminated. Here in '*dṛṣṭvā* and *tyaktvā*' the participle '*ktvā*' is used in the sense of the identity of the agent. It alone forms the primary sense without any inconsistency. In the following illustration, "Having opened the mouth, he sleeps" there is inconsistancy regarding the time of the first (*i e.*, opening the mouth). Because of this, it cannot be considered to be the primary sense. In the section on "*Bṛhaspatisava*", it had been established that when there are two actions done by the same doer, the first action is explained and indicated by the participle "*ktvā*". When two actions are said to have one and the same agent, it cannot take place without one action being secondary (*guṇa*) and the other, primary (*pradhāna*). This relationship of the primary and secondary may be understood merely as the relationship between what is helped (*upakārya*) and that which is helping it (*upakāraka*), or the one between the means and its end (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*). In this context, it has to be understood that as in the illlustration "after fighting, kingdom may be attained," the term "*darśana*" (implied by the word *dṛṣṭvā*), through the relation of the means and its end, becomes the means for removing the obscurity.

IX.1.8 Release is not merely the extinction of *mala*, which is the source of all miseries but, it is also the manifestation of the pervasive bliss of Śiva. This is in accordance with the following passage from the *Acintyāgama* and the *Jñānatilaka* respectively: "Release lays inside bliss; some say, it is bliss itself." "In release the bliss is inexhaustible, infinite and incessant." Keeping all this in mind it has been said: "attaining the shade of the abode of Śiva." Here by the etymology '*padyate*', that which is attained or reached, only Śiva becomes the abode. As the dense shade (of a tree) is for a person scorched by the hot sun, and as the removal of a cataract is for a person (afflicted by it) in perceiving objects, so for one afflicted by the heat of the transmigratory existence, the 'shade', (*chāyā*) (of *Śivapada*), like the 'shade' (*chāyā*) (of tree), confers mercifully upon a man supreme bliss in the form of attaining his own nature since he is dependent upon the function of Lord Śiva in the form of showing, 'mercy', so as to visualise the auspicious form of his own self. The expression "having attained that," is a restatement of the attainment of bliss of the self, of such a description which invariably results from the capacity of conferring the special bliss of the self mentioned in the preceding word. Here also, the expression "by the eye of consciousness" is to be construed with. This is the idea — Though *mala* is extinguished at the outset, merely by that, the consciousness of the individual self, is not capable of experiencing the bliss of Śiva. Though the cataract of the eye is removed, without proper medical aid like covering the eye for three days, a clear perception of external objects does not become possible. Similary, as by covering the eye for three days etc., here also, through the grace of Śiva, the eye of consciousness attains the nature of Śiva conferred by Himself. 'Attaining' (*labdhvā*) means, realising or experieneing. That the eye of consciousness depends on the grace of Śiva is mentioned in the *Mokṣa Kārikā* thus : "The individual self, after the removal of the cover, with its eye of consciousness rendered efficient, by the power of rays of the Sun in the form of Śiva, visualises Śiva with all His power."

IX.1.9 Or, by the term '*chāyā*' (shade), supreme bliss is meant. Therefore, it is established that the human end lies in the removal of *mala*, and also in the manifestion of bliss of Śiva. This alone is the meaning of the term '*prāptiḥ*' (attainment). Doubt arises regarding the nature of release, as to whether it comes after the death of the body of a person, since it is consequent upon knowledge alone, or if one remains embodied also for some time.

Some explain this as follows — In accordance with the statement, "The fire of knowledge reduces all *karmas* to ashes, O! Arjuna!", all *karmas* are destroyed by knowledge itself". Therefore there can be no enjoyment caused by them (*karmas*). Then, there is no evidence regarding the existence of a body which can procure them (*karmas*). Supreme bliss is manifested by knowledge which is free from concealment due to the removal of *mala*. This supreme bliss is opposed to the experience of pleasure and pain caused by the association with a physical body. Therefore, according to them, bodiless beatitude (*videha-kaivalya*) sets in immediately after knowledge. But such a thing is not possible. In accordance with the passage, "*Prārabdha* is destroyed by experiencing it and the remaining (*karmas*) by knowledge," *prārabhda* is known to be destroyed only by experiencing it, and it cannot be extinguished by knowledge. Only other acts (*karmas*) can be destroyed by knowledge. Therefore, in accordance with the restrictions of this passage, the general statement of the *Bhagavadgītā viz.*, "the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes" should be taken as referring to all actions other than *prārabdha*. In this way release involves embodiment till the *prārabdha* is exhausted. In the *Skānda*, in the second chapter, in the section on liberation, it is said "For one to whom release is manifested as of the form of his own pure self 'liberation-while-living, (*jīvan-mukti*) occurs till his *prārabdha* actions are exhausted." Thus in the *Tattvasāra* and in the *Bhagavadgītā*, statements about liberation-while-living are to be met with in greater details.

IX.1. 10 It may be objected that for a person, who has his *mala* extinguished, again the experience of pleasure and pain associated with human body becomes unintelligible. It is also contradictory to release. But it is not true. Although *māyā* and its effects are not powerful enough to overpower a person and make him experience as before since all the *mala* has been removed, still, experience by itself, is necessary for the destruction of the *prārabdha*. Enjoyment for him is not of the nature of superimposition as during the state of *saṁsāra*, which is based on attachment to body etc. and born through desires etc. As a result of this, it will not be there after the removal of *mala*. But even when there is no attachment to enjoyment, there will be just a gesticulation of it, as in the case of dance etc. (where the dancer gesticulates some event, although there is no actual experience of it). Likewise here also (in the case of a *jīvanmukta*), the gesticulation of the experience of *saṁsāra* will be there, which is similar to his actual experience of it; and this is devoid of horripilation etc. unlike the experience of the bliss of Śiva, and which is carried on just for the purpose of exhausting the *prārabdha*. Such an enjoyment is proper, even after the extinction of *mala* etc. Hence, because of its (*karma's*) persistence in the form of slight obscuration, it just appears like a burnt cloth and therefore there is no contradiction to liberation. It has been said in the *Skānda*: "Oh! Lord Mahāviṣṇu! liberation is the manifestation of the nature of one's self by the removal of ignorance. The nature of release is like a burnt cloth. Oh! Puruṣottama! such a person continues to live in the world, knowing its nature fully well. O Hari, the *prārabdha* actions are extinguished by experience. The appearance of the world will undoubtedly cease (in his case)."

IX.1. 11 Thus establishing release for one even in embodiment which is proved by *pramāṇas*, the activities of such a *jīvanmukta* is stated as follows: "He may meditate on the *mantra* consisting of five syllables." Here as in the case of the words "*praviśa*" (enter) and "*piṇḍam*" (ball of food) one adds the words "*bhakṣaya*" (eat) and "*gṛham*" (house); it should be supplemented by the expression "he may invoke Śiva." In this manner, in order to avert the domination by the seen miseries and for cultivating compassion, he may sometimes invoke the *mantra* consisting of five syllables and sometimes meditate on Lord Śiva, which alone cause liberation in the form of attainment of supreme bliss. In the term '*dhyāyet*' the potential is used in the sense of possibility and not in the sense of enjoining. For one who is released, who is a man of knowledge, who has got all his desires fulfilled, who is flawless and who is devoid of the feelings of caste and *āśrama* there can be no injunctions because there is no question of his being brought under any eligibility. Hence for him there can be no sin either for not performing the prescribed acts or for performing a prohibited act. In the *Tattvasāra*, regarding a man of knowledge, it is said "what is the use of munificence and rites of forefathers for him?"

IX.1.12 Or, the term "p*añcākśarī*" denotes the etymological meanings of the individual syllables. It is as follows:

the syllable "*śi*" means Śiva;
the syllable "*vā*" means His energy;
the syllable "*ya*" means the individual soul;
the syllable "*ma*" means *mala* which is binding; and
the syllable "*na*" means extinction of that *mala*.

So it has been stated in the *Āgama*, "In the middle is Śiva and then (His) energy. The self is said to follow that. "Binding" is said to precede that. The removal of it is said to precede that also."

The whole idea is that one should, according to one's capacity, meditate on Śiva, for the extinction of *mala*. It may be objected here that commanding (to do this or that) one who is devoid of any feeling of attachment to one's body, is improper. In answer we say that although there can be no subjection to injunction in the case of a man who is free from any such feeling, still such a thing is possible because in him there is at least the awareness that he is functioning for removing even the latent impression (*vāsanā*) of identification with body etc. Therefore, only regarding other matters, injunctions and prohibitions do not have any jurisdiction over him. In this manner, the activities such as smiling etc. of one liberated-while-living, is elaborately dealt with in the *Tattvasāra*, thus: "Listen! I speak the truth. His activity is really incomprehensible."

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Ninth Aphorism.

X

X.1 *Beginning of the Brief Commentary on the Tenth Aphorism*

X.1.1 The nature of the ultimate release has been generally dealt with in the eighth aphorism. The disputants, however, explain in different ways the specific nature of ultimate release, according to their own convictions. To explain: According to the Cārvākas, ultimate release is nothing but the destruction of the self, which is none other than the body, the abode of all miseries. One section of the Buddhists states that it is the undisturbed series of knowledge. Yet another section of the Buddhists opines that *mokṣa* is the destruction of series of knowledge assisted by the prior non-existence of the series of knowledge. According to the Jains a continuous upward movement of the soul is *mokṣa*. The Sāṅkhyas hold the view that it is the existence of *puruṣa* in his own real form, when the proximity of *prakṛti* and its modifications is removed in full. According to the Yoga, liberation is the enjoyment of one's original nature which is made up of pure *sattva*. The votaries of different deities, like Gaṇapati, Indra, Sūrya, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra opine that *mokṣa* is the attainment of *sālokya*, *sāmīpya*, *sārūpya* and *sāyujya* with those respective deities. Others are of the view that the merger of the individual self into the supreme Self is itself *mokṣa*. The Naiyāyikas say that it is the total dissolution of all miseries. The Prābhākaras hold that it is the prior non-existence of all miseries. According to the Bhāṭṭas, it is the manifestation of eternal bliss.

X.1.2 People who believe in *ādhikyamukti* say that for a *mutka* (released person), omniscience and all-embracing agency come from the all-knowing Īśvara, the non-agent. Even those who believe in release as marked by alround agency, omniscience and similarity with Śiva, say that similarity is of four kinds. Thus, according to the Pāśupatas, *Śiva-sāmya* is the transfer of qualities such as omniscience present in Śiva (to the released soul), whereas the Mahāvratas state that at the time of liberation omniscience is generated (afresh) in him. Again there are others who hold that it (*Śiva-sāmya*) consists in the possession of Śiva's omniscience. Also, one section of Śaivites states that *Śiva-sāmya* is the emergence of omniscience and allround agency inherent in the soul through the extinction of *mala* having formerly been obscured by "true" *mala*. The Māyāvādins (Advaitins) say that *mokṣa* is the attainment of supreme bliss, through the removal of indeterminable *avidyā*.

X.1.3 In this connection the following views which consider release as the destruction of the body, the destruction of series of knowledge, the dissolution of the individual soul, remaining of the self in its own form, absolute anterior non-existence of miseries, and complete destruction of miseries, cannot be accepted as *puraṣārthas*, because they are not known. Also there is the rule that "what is not known is not *puruṣārtha*". As for the three views enumerated in the beginning, the '*puruṣārtha*' remains "unknown" (*avedya*) or "unexperienced", because the knower (experiencer) himself gets destroyed in the process. In the remaining views, there is no possibility for the *jīva* to know because at that state (of *mokṣa*), knowledge is not accepted as existent and through it, its self-effulgence is also not accepted. Although the *Purāṇas* set forth the attainment of form similar with that of Gaṇapati (*sārūpya*), and other deities as *mokṣa*, it cannot be considered as the final release characterised as the ultimate *puruṣārtha*, which in fact is non-return to worldly life, because this implies the necessary relationship with body and thereby the experience of miseries consequent upon it. Also because the body which is a product is definitely perishable and there will be the contingence of revolution of births. Such a thing can only be a secondary *mokṣa*. That is why, even the continuous upward movement and the enjoyment of the *sattva guṇa* of *prakṛti* (accepted by some) cannot be considered as ultimate release Even these states do not take place without a body, and hence these views are also defective. The view regarding "series of knowledge" as liberation too is devoid of *pramāṇa*, and also such a state cannot be desired by a *puruṣa*. The other view which considers superiority to Śiva as liberation is absurd on the very face of it. As regards "*Śivasāmya*" through "transfer of the qualities of Śiva", constituting liberation, it cannot be accepted because there will be the contingence of Śiva becoming bereft of knowledge. So this cannot be liberation. Similarity with Śiva through origination of omniscience in the state of *mokṣa* also cannot form liberation because of the contingence of impermanency (of such a state). Similarity through "possession" (of omniscience) is also not release (as held by some) because it involves subduing one's own knowledge and such a state is not wished for by anybody. Similarity with Śiva which is of a totally different kind also cannot be considered as liberation because if similarity is said to be there partially, then it becomes a common feature (between Śiva and the *jīvas*) and it ceases to be the intended '*sāmya*' (similarity). If similarity in all aspects is accepted as liberation, then it is agreeable to our doctrine because it will lead to identity (*abheda*) only.

Regarding the views that similarities of different kinds constitute liberation, since they are not free from pleasure and pain (of the mundane life), there is not even a chance of their forming the ultimate release, constituting the final *puruṣārtha*. As regards the view that release is the 'manifesation' (*abhivyakti*) of eternal happiness, if the manifestation intended is only the removal of the obscuration (*āvaraṇa*) then it is agreeable to us. If it is, however, called knowledge, and if it is beginningless, (*anādi*), then it cannot be *puruṣārtha*. If it is produced, then there arises the contingence of its becoming impermanent. Since there is no *pramāṇa* regarding the existence of indeterminable *avidyā*, release as agreeable to the Advaitins is also not correct.

X.1.4 Thus considering the doctrines of other disputants regarding release as faulty, and because his view is free from flaws, proved by many *pramāṇas*, favoured by four-fold *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya school, and which is in accordance with the worldly experience, the author states that ultimate *mukti* is bodiless beatitude which is nothing but the manifestation of identity with the ultimate bliss of Śiva, through the annihilation of the obscuring and confusing *mala*, *māyā* etc. Thus propounding he now explains the annihilation of *pāśa* (bondage).

TENTH APHORISM

Having attained identity with Śiva and with all his modes under his control, untainted by *mala, māyā* etc., the liberated soul attains experience of his own self and thus becomes successful (in attaining his *puruṣārtha*).

X.1.5 Here the sentence is to be construed as follows: The individual self not being tainted by *mala*, *māyā* etc. and becoming one (identifying himself) with Śiva and experiencing his own self, accomplishes his ultimate aim. The word '*mala-māyādi*' forms what is called the "*tadguṇabahuvrīhi*" compound. To be clear: The compound means the entire group of *bandhas* connected with *karma*, headed by *mala*, *māyā* etc. The group of *mala*, *māyā* and *karma* is the meaning of the compound. This interpretation is in accordance with the view which accepts three bondages (*tribandhana*). In the case of four bondages (*caturbandhana*) the power to prevent (*nirodhaśakti*) is also to be added ; in the case of five bondages (*pañcabandhana)*, *kuṇḍalinī* should also be included in the meaning of the compound. "Not being tainted by such *mala* etc." is the meaning (of the entire compound).

X.2 *Analysis of the Removal of Contact with Mala*

X.2.1 Here, disconnection from *mala* takes place because of its removal by the direct vision (of Śiva). According to some, the removal of *mala* is the destruction of the energy of *mala*. It is not so. If the energy of *mala* is said to be of limited pervasion, then there will be the contingence of the manifestation of the self in places where there is no energy of *mala*. If it is of a complete pervasive nature, then, those energies being present everywhere, when one individual is released and even though that particular energy is removed other energies being present, there is no possibility for release. Nor it may be said that though there is the presence of energy which obscures others and since the energy which obscures a particular being is removed, there is the possibility of release. Also, it is not reasonable to accept liberation in the case of a person who is associated with a substance which has an intense power of obscurity. And also a person devoid of energy cannot even sustain himself. Therefore, the destruction of conjunction (with *mala*) alone constitutes separation. Nor it may be said that the destruction of *saṁyoga* between two proximate substances which are in conjunction with each other is unreasonable. Just like the total non-existence of *saṁyoga* for *jīva* and *mala* which are pervasive, and hence present in all places, it is intelligible to accept destruction of *saṁyoga* for them (Śiva and *jīva*) who are pervasive. Nor it may be said that again there is the contingence of obscuration through the rise of *saṁyoga* because there is the absence of any other action, which results in *saṁyoga*. *Pramāṇas* establish Śiva as the *dharmin* and the *Āgamas* prove Him to be devoid of obscurity.

So for an individual who has attained identity with Śiva, obscurity (of his nature) is not possible. That is why, only identity (with Śiva) has to be accepted for the released. Otherwise, again there will be the contingence of obscurity. Nor may it be said that again obscurity is unintelligible, since it is removed by *dīkṣā* which is its remover. The absence of obscurity again is untenable without identity with Śiva, which is by nature devoid of obscurity. It is seen that the sun, who is by nature, devoid of obscurity can never be covered (completely, for ever), whereas though darkness is expelled from the eyes in the presence of the light of the lamp, again there is veiling by darkness. Therefore re-obscuration is not possible, only because of the identity of the self with Śiva, who, by nature cannot be obscured. Therefore, '*asaṁsparśa*' here means disconnection.

X.2.2 Here the term '*māyā*', denotes *māyā* which is modified in the form of effects starting from *kalā* and ending with *avani*. The liberated soul has no connection even with *māyā* of such a nature. When there is annihilation of *karmas* which cause *kalā* etc. in the manner to be described hereafter and also by the annihilation of the two types of impressions viz., obscurity and confusion, *kalā* etc., which are the modifications of *karma* will also be destroyed. The cause being absent *kalā* etc. will not be originated again. Nor it may be said, that since bliss of Śiva is manifested by the expulsion of *mala* alone, what is the need for the so-called disconnection from *māyā*. Even as the light of a lamp is not seen clearly when it is disturbed by wind, here also, though the obscuring *mala* is removed still, if there is the presence of *kalā* etc. in the form of disturbance, then there will be the contingence of indistinctness for the bliss of Śiva. Hence for experiencing the bliss of Śiva clearly, even disconnection from *māyā* and *kalā*, etc. is also required.

X.2.3 Actions are threefold namely *sañcita*, *prārabdha* and *āgāmin*. Regarding *sañcita*, it is said: "*Sañcita* is destroyed by *dīkṣā*." Regarding *dīkṣā*, we have the following: "The fire of knowledge burns good and bad deeds within a moment." "The fire of knowledge reduces all *karmas* to ashes." "*Prārabdha* gets destroyed through enjoyment; the rest is burnt by knowledge." Some people say that a person remains untainted by *karmas* because it is possible for the annihilation of *karmas* either by *dīkṣā* or by *karma*. On the other hand, our explanation is as follows: In the statement "*sañcita* is extinguished only by *dīkṣā*, the rest is burnt by knowledge", by the term *jñāna* (knowledge) only *dīkṣā* is implied, because it forms the cause of knowledge. Since *dīkṣā* is taught as not depending on any other means and if knowledge also is admitted as the cause, then there will be the contingence of eight-fold defects for the option. Even in instances like "death in Kāśī", we state that it is possible to remove *sañcitakarma* only by *cākṣuṣadīkṣā*.

X.2.4 In this connection, the Naiyāyikas state that *karmas* are neither destroyed by knowledge nor by *dīkṣā*, but only by experiencing them, according to texts such as: "An action performed, be it good or bad, should certainly be experienced. Even after several aeons, one's *karma* does not get exhausted without enjoyment." The statement that *karmas* are destroyed by knowledge means that when there is acquisition of many bodies through knowledge, they can be removed by enjoying them. That is why what we hear in the *Purāṇas* about men of knowledge like Saubhari and others enjoying through multiple bodies becomes explicable. As such the view of the Naiyāyikas stands rejected. In accordance with the texts, "O Arjuna! the fire of knowledge reduces all *karmas* to cinders" and "The *prārabdha* has to be destroyed through experience, and the rest is burnt down by knowledge", we can reasonably conclude that *karmas* are destroyed by knowledge. Then, in accordance with the text: "One has to invariably experience (the result of) the performed action, be it good or bad", we can restrict its application to the *prārabdhakarma* because *karmas* are said to be exhausted only by experience. Moreover, you have admitted that *karmas* are destroyed even without experiencing them; by singing the names of God (*kīrtana*), crossing the river Vipāśā, performing *prāyaścitta* rites etc. Hence limitation (in the destruction of *karma*) should certainly be done. Here the restriction should be regarding the *prārabdha* acts only, which cannot be destroyed by knowledge and *dīkṣā* acknowledged by scriptures as annihilators (of *sañcita* and *āgāmi*). It will be cumbersome to accept *kīrtana* etc. as destroying *prārabdha* and we cannot also decidedly know if such methods can really deliver the goods. Otherwise '*prārabdha*' should be qualified by the epithet "which cannot be removed by knowledge." Because the case is similar: Since *prārabdha karma* is manifold and continues in many births, acquisition of multitude of bodies is quite possible. *Prārabdha karmas* being terminable only by experience, the liberated soul cannot be connected even with that.

X.2.5 It is true that in the *Bhagavadgīta* — by the passage "the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes" — all actions are said to be destroyed by knowledge. Also in the *Śivajñānāgama* we hear thus: Just as fire with blazing flame," etc. still the term "*sarvakarmas*" (all acts) does not refer to all actions in general. It implies that even heinous sins like killing a brahmin, are destroyed (by it). Moreover, in accordance with the statement "*prārabdha* is destroyed by enjoyment" which specifies a restriction, and also in accordance with the statement propounding liberation-while-living (*jīvanmukti*), the term '*sarva*' (qualifying *karma* in the passage cited above) is assumed to denote all *karmas* excepting the *prārabdha*. Since *tirodhānaśakti* (power of obscuration) also is removed by *mala*, and since *karma* which is responsible for enjoyment is also destroyed and since re-obscuration for that purpose is not possible, it has to be deduced that the *tirodhānaśakti* becomes simply stultified in its case. It does not start its function and as such there can be no contact with it also. Same is the case with the *kuṇḍalinī* also. Although greater enjoyment is produced in the *tattvas* derived from *kuṇḍalinī*, it still obstructs the ultimate release and hence its extinction becomes necessary.

X.2.6 Thus taking for granted the annihilation of *āgāmi* and other bonds, the commentator gives the reason for the disconnection of the *pāśa* of *āgāmikarma* by the expression, "One who has his (activity) under His control." This compound (*tadadhīnasva-vṛttikaḥ*) should be dissolved as "One who has his own activity" (*i.e.*) (performance of *karmas* of the nature of merits and demerits) removed by Him, *i.e.*, by the agency of Śiva alone." Even by performing act of the nature of merit and demerit, he will not be tainted by merits, demerits and the like. Since his *mala* is removed, and since he has attained identity with Śiva his activities become similar to those of Śiva. The activities of Śiva, do not give rise to merit and demerit. Moreover, though prescribed and prohibited actions are performed by such a person, because of the latent impressions (*vāsanās*) and *prārabdha-karma*, since knowledge of the real is there, they are non-productive of merits and demerits, like a picture drawn on a wall with lac, by a dullard. This has been explained in detail in many places. Further, by the destruction of the *anādikarma*, which forms the basis, there will be no connection with *āgāmikarma.*

X.2.7 It may be explained thus. For *karmas* which are three-fold as *sañcita, prārabdha* and *āgāmi*, and which are beginningless like a stream (*pravāha-anādi*) there exists some other *karma*, which, being by itself beginningless, forms their basis and remains invariably in every individual. If such a basic *karma* is not accepted then the origin of various *karmas* will not be possible at all. In the world it is seen that manifold effects can be derived from a single source which is of a similar nature. In the case of a body etc., it is absolutely necessary to accept a cause, which is peculiar to every individual. It will be cumbersome to postulate the *vāsanā* of such and such an individual as the cause of *karmas* of such and such an individual. It is therefore proper to accept some *karma* of his alone, as the regulating factor, by itself. In the sacred *Kiraṇa* it is said: "Just as *mala* is *anādi*, in the same manner *karma* also is *anādi.*" Here since *mala* which is *anādi* by itself is given as the illustration it follows that *karma* is also *anādi.* It is not beginningless like a stream (*Pravāha anādi*). Thus, when the basic *karma* is destroyed by purification with *dīkṣā*, there is no production of *āgāmi karma*. In this manner however, it will not be possible to remove the *prārabdha karmas.* In the case of a tree whose roots are cut, although fresh sprouts etc. ate not generated, still the leaves etc. which were already present will continue to be there for some more days. Likewise it stands to reason that *prārabdha* also will be there for some time. Nor can it be asked as to what necessity is there for accepting disconnection from *karma*. Because, if *karma* exists then disconnection from *mala, māyā* etc., becomes an impossibility. Hence for that purpose, disconnection from *karma*, can also be looked upon as a *puruṣārtha.*

X.2.8 In this manner, the annihilation of *pāśa* is propounded. In order to explain that emanicipation is not merely the annihilation of all *pāśa*, which is the abode of all miseries, but it is also the abiding of the individual self in identity with the pervasive blissful nature of Śiva, like the waves becoming one with the sea due to the absence of wind, it is said: "with Śiva". As the word 'Śiva' is purposeful, the desired nature of pervasive bliss is denoted by that. Here by the term '*aikya*' identity between *jīva* and Śiva who are not extremely different from each other, caused merely by the removal of adjunct, is not meant as in the case of the space conditioned by a pot and the space outside, or as in the case of an object and its reflected image. This is so because in the *Śaivāgamas* such an identity is denied, in order to avert the contingence of non-distinction between bondage (*bandha*) and release. Nor is that type of identity which is caused by the destruction of the already existing difference, meant here as between a river and the sea into which it has flowed, or between water and milk mixed together. Because here also the contingence of the same defect mentioned in connection with release described as the dissolution of *jīva* in Siva, will crop up. By the text, "The individual self with his obscurity driven away, visualises Śiva along with *śaktis*" even in, the state of release, the difference between the released and Śiva is learnt to be of the nature of the subject and its object. Nor is this identity caused by the identity of attributes, pertaining to cognitive and conative energies in all matters as in the case of two entirely different entities. Because then there will be invalidity for the statements of the *Nigamas* and the *Āgamas* quoted here and there pointing to the oneness of attributes supported by many logical inductions. Therefore, in this context, even in liberation there is non-difference with slight difference, as in the case of a quality and its substrate or in that of light and its locus. This is what is meant by identity. *Tādātmya* is its synonym. That is to say, identity is qualified (with slight difference). Here too, by the term '*gata*' (having attained) identity as in the case of a heated iron ball with fire, is not intended, which is similar to the statement "a thing which was not there before, is produced now." If so, there will then be the contingence of impermanence for release, in accordance with the rule that anything that is produced should also be destroyed. In the state of transmigration too, this kind of release, though present is not understood because it is obscured. Fire concealed by the (external) form of the wood and which remains in the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) with the pieces of wood such as the *araṇi* (fire-producing) sticks becomes manifest subsequently through its parts when certain obstructing factors like heaviness and hardness, fluidity and earthness are destroyed through the act of churning the sticks. On the same analogy, oneness which remains unmanifest before, becomes manifest (later). This is the point intended here.

X.2.9 It may however be objected that in the example cited, fire, which really does not exist, is created afresh by rubbing the pieces of wood. But it is not so because, although fire exists before, it does not have *tādātmya* with the wood. And there is nothing to prove the *tādātmya* in the case of wood ánd fire, which do not form the material cause (*upādāna*) and its product (*upādeya*) respectively. Hence it should not be said that the given illustration is not well-known. Here (in the pieces of wood), there is no contact with another fire, as in the case of a wick in which fire is produced by contact with another wick which is capable of generating fire. Hence, the production of one fire by another fire which originally was not there, cannot be postulated. Here (in the pieces of wood), fire, though already present (in a latent form) is brought out or not brought out, depending upon the presence or absence of churning (respectively). Likewise, in the case of a gem its effulgence is made manifest or unmanifest by the presence or absence of polishing it on a touch-stone. This act helps to remove the cover (which conceals the latent fire or effulgence). Nor is there no *pramāṇa* in support of this kind of *tādātmya*. Because the cognition of "ball of fire" and its verbal reference based upon the appositional relation of wood and fire, become a *pramāṇa*. Another example is the expression "four-angled fire."

Even in the case of clay and pot which are the material cause and its product respectively, except the cognition and the appositional designation "earthern pot", there is no other *pramāṇa*. Therefore, identity (of *jīva*), with Śiva of blissful nature is non-difference with slight difference. And that is eternal. Because of removal of obscurement, it appears to have been attained afresh. This is the meaning of the text: "having attained identity with *Ś*iva." This being the case, in accordance with the scriptural illustration of the ether limited by a pot and the ether outside, and in accordance with the *Āgama* illustration of sea and river, and the illustration of "milk in milk, and water in water", where reference is made to milk poured in milk and to water being poured in water, similarity being of attribute alone is intended by the term "*tādātmya*", referred to earlier. In this way identity of the released soul with Śiva is to be understood. Here, the factors of total non-difference and destruction of the previous difference are not intended to be present in the illustration and the illustrated. Indeed, there is no need to postulate allround similarity between an illustration and the illustrated. Because then there will be absolute non-difference (between *jīva* and Śiva).

X.2.10 In this manner, though the removal of the cause of miseries and the absence of miseries in the state of liberation are shown as *puruṣārthas* through the emergence of the bliss of Śiva, they become *puruṣārthas* only when mingled with bliss, and not merely by themselves. Nor it may be said that where there are miseries and its means present, there is the sublation of happiness also, because there is no contact with objects. Because like contact with objects, the removal of miseries and its means also form the cause for happiness. That is why, for a person, carrying loads of hay, faggots, etc. experience of happiness after the removal of the weight cannot be denied. In this manner, your objection that mere removal of *mala*, which cannot be the *puruṣārtha*, is rejected.

X.2.11 Manifestation of the blissful nature of Śiva, it may be argued, cannot by itself be a *puruṣārtha*. As a matter of fact, though the obscurity is removed, the necklace (which one has forgotten, although it is worn by oneself) is not seen to be a *puruṣārtha* in the day-to-day experience, unless it is directly perfectly perceived. Further, there is the maxim that "a *puruṣārtha* is not something unknown." Anticipating this, it is said "one who has experience of one's own self," meaning that there is also the experience of that (*Śivatādātmya*) by means of self-knowledge. Experience of one's self is the experience of Śiva itself (as already) stated. Also it is untenable to ask how the experience of Śiva can be denoted by the term "*svānubhūti*" (experience of one's self). Because of (his) identity with Śiva, it is possible to explain the term *jīva* (oneself) as denoting Śiva. He too is of the nature of knowledge, because of the identity of such a knowledge with Śiva. It is not the "energy" of intelligence, because it is of the nature of revealing external objects. During that time (in the state of release) knowledge born out of valid means, does not exist at all. The participle indicating possession, *viz.*, "*matup*" (in *svānubhūtimān*) merely indicates the difference which is superimposed. Hence by the term "*svānubhūti*" (experiencing one's self), it is shown that blissful nature of Śiva is something to be known only through the experience of oneself like the saliva. It is indicated that it is impossible either to describe it or to delimit it. The term '*svānubhūti*' is popularly used only with respect to such an object (of experience).

Therefore the point established is that when there is disconnection with *mala*, *māyā*, *karma*, *tirodhānaśakti* and *kuṇḍalinī* in the proper manner, the experience of the supreme blissful nature of Śiva which is manifested by self-knowledge alone constitutes the ultimate release. It is the final goal. Here by the term '*anubhūtimān*' the views of Cārvākas, 'one sect of the Bauddhas, Naiyāyikas and Prābhākaras who do not accept knowledge in the state of release are refuted. By the term "*sva*", meaning by oneself, the views of (*Śivasāmya*) through transfer, origination and possession (of the nature of Śiva) are refuted. By the term '*Śiva*' meaning, 'the nature of bliss", the views of Sāṅkhyas and one sect of Śaivites, who accept only knowledge in the state of release and who do not accept bliss, are refuted. By the term '*Kalāsaṁspṛṣṭa*", the view of those who admit only the destruction of *karma*, is refuted. By the term '*māyādyasamspṛṣṭa*", the view of Bhāṭṭas and others who accept manifestation as originated and the view of the Yoga school who accept enjoyment along with the body (in liberation) are refuted.

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Tenth Aphorism.

XI

XI.1. *Beginning of the Commentary on the Eleventh Aphorism*

XI.1.1 So far, questions about the *svarūpa*-definition of Śiva, *pramāṇas*, inferences, means and result have been asked and explained. If it be asked as to what else remains to be stated for whose purpose the two succeeding *sūtras* are composed, the reply is as follows. The adorable Śrīkaṇṭhanātha still has something else in his heart, which remains to be stated. To explain: Formerly, in the eighth aphorism, after the discussion about the *svarūpa* of Śiva, its *pramāṇā* and definition, the means was inquired into. Then, knowledge was taught as the means thereof by the text. "One who has been taught, attains that abode." The problem is that then the statements explaining *dīkṣā* and all other *karmas* pertaining to the *Śrutis*, *Smṛtis* and *Āgamas* as the means of release will become stultified. Since *nirvāṇadīkṣā* is equal to knowledge which is the chief means of liberation, the solution (for the problem raised above) is given by the term "*dhanya*." *Karmas* excluding the *nirvāṇadīkṣā* are subsidiaries to knowledge the chief means and they also can act as the means to verbal knowledge explained earlier. Since the commentator was engaged in enunciating other means, he states: "I will explain them later." He thus avoided explaining *karmas* then lest the disciple be confused, he being devoid of concentration. Explaining the other means such as contemplation and profound meditation which were also the means occasioned by the context, he also taught him about the result which was important. Since all the main factors have been explained so far, he now deals with the doubt raised earlier that acts other than the *nirvāṇadīkṣā* which are laid down in the *Śrutis*, *Smṛits* and *Āgamas* as means of liberation, will be affected. This is the appropriate place to deal with it. Through one and a half *sūtras*, the doubt (raised above) is refuted and it is stated that they (the different rites) also form the means to release, through knowledge. Hence the said defect will not occur. Devotion to Śiva is mainly explained as the *antaraṅgasādhana* (internal means) and worshipping the devotees of Śiva is stated as the "*bahiraṅgasādhana*" (external means).

ELEVENTH APHORISM

Like the self being the revealer of objects (to sense-organs) Śiva is the revealer (of His own nature) to the soul. Therefore, one (an aspirant) should be ardently devoted to Śiva, who helps the soul (by endowing him with self-knowledge).

XI. 1. 2 Now, according to a difference in opinion, a sentence which speaks of the Vedic rites as the means of liberation is twofold: it can be a Vedic sentence straightway, or a sentence which refers to some sacrament (*saṁskāra*). The passage, "One who has these forty-eight *saṁskāras*" speaks of the *saṁskāras*. There with respect to the *saṁskāras*, when a doubt arises as to what is the cause that generates the factor to be helped, the *saṁskāras* are said to be helpful, by generating knowledge (in the person concerned). It is explained thus: Because the *saṁskāras* can only purify (a person) like the act of sprinkling (in the case of grains etc.), they are not productive of any result of their own. They become responsible for the result only (indirectly) by being helpful to the (direct) cause of the result. Likewise here also, when one wants to know if they (the *saṁskāra-vākyas*) can generate *mukti* in the form of identity with Śiva the factor to be assisted, only the knowledge of identity with Śiva, which is established by the texts such as "The supreme *Śruti* says that *mokṣa* is attained through knowledge alone," becomes relevant as the cause thereof. Ignoring the cause which is presented by *pramāṇas* and assuming another cause which is not stated, is cumbersome. Thus in this view about *saṁskāras*, it is to be explained that in the case of one who has forty-eight *saṁskāras*, union with Śiva is possible through knowledge assisted by those *saṁskāras*. Thus the question regarding the utility of the text speaking of *saṁskāras* is answered by stating that they become useful through the mediacy of knowledge.

XI.1.3 The *vividiṣā* text is as follows: Oh gods! the wise man who desires knowledge through the recitation of the *Vedas*, through sacrifice, through study, through discernment, through penance and also through fasting, is the sage and no other person." Though *karmas* are understood as means to release by other sentences, this particular text itself is the evidence to show that they should be related to knowledge (*vedana*) through such a desire. In the statement "He desires to go by horse" even though the word '*aśva*' (horse) is not principally connected with the act of going, merely by its word-function, it gets principally connected with the act of 'going' through its meaning. Likewise, the recitation of the *Vedas* etc. are connected with *jñāna* in accordance with the principle: "And there is the necessity of all *karmas*, for the scriptures prescribe sacrifices, etc. even as the horse." Even though desire is intended as the principal factor on account of the word-function, still through that desire, connection with knowledge gets established. Or, even if an ordinary interpretation of the word is resorted to, mediacy of knowledge becomes firmly established. But, in fact, by resorting to the interpretation accepted in the *Mīmāṁsāśāstra*, the word "*icchati*" (desires) in the present tense being syntactically connected with the "recitation of the *Veda*" etc. (*vedānuvacana*), can be assumed to convey the sense of the fifth *lakāra* (*i.e.*) "*let*", the subjunctive mood. Thus we arrive at the meaning that "one who desires knowledge, should recite the *Vedas* and should perform the sacrifices." Through this fifth *lakāra* ("*leṭ*"), the advantage of showing *karma* as means to release through knowledge is arrived at. Thus in both the views of *saṁakāra* and *vividiṣā*, the vedic rites are shown to operate through knowledge. For the Śaivites however, *karmas* like *kriyā* and *caryā* of such a nature become productive through knowledge. And this is in accordance with the following statement of the *Āgama*: "Rites (*kriyā*) and practices (*caryā*) are spoken of for the purpose of generating knowledge." In this manner, in both the views, *karmas* like *kriyā* and *caryā* ordained in the *Śrutis*, *Smṛtis* and *Āgamas*, being helpful through knowledge, there is nothing wrong with the statements explaining them as means to release. In spite of this, when compared to the view of *saṁskāras*, the view of *vividiṣā* has an advantage. In the view of *saṁskāras*, the *vedas* teach *karmas* exclusive of the forty-eight *saṁskāras*, as means to the knowledge of Śiva, which leads to release.

XI.1.4 Thus, "Śiva's knowableness from the *Vedas*, *Āgamas*, *Ithihāsas* and *Purāṇas* either directly or through *saṁskāras*, is explained by statements like the following: "Śiva is known from all the *Vedas*." Therefore, there is no impropriety in Śiva's being the object of knowledge through the *Vedas* etc. For others who wish to include concepts such as *prakṛti* and its modifications within the forty-eight *saṁskāras*, there is great strain. Moreover, according to this view, there is no hard and fast rule that the *karmas* performed should generate knowledge after effecting some other means also such as detachment.

This is so because there is no connection between *vividiṣā* and *karmas* which are neither enjoined nor performed for the sake of knowledge. But *karmas* performed for the sake of their respective results, through respective causes produce knowledge and through that, liberation, provided there is detachment. Otherwise, (when there is no detachment) *karmas* produce only their respective results. But according to the "view of *vividiṣā*," as explained before, all the injunctions on sacrificial rites become re-statements (*anuvāda*) and become useful in generating knowledge. Therefore there is no difficulty in including *karmas* under *vividiṣā* unlike in the "view of *saṁskāras*." Sacrifices which are performed with a view to attain *Svarga* certainly give rise to *svarga* after bestowing a suitable form, *loka*, etc., on the concerned aspirant. Similarly, *karmas* which are enjoined by *vividiṣā* sentences, first of all, generate in a person detachment etc., and invariably (through it), produce such a knowledge. For this reason the view of *vividiṣā* alone is superior. Even there, regarding the *vividiṣā* statement found in the *Smṛtis*, as for instance, on pilgrimage to Vārāṇasī, one may entertain doubt as to their inclusion (in the causal factors). Therefore, in respect of the context, all the *śrauta* and *smārta* rites such as *garbhādhāna* etc. and Āgamic rites like *Caryā*, *Kriyā*, and *Yoga*, and the worldly acts like inhaling and not eating the prohibited food are all referred to categorically by the term '*kuryāt*' (one should do) and an aspirant is advised to practise these *karmas*, since they are the internal means for the worship of Śiva which is the chief aim.

XI.1.5 It may now be objected that a person, who is capable of offering a particular thing, should alone be worshipped by a person, who aspires for that particular thing, and that Śiva is not capable of bestowing knowledge, because there is no valid proof thereto, and also because an individual soul, being sentient by himself, can attain supreme knowledge. Therefore, one who aspires knowledge is enjoined to perform actions conducive to it. It is in reply to this that the statement is made, "Like the Self which reveals the objects (to the sense)" etc. (in the Aphorism). This implies the fact that Lord Śiva confers knowledge (upon the aspirant), which is in accordance with reason, and established by a number of *Śruti*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* texts, as for instance, the passage, "One should aspire for knowledge from Lord Śiva."

XI.1.6 Here, in the term "*dṛśaḥ*", the word '*dṛk*' is a synonym of sense-organs. The singular number is used in the sense of *jāti* or generality. In the reading "*dṛśoḥ*", the external and internal organs are collectively indicated. "*dṛk*" means intellect. According to the grammatical aphorism "*gati buddhi*" etc., this term "*dṛśaḥ*" which is in genitive case indicates accusative. Therefore, the meaning is: "Just as the soul reveals the objects to the sense-organs, they being non-sentient, so also for the soul, Śiva is the revealer of His own nature." The syllogistic explanation of this as an inference is to be drawn from the Fifth Aphorism, where this factor has already been stated. The repetition here is not only to show that Śiva, through His power of concealment gives knowledge to one in the form of enjoying the filthy objects of the world, but also to highlight the fact that through His power of Grace He can confer upon one, the knowledge of Śiva (*i e.* Himself), which constitutes the means of the highest human end (*viz.*, liberation). That is why, there (in the Fifth Aphorism), the word "objects" has been used. But here He is stated as helping the souls by becoming their object of knowledge. The word "*tasmāt*" (therefore) means, "because He bestows knowledge." Here though such a person is understood as Śiva by being the subject, and through the context and propriety of the statement "helpful for *Ātma*," the mention of the word 'in Him' (*tasmin*) is to recognise and remind that Śiva is clearly confirmed as the bestower of self-knowledge in the *Vedas*, *Āgamas*, *Smṛtis*, *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*. In other words, the sentence means that He is proved by the *Vedas*, etc. as the bestower of knowledge. The term '*param*' (of the Aphorism) is explained thus: "superior, being free from the desire for results — promised by different texts." Here by the expression "one should be devoted to Him, who bestows knowledge" by means of the causal factor, an "aspirant of knowledge" is understood to be referred to. This is on the analogy of the statement "one should worship Kubera" where an aspirant of wealth is understood. In the term "*kuryāt*" the primary root (*kṛ* to do) only repeats (mentions) the performance of all *karmas* which are enjoined by the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* ordained as duties. The expression, "One should be ardently devoted to Him," refers to his association with a quality (*viz.* devotion) (as essential).

XI.1.7 This is the central idea: Whatever *Vaidika* and *Āgamika* rites have been enjoined as obligatory, occasional and optional as a means of worshipping Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others, including *saṁskāras* like *garbhādhāna* etc., and whatever *karma* has not been enjoined such as shutting the eyes etc. and whatever rites are prohibited like killing the living beings etc., these should be performed by an aspirant of knowledge as a mode of worshipping Lord Śiva. In addition, he should be ardently devoted to Lord Śiva. Here the term '*tasmāt*' (therefore) should be employed. But instead, "*tasmin*" (towards Him) is used. By this it is pointed out that devotion to Lord Śiva should necessarily be practised since it constitutes the (integral and) internal means to knowledge. That Śiva bestows knowledge is vouchsafed by the following passage from the "*muktikhaṇḍa*" of the *Sūtasaṁhitā*. "Only at the end of many births, due to my Grace, perfect knowledge (of the *Vedas*) originates in meritorious people. Oh! Acyuta, firm, pure knowledge of the supreme reality which bestows release originates in the last birth (of an aspirant) only due to my Grace."

In the Smṛti also it is said. "One should desire to get health from the sun-God, prosperity from the fire-God and knowledge from Śaṅkara." In the *Sūta-saṁhitā*, incanto three, in the section on the greatness of sacrifices, after enumerating the obligatory, occasional and optional rites and their respective results like purification etc. which are desired and essential, the performance of *karmas* for attaining results is condemned. By stating that these *karmas* yield only low results if performed merely with the attitude that they are to be performed since they are enjoined, it is advised that they should be performed with the predominent intention of propitiating Śiva for quickly attaining the result, namely release.

It is said thus: "Those who perform sacrifice with faith, and with the intention of adoring Śiva, attain the result in the form of release, quickly." There are also statements which enjoin the performance of sacrifices for other deities like Viṣṇu, in general. Performance of sacrifices for them as main deities is condmned and there itself, it is stated that Śiva alone should be the chief object of propitiation. Thus for example: "Those who perform sacrifices with Viṣṇu, Brahmā Indra and others as the chief deities deliberately or due to ignorance, will be in the dreadful hell as long as the universe lasts. Mahādeva is the Supreme Lord by letter and spirit. He alone is 'Sāmba,' all knowing and He should be worshipped with all sacrifices."

In the same way, there itself it is stated that even the performance of *karmas* which are not directly enjoined and which are prohibited by the *Śrutis*, *Itihāsas*, *Purānas* and *Āgamas* as means of propitiating Lord Śiva, becomes means to knowledge, in the following manner. The knowledge that *karmas* which are prohibited and also those which are not enjoined, form the great worship of Lord Śambhu, is a source of great bliss. The knowledge that all those *karmas* which are prohibited in the *Śrutis* and *Smṛtis* constitute the propitiation of Lord Śambhu, is a great happiness. Oh! men of good austerities! those *karmas* which are held as sins, when performed as an adoration of the lord, become completely holy, it is but true undoubtedly. As a big fire (first) makes dry the wet fuel and (then) burns it, even so, sin when performed for the sake of propitiating the lord becomes pure and productive of knowledge."

Karmas ordained in the *Tantras* are of two kinds— those which follow the *Vedas* and those which are outside the realm of the *Veda*. Of these because the first kind of *karmas* belong to *Śruti* and since *Śruti* advocates the propitiation of Śiva, it is understood that they should be performed for the adoration of Śiva. As regards the second kind of *Karmas*, prescribed in Buddhism, Jainism and other schools which are outside the path of the *Veda* or the worship of a particular deity done by a person purely on his own will, are also considered as the sacrifices for pleasing Śiva, by the process of implication. There itself, it has been declared thus. "O twice born, and the most versatile in Vedic lore! It has been declared by me that an act which is performed according to one's own wisdom, ignoring the *Vedic* and *Tantric* ways, can also be a sacrifice. Whatever act is done with faith will bring forth immense good."

Here, the *karmas*, whether they are occasioned or optional or prohibited or obligatory or those which are not specifically prohibited, or those which are performed according to one's desire and those, which are done by the physical body are proved to be means for knowledge when performed as the means of propitiating Lord Śiva. In the same manner, *karmas* pertaining to speech and mind, *japa* of the syllables of the Matṛkā— etc. and meditation of Sāmba form the means to attain the supreme reality. One has to understand the four types of meditation etc. useful in this connection.

XI.1.8 The aforesaid three-fold *karma*s, namely those pertaining to the body, speech and mind is again two-fold, each as that which is directly related to Śiva, and as related to Viṣṇu and others. Worshipping Śiva and dwelling in the sacred places of Śiva are acts pertaining to body, concerning Lord Śiva. *Japa* of the *pañcākṣara* and chanting of the special names of Śiva etc. are acts pertaining to speech, having Śiva as their object. Mental recollection of Śiva and meditation of Sāmba, and the special forms of Śiva etc. are acts pertaining to mind, and concerning Lord Śiva as their object. Worshipping of Viṣṇu and dwelling in holy places of Viṣṇu are *karmas* pertaining to body and concerned with Viṣṇu. *Japa* of *Aṣṭākṣarī* and chanting of the names of Viṣṇu are acts pertaining to speech and having Viṣṇu as their object. Mental recollection and meditation of the form of Nārāyaṇa etc., are the *karmas* pertaining to mind, and concerned with Viṣṇu as their object. Even among the aforesaid *karmas*, only *karma*s related to Śiva, immediately confer beatitude. Other *karmas*, (related to Viṣṇu and others) lead to the desired goal only through stages since even those acts are said to be the means of knowledge through the adoration of Śiva. *Karmas* directly relating to Śiva are thus shown to be far superior. In the *Āgamas*, too, this point is made very clear. In the *Sūtasaṁhitā*, and in the *Parāśara Upapurāṇa* this fact has been mentioned in many places. (Because no other factor remains to be attained in this connection, there is no further detailed discussion on this Aphorism.)

[Thus ends the commentary on the Eleventh Aphorism.]

XII

XII.1. *Beginning of the Brief Commentary on the Twelfth Aphorism*

XII.1.1 In the preceding Aphorism, it has thus been taught that all *karmas* become means to knowledge if they are performed as propitiation to Lord Śiva. There itself it has been instructed that *karmas*, which are enjoined and which are not prohibited should generelly be performed. Among the threefold *karmas* to be performed by those qualified in Śaivism, namely those who follow the path of *Dāsa*, of *Prapanna* and of *Sanmārga*, the prescribed observance of a *Prapanna* is mainly said to be helpful in acquiring the knowledge of Śiva. In the Eighth Aphorism too, religious observances like the *nirvānadīkṣā* etc. of the followers of the *sanmārga* is stated as forming the internal cause (of liberation). Now, in the Twelfth *sūtra*, through the first half, the utility of the *karmas* of the followers of the *dāsa* path, which are of the nature of external devotion, is pointed out.

TWELFTH APHORISM

One should, for the sake of release, approach the virtuous and render service to them. One should assume their appearance and propitiate the temple of Śiva. In this manner one should understand the doctrine of Śaivism established in the *Śivajñānabodha*.

XII.1.2 It is explained thus: Those who are eligible to follow Śaivism are fourfold, namely the *Samayi*, *Putraka*, *Sādhaka* and *Ācārya*. Of these, the *samayi-dharma* which is an external limb of devotion consists in worshipping Śiva-temple and serving the devotees of Śiva, after acquiring *samayadīkṣā*. *Putrakadharma*, which is internal is devotion towards Śiva, which is of the form of performing *arcana* to the *Śiva-liṅga*, after acquiring the *viśeṣadīkṣā*. The *dharma* of *sādhaka* and *ācārya* is the meditation on the *mantra* internally, and listenting to the expositions of the *Āgamas* from the preceptor, after acquiring the *nirvāṇādikṣā*. In the Eighth Aphorism, it has been stated that the *dharma* of such a *sādhaka* and *ācārya* is useful in generating knowledge. In the Eleventh Aphorism it should have been stated as follows, "for the sake of Śiva." Instead, it is stated as "devotion towards

Śiva." By that it is indicated that the *putraka-dharma*, which is internal, is also mainly helpful for knowledge. Now, by means of the first half of the Twelfth *sūtra*, the remaining *samayidharma* — which is external and of the nature of serving the preceptor, Śaivite saints and Śiva temples — is also declared as helpful in generating knowledge (leading to liberation).

XII.2 *Statement* of the *use* of *Dāsakarma which is of the Nature of External Limb of Devotion, in Producing Knowledge*

XII.2.1 It may be explained as follows: Among the three-fold *Śiva-dharmas*, the first one performed after the acquisition of the *nirvāṇadīkṣā*, yields *mokṣa* in this birth itself. The second yields *mokṣa*, after the interval of two births. Regarding the validity of the first *dharma*, the *Āgamas* are already quoted in support. Regarding the *nirvāṇadīkṣā*, it is said in the *Sūtasaṁhitā*, as follows: "When the knowledge arising from the *Vedānta* statements is associated with the *śaktipāta*, then that person gets released as and when it is accomplished. There is no doubt about it." About the third, it is said in the *Śivadharmottara* thus: "Thus, one who always shows devotion to a *Śivayogin* attains identity (with Śiva) in two or three births." Regarding the second, the outcome is known from the context itself. It is also proved by the previous aphorism.

XII.2.2 Thus, one has to understand the teaching about the application of these methods, keeping in mind the order of assistance rendered by them. Here in this aphorism the term "seeker of knowledge" has to be supplied from the previous *sūtra*, where that term is understood through implication. By the term '*sat*' (in *sataḥ*) either the *Śaivāśramin* or those who wear holy ashes and *rudrākṣa* beads or the seekers of knowledge of Śiva or preceptors or devotees of Śiva (the mobile *gurus*) are denoted. It is said in the *Skānda* thus: "O best among sages! those who besmear (their body) with sacred ashes and those who happily put on *tripuṇḍra* alone are eminent and learned, not others."

In the *Suprabheda* it is said "A preceptor is a mobile Śiva. *Liṅga* is said to be of three kinds. Let one be a *brahmin*, or a *Caṇḍāla*, or good or bad — if he wears the signs of a *sat* (the virtuous) such as ashes and *rudrākṣa*, he is undoubtedly Śiva only." Even without being a *sat*, it is possible for him to put on the

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appearance of a *sat* which will be stated shortly. Since in such a case the attainment of the state of a *sat* results only in some unseen result (*adṛṣta*), the question is now raised as what the tangible result of it could be which would be helpful. As a reply, it is said that what is stated in other scriptures as *samayidharma* such as services rendered to the devotees of Śiva and the *jaṅgama-gurus* like shampooing their feet, constitutes the result. The meaning is as follows: For the sake of release, a *samayin* who seeks knowledge, should approach a *Śivayogin* and render services like shampooing his feet.

XII.2.3 So it is stated in the *Śivadharmottara*: "Those who always adore the Śivayogins with devotion, obtain great enjoyments and in the end, attain union with Śaṅkara. Therefore, the *Śivayogins* should be adored by the seekers of *bhoga* and *yoga* through the offerings of shelter, food, drinks, bed, clothes, seat, etc. Thus one, who always serves the *Śivayogins*, attains *Śivayoga* in two or three births. Regarding the poor man, who always with devotion offers shelter and service to a *Śivayogin* (in spite of his poverty), hear the meritorious results he is destined to get. As soon as he dies, he, along with twenty-one generations of his kinsmen, goes to the abode of Śiva by *vimānas* which can go anywhere, and which are brilliant like the sun's rays. Served by thousands of beautiful women and by meritorious divine beings, he remains there for ten million aeons. At the end, he dwells in the abode of Viṣṇu, again adored by thousands of ladies and enjoying various enjoyments there, for the same duration of time. Moving from the abode of Viṣṇu, he reaches the abode of Brahmā and again sports there experiencing many, rare, subtle enjoyments, again for the same duration. After enjoying manifold enjoyments in the abodes of Prajāpatis, Indra, Gandharvas and Yakṣas respectively, he will be born on the earth in the family of eminent *vipras*, endowed with wisdom, conduct and virtues. He approaches a *Śivayogin* with fervent devotion. After attaining knowledge from him, he practises *yoga*. Being detached from *saṁsāra* through *yoga* he attains the supreme abode. Thus, he who is always devoted to *Śivayogins* attains identity with Śiva after the interval of two or three births." Thus one has to understand the mode of adoring the devotees of Śiva from texts like the *Sūtasaṁhitā*.

XII.3 *Through the Denial* of *Other Things, the Wearing of Sacred Ashes, Tripuṇḍra and Rudrākṣa is Pointed out as Obligatory (on a Śaiva Devotee).*

XII.3.1 Besmearing one's body with ashes, wearing of *tripuṇḍra* and *rudrākṣa* etc. form the external appearance of those who are virtuous (*i.e.*, the *Śivayogins*). The following *smṛtis* namely *Bodhāyana*, *Bhāradvāja Viṣṇu*, *Yama*, *Śātātapa*, *Smṛti-ratnāvali*, *Smṛti-dharma-sāra*, *Smṛti-sudhānidhi*, *Smṛti bhāskara*, *Smṛtisārasamuccaya*, *Nāradīya* and *Laugākṣī*: *Mahāpurāṇas* such as *Brāhma*, *Skānda*, *Kaurma*, *Bṛhannāradīya*, *Garuda*, *Vāyavīya*, *Laiṅga* and *Matsya*: *Upapurāṇas* like *Parāśara*, *Śivadharma*, *Vāsiṣṭhalainga* and *Dānava*, the *Itihāsa* namely *Bhārata*, *Kalpasūtras* like *Bodhāyana* etc., and *Āgamas* such as *Śivadharmottara*, *Kriyāsāra*, *Mānavīyasaṁhitā*, *Śivarāghavasaṁvāda* and *Śivarahasya* — which are based on *Upaniṣads* like *Atharvaśiras*, *Śvetāśvatara*, *Taittirīya*, *Kaivalya* etc. — clearly condemn the disinterest shown (by a man) in the observances of Śaiva practices like besmearing with ashes, wearing of *tripuṇḍra* etc. Interest shown in the wearing of marks which are vertical (*ūrdhva*) shaped like a trident (*triśūla*), like a circle (*vartula*), a quadrangle (*caturaśra*) and a crescent (*ardhacandra*) which are different from *tripuṇḍra*, and in branding one's body with the emblems of (conch) and (discus) which preceed *ūrdhvapuṇḍra* etc., are also directly condemned. The condemnation is in the form of enumeration of the following sins which are the causes for lack of faith in the *tripuṇḍra* and faith in the *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* etc. The *doṣas* are as follows: general sins, minor offences, being born in a family of mixed birth, being bereft of the *saṁskāras* of a brahmin like *garbhādhāna* etc., infatuation due to the curse of Brahmā and curses of the six sages like Gautama. Through this condemnation in the form of enumeration of sins like becoming a *caṇḍāla* (patita) which are the effects (of not having faith in *tripuṇḍra* and having faith in the *ūrdhvapuṇḍra* etc.), it is pointed out that faith in *tripuṇḍra* arises in a person due to the merits arising from his previous births. Thus in some places, the *Śaiva* practices are enjoined as an obligatory ritual — by means of statements teaching them as a *dharma* for *varṇas* and *āśramas*, by repeated stress on their observances, by condemning their non-observances and also by the employment of the term "*nitya*" and "*sadā*." In some places, they are enjoined as expiatory rites for driving away sins. In some places, though they are enjoined as obligatory in association with the result of attaining the abode of Śiva, it is also enjoined as an optional rite. In some places it is mentioned as an *arthavāda* as an immediate means of knowledge for an aspirant of release. This is because only practices (besmearing one's body with sacred ashes and the wearing of *tripuṇḍra* etc.) are enjoined on a specially qualified person, who is a Śaivite, following the *Vedas*. Since his observances are the distinctive marks of the virtuous, a person should adopt his practices only, and not the purely tāmasic practices like the wearing of *ūrdhvapuṇḍra*, and branding one's body with conch and discus as enjoined in the *Pāñcarātra Tantra*. They cannot be based on the *Vedas*. Although prescribed in the *Padma-purāṇa*, they are prohibited by the *Smṛtis* and *Purāṇas* which are directly based on the *Vedas*. This is also because the statements of that *Purāṇa* are only capable of revealing the meaning of *Tantras* (and nothing else), and also because they have *Tantra* as their base. Nor are the marks of *gopīcandana* etc. distinct from the *ūrdhvapuṇḍra*, though enjoined by *Smṛtis* like, *Vyāsa*, *Satyavrata* and *Manu*, which do not remind us of the *Tantras*. Although ordained in the *Vaidika-āhnika* sections of *purāṇas* like *Bṛhannāradīya* and *Brāhma*, since prohibition of the *ūrdhvapuṇḍra* is generally made for a Śaivite they will not fit in to the context.

In fact, context is superior to other considerations. Even if the context is in favour of it (*ūrdhva-puṇḍra*), when compared to the *tripuṇḍra* it is still inferior. It is explained thus: In the *Smṛtis* as those of *Bodhāyana*, *Viṣṇu*, *Yama* and *Śātātapa*, in the *Purāṇas* like *Brāhma*, *Skānda*, and *Bṛhannāradiya* and in the *Upapurāṇas* like *Parāśara*, *Vāsiṣṭhalaiṅga* and *Mānavā* the faith of a *Vaidika* in besmearing himself with ashes and in wearing *tripuṇḍra* and his lack of faith in the wearing of the *puṇḍras*, which are — *ūrdhva*, *triśūla*, *vartula*, *caturaśra* and *ardhacandra* in shape and branding with conch and discus emblems are explained. Also sins such as offences, minor offences, birth in a family of mixed caste, absence of *saṁskāras* meant for a brahmin, curse of Brahma and curse of six sages like Gautama are stated to be the causes. Becoming a *caṇḍāla* etc. is said to be the detrimental effect of one's lack of faith in *tripuṇḍra*, and having faith in *ūrdhvapuṇḍra*, wearing of *ūrdhvapuṇḍra* and branding one's body with emblems of conch and discus are directly prohibited for a *Śaivāśramin* who follows the *Vedas*. Observances like besmearing the body with holy ashes etc. are praised as the practices of eminent eligible persons.

XII.3.2 In the *Skānda*, in the *Sūtasaṁhitā* sin is spoken of thus: "Those in whom there does not arise any faith to wear *tripuṇḍra*, to besmear oneself with sacred ashes etc. in spite of the awareness of the validity of such acts are associated with heinous sins. Those who mark themselves with conch, discus, *Gadā*, *Padma*, *Vajra*, *Pāśa*, *aṅkuśa* and other emblems etc. become sinners." In the *Vāsiṣṭhalaiṅga* mixed birth and absence of *saṁskāras* for a brahmin are stated thus: "O Brahman, those in whose heart there is always hatred towards *bhasma*, must belong to the family of mixed birth. A wise man should infer that those who are always angry on seeing the *bhasma* on the forehead (of the Śaivites) must be born of people of mixed birth. It is certain O Sage, that those who are never interested in wearing *bhasma* of scriptural authority, are bereft of the *saṁskāras*, such as *garbhādhāna*."

In the *Parāśara Upapurāṇa*, the curse of Brahmā is stated thus: "Brahmins who are your devotees will be averse to wear *tripuṇḍra* and to besmear the body with sacred ash, which possess Vedic sanction and yield *mokṣa*. These *tāntrika* brahmins will ever be interested in wearing other marks such as *triśūla*, *caturaśra* and *veṇupatra* and will brand their bodies with emblems of conch and discus pertaining to you." The curse of the six sages is briefly stated thus in the *Āditya purāṇa*: "Due to the curse of great sages like Durvāsas, Kaṇva, Upamanyu, Dadhīci and Gautama, may the brahmins of the southern state who are utmost sinners and merciless, have no faith in Śiva. in the holy ashes and in the *rudrākṣa*." In the *Kaurma* and the *Skānda*, Gautama's curse, in particular, is narrated thus: "Somehow knowing about it, Gautama, who was very much enraged cursed thus: 'May you, who are outside the path of the *Vedas* become similar to the most abominable sinners. O wretched brahmins! may you always be lacking in faith in the greatness of Śiva, *tripuṇḍra* and holy ashes."

XII.3.3 In the *Parāśara Upapurāṇa*, *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* and branding one's body with *cakra* emblem are directly prohibited thus: "A follower of the *Vedas* should not wear *ūrdhva-puṇḍra*, *triśūla, vartula, caturaśraka* and *liṅga* in the shape of a crescent moon. A person should, neither (himself) brand a brahmin with marks of *cakra* emblem nor cause others to brand. The king should soon banish such a person from the country who brands one's (his) body (with the aforesaid emblems)." In the *Skānda*, in the *Sūta-saṁhitā*, other *puṇḍras* and marking with the *Cakra* emblem are prohibited and delusion about them is stated thus: "A follower of the path of the *Vedas* should not inscribe over his body with emblems (of Viṣṇu). Even out of delusion, he should not wear other *puṇḍras* on his forehead. Those people, who out of delusion wear on their forehead either *ūrdhva puṇḍra* or *vartula* or *caturaśraka*, they become similar to *pāṣaṇḍas*. These people who out of delusion mark their bodies with emblems of *śaṅkha, cakra, gadā* and *padma*, are similar to the *pāṣaṇḍas*."

In the *Mānava purāṇa*, in the fourteenth canto, branding with *śaṅkha, cakra*, etc. is prohibited thus: "A person should never brand his body with emblems of weapons (of Viṣṇu) like *śaṅkha, cakra*, etc. Even out of delusion, he should not mark his chest with the names of human beings." In the *Brahmapurāṇa*, while stating about the greatness of the *gopīcandana*, *taptamudrā* is prohibited thus — "In days of yore, *tapta-mudra* (branding one's body) was prescribed by Hari for the lowest caste. Wearing *gopīcandana* on the forehead too was for the last caste. A brahmin, who out of foolishness wears the marks of *taptamudras* becomes a *sūdra* in this very birth. After his death, he will be reborn as a dog." In the *Bodhāyana-smṛti*, marking with emblem is prohibited thus: "One should not burn his body with emblems, according to his own will." In the *Śātātapa-smṛti* it is said thus: — "A brahmin should not brand his body with emblems of weapons of God (Viṣṇu)."

In the *Yama-smṛti* it is stated thus: "One should not burn his body with emblems of weapons of the God (Viṣṇu)." In the Skānda, in the *Yajñavaibhavakhaṇḍa* it is stated thus: "A follower of the path of the *Veda*, who even out of delusion, brands himself, wears other *puṇḍras*, falls down. There is no doubt about it." "In the *Viṣṇu Smṛti* it is stated thus: "If a person marks himself with the *śaṅkha*, and *cakra* weapons (of Viṣṇu) by pressing the heated symbols on his body, he should be forbidden from performing the activities of a brahmin, like a *śūdra.*" In the *Vīra* it is stated thus:— "A brahmin, who has the marks of *cakra* on his body is similar to a *caṇḍāla*. One should bathe with his clothes on, in case he happens to see or touch such a person. If a person, at a distance, happens to see the faces of these persons wearing the marks of *śaṅkha* and *cakra*, he should (immediately) look at the sun (as atonement)."

XII.3.4 In the *Skānda Purāṇa* and the *Parāśara Upa-purāṇa*, faith in *tripuṇḍra* etc. is praised as the result of great merit, thus: "A meritorious person shows earnestness in the greatness of the *Vedas*, the greatness of Śiva, the greatness of learning and also in the greatness of wearing *tripuṇḍra* and besmearing (one's body) with sacred ashes. Only the mind of those, who have followed in their several births the religious observances enjoined in the *Śruti* and *Smṛti* turns towards wearing the way taught by the *Veda*".

XII. 3.5 Thus praising the faith in *tripuṇḍra*, censuring *ūrdhva-puṇḍras* and prohibiting other *puṇḍras* respectively, one's faith in *tripuṇḍra* is praised by terms like "*nitya*" etc. In the *Parāśara-upapurāṇa* and the *Skānda*, besmearing with ashes and *tripuṇḍra* are prescribed as a daily obligatory rite for a *Śaivāśramin* who follows only the *Veda*. In the *Parāṣara-upapurāṇa* the term '*nitya*' is thus explained: "A brahmin should daily wear *tripuṇḍra* horizontally on his forehead with the sacred ash prepared according to Śāstraic principles; he should also besmear (his body) with the sacred ashes." In the *Skānda* it is said thus: "A person, remaining in *gṛhasthāṣrama* should always wear the *tripuṇḍra*". In the *Parāśara-upapurāṇa*, the word "*sadā*", is thus interpreted: "Since the first brahmin (*viz*., Brahmā) put on *tripuṇḍra* with sacred ash, a brahmin should, therefore, always wear *tripuṇḍra*." In the *Skānda* it is said: "A brahmin should always wear (*tripuṇḍra*)." In the *Parāśara-upapurāṇa* the enjoinment for not neglecting it is thus stated: "One should not abandon, even by delusion, the wearing of *tripuṇḍra* with the sacred ash, the besmearing of one's body with *bhasma* and also worship of *rudraliṅga*, all of which has been sanctioned by the *Vedas*." In the *Skānda* too it is stated thus: "A person should wear *tripuṇḍra* with devotion Even mentally one should not neglect it."

In the *Parāśara-purāṇa*, the sin for neglecting *tripuṇḍra* is thus spoken of: "One should always wear *tripuṇḍra*, by using the sacred ash which has the Vedic sanction. Any ritual pertaining to the *Vedas* or *Smṛtis*, if done without wearing *tripuṇḍra* only leads to evil effects." In the *Skānda* too it has been stated thus: "Because it is enjoined by the *Śruti*, a person who abandons it becomes a *patita* (fallen)." In the *Parāśāra-upapurāṇa* it (wearing *tripuṇḍra*) is stated to be the *dharma* of all the *varṇas* and all the *āśramas*. "Wise sages mention the wearing of *tripuṇḍra* with the sacred ashes accompanied by the chanting of the *Veda-mantras* as the duty of all the *varṇas*. *Āstikas* state it to be the *dharma* of all the *āśramas*." In both the places, its result is not mentioned. In the *Kaurma* and *Garuḍa-purāṇas* and in the *Manu-dharma-śāstra* too it has been said: "A brahmin should daily wear *tripuṇḍra* horizontally on his forehead with the sacred ash prepared according to Śāstraic principles, and he should besmear (his body) with sacred ash." Thus in these texts the term '*nitya*' is used to show the daily observance of such a practice.

XII.3.6 In the same way, in the *Smṛti-bhāskara* of Baudhāyana, the wearing of sacred ash is said to be expiatory: "The *tripuṇḍra* which is worn on a person's forehead by means of the middle finger, ring-finger and thumb, becomes a powerful weapon (*śastra*) in destroying great sins (of that person)." "If a person with his body besmeared with sacred ashes sees Lord Śaṅkara being worshipped under the *vanaspati* (*bilva* tree) on Mondays, then he gets rid of all sins." Thus in the *Bodhāyana-smṛti*, the successful fulfilment of an act is said to be the result of wearing *tripuṇḍra*: "This is said to be a bath relating to Agni by the sages: A wise man should do this, at first, for the successful fulfilment of all actions."

In the *Dharma-sāra-sudhā-nidhi* also, it is said: "A person should always wear *tripuṇḍra* with the sacred ashes, sanctified by *mantras*. By wearing it in the way stated in the *Vedas*, a person attains identification with Śiva." In the *Vāsiṣṭha-laiṅga*, it is said to be the means for knowledge: "What then to state elaborately about it? The wearing of it is a means to knowledge. Knowledge soon dawns upon a person who always puts on sacred ashes." Thus, in all these *Smṛtis* quoted, there are many statements declaring the wearing of *tripuṇḍra* and ashes to be the means for knowledge, means for release and as obligatory and optional rites.

XII.3.7 In the *Āgamas*, like the *Śivadharma* also the term *'nitya'* is used: "A person who performs daily the bath relating to Agni, will have all his senses controlled." "In *Vīpsākālottara*, it is said "During the three *sandhyas*, a person should perform either the *snāna* of sacred ashes or wear the *tripuṇḍra*." But in all these places its result is not expressly mentioned. In the *Suprabheda* the term *'sadā'* is used: "A person should always wear *tripuṇḍra* with sacred ash mixed with water." In the *Vīra* it is said thus: "O!. Brahman! Hear! I will tell about the *'snāna'* with sacred ash. It is proclaimed as "*bhasma*", because it threatens all sins."

In the *Dviṣatī kālottara*, it is said thus: Wearing of *tripuṇḍra* alone is enjoined for protection from all (evils) for a *samayī*, *putraka*, *sādhaka* and preceptor." Wearing *triśūla*, *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* and the marks of *śaṅkha*. *cakra* etc. as stated in *Pāñcarātra* are enjoined for a *tāmasādhikāri*. That is why either an eminent *vaidika* or a *Śaivāśramī* should not observe these appearances pertaining to persons of low cadre. A *vaidika* should observe only those enjoined either by the *Veda* or based on the *Veda*. Even a *Śaivāśramī* of *Śaiva Siddhānta* should observe only those enjoined by the *Śaivāśrama* of *Śaiva Siddhānta* which is stated in the *Vedas* These (aforesaid practices stated in the *Pāñcarātra*) are not enjoined either by the *Vedas* or by the *Smṛti*, *Purāṇas* or *Śaivāgama* based on the *Vedas*. Therefore either a *vaidika* or a *Śaivāśramī* of *Śaiva Siddhānta* should not wear the *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* like *triśūla* etc. or mark himself with emblems of *cakra* etc.

XII.3.8 But it may be objected: In *Purāṇas* like the *Padma* which are based on the *Vedas*, we have the following — "A brahmin, *kṣhatriya*, *vaiśya*, *śūdra*, women and so also others should mark themselves happily with *cakra* etc. The twice-born should wear the *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* (vertical line) even as they wear tuft and the sacred thread. It may be said that the marking etc. are enjoined on the twice-born. According to the general rule of the *Smṛtis* following the *Vedas*, and due to the inference that these statements (of *Smṛti*) are based on the *Vedas*, even *Vaidikas* should compulsorily wear them. In the *Smṛtis* stated, which are directly based on the *Vedas*, *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* and branding oneself with emblems are not denied. As in the Bauddhāgamas and in accordance with the rule of *Virodha-Adhikaraṇa* it may be said that the *Śruti* which forms the source of the present *Ṣmṛti* can be inferred. As for the quotations given so far, which speak of the application of *tripuṇḍra* (as favourable) and condemn other marks, they can be understood as different independent sentences glorifying what is contextual, but not purporting to refute others, as in the case of the "*udita*" and "*anudita*" sacrifices.

But this is not so. In the *Bodhāyana-smṛti* etc. which are directly based on the *Śruti*, refutation of other symbols is found to be direct. Therefore, one cannot infer an original *Śruti* —text, basing oneself on the *Smṛtis* and the *Purāṇas* which speak of forbidden acts, which is a matter of direct knowledge. By examining the preceding and succeeding portions of the text "the middle line of the *triśūla* must have a hole, which is to be filled with yellow sandal," it is possible to deduce that this passage is based on a *Tantra*, in as much as its import is identical with that of a *Tantra*. Because of these reasons and also according to the rule "*hetudarśanācca*" it can be concluded that these passages of the *Purāṇas* are not based on the *Veda* but on the *Pāñcarātrāgama* As a matter of fact there are *Smṛtis* and *Purāṇas* based on *Tantras*. Therefore, these topics are also subject-matter of the *Pāñcarātra Tantras*, which are "tāmasic" in nature. Therefore, there can be no validity for them.

It is said in the *Saura Saṁhitā, Skānda Purāṇa* thus:- "There are some *Purāṇas*, which depending upon *Tantras* alone, speak of factors directly contradicting the *Vedas* in some places, according to the difference in the *adhikārins*. They do not follow the *Vedic* tradition. Even then since in the *Pāñcarātra* even brahmins too are the *adhikārins*, it may not be said that the statements there, are not invariably related with the *Purāṇas*. In the context of proving the validity of these *Āgamas*, it has been established that even among the twice-born only those of impure *sattva* are eligible for them.

XII.3.9 It has been said by Brahmānanda Bhārati as follows: "Those persons, who are by birth brahmins, are not eligible, because of the express denial found there. In the *Purāṇas* quoted above, the terms, '*brāhmaṇa*' etc. indicate those who have attained the status of brahmins, only through their acts as in the case of *Pāñcarātra Āgamas.*" But it is not so, because it is not possible for an injunction like the present one, to enjoin *saṁskāras* on those who become brahmins afterwards, and also because formerly only brahmins by birth are established as eligible (for *saṁskāras*).

XII.3.10. Now, let *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* with hole and the marking etc. stated in the *Padma-Purāṇa*, be the subject-matter of the *Pañcarātra Tantra.* In the same manner, the wearing of *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* without a hole and marked with mud of the Ganges and *gopīcandana* relates only to the Vedic practice, because of the absence of the defects mentioned there. It may be explained follows: It is enjoined by the *Vaidikāhnika* section, by the *Smṛtis* like those of Vyāsa, Satyavrata and Manu and by the *Purāṇas,* like *Brahmāṇḍa, Brahma* and *Nārada* thus: "The person who wears the mud from the banks of the Ganges on his head, attains the form of the Sun, which drives away darkness," "He, on whose forehead is seen the pure *ūrdhva puṇḍra*, made with the mud of the Ganges, though he be a *caṇḍāḷa*, becomes undoubtedly sanctified." "A brahmin reciting the *Vedas* should wear *ūrdhva puṇḍra* with mud." "A brahmin should either wear *ūrdhva puṇḍra* or *tripuṇḍra* or both. A person who wears *ūrdhva puṇḍra* can wear *tripuṇḍra* but a person who wears *tripuṇḍra* should not wear the *ūrdhva-puṇḍra.*" "O brahmins, sacrifice, munificence, austerities, *homa*, learning and rites for forefathers become in vain, if one performs them without wearing the *ūrdhva-puṇḍra.*" Such statements from the *Bṛhannāradīya* are indeed many. Especially in the *Brahma-Purāṇa*, it is said — "Besmearing the body with *gopīcandana* if a person sees anyone" etc. — such passages are many.

In the *Brahmāṇḍa* too it is said thus: "A person, though impure, though devoid of good conduct and even if he commits sin mentally, he always becomes pure, if only he wears the *ūrdhva-puṇḍra*". Thus we come across several statements instructing such observances. Here, the adjective "*brahmavādin*" is found. Also it is mentioned in the *vaidikāhnika prakaraṇa.* It is said "An observer of the Vedic path should not wear, either an — *ūrdhva-puṇḍra*, or *triśūla* or *vartula* or *caturaśraka* or the crescent-shaped one." One following the Vedic path, even out of delusion, should not wear any other *puṇḍra* on his forehead." By these we understand that though there is a general prohibition of *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* for a *vaidika*, the denial is only with respect to *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* shaped like *triśūla*, the feet of Hari etc., excluding *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* made with *gopīcandana* etc. Therefore, since our contention is not contradicted, these statements can certainly infer a basic *śruti*. By this, the statement of Brahmānanda Bhāratī that an *ūrdhva-puṇḍra*, is prohibited in general in the passages cited and that these statements cannot infer a basic *śruti*, is also refuted.

XII.3.11 Moreover the expression "*ūrdhva-puṇḍra* and *triśūla* etc. relates to *ūrdhva-puṇḍra*, with a hole, mentioned in the *Pāñcarātra*. Because of its association with the term "*triśūla*", by the word '*ūrdhva-puṇḍra*", only *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* with a hole, and formed with the feet of Viṣṇu should be understood. In the passage, "out of delusion, other *puṇḍras*" etc. also due to the adjective "*Viṣṇu Āgamas*", only the *ūrdhva puṇḍra* of such type should be understood. Accordingly, though the *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* is worn, there is nothing contrary in wearing *tripuṇḍra* without gap on it. Because of this and also in accordance with the rule that when there is conflict between the *Śruti* and *Smṛti* texts only the *Śruti* is stronger, the statements made so far cannot be inferred as being based on the *Śrutis*. Therefore, as there is no contradiction, "One may wear both". Thus upon the *ūrdhva puṇḍra*, one can wear *tripuṇḍra* also. Thus, because a combination (of both) is enjoined, for an ordinary *vaidika*, only combination is proper. The optional passage "either *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* or *tripuṇḍra*," may be taken either as accepting the mutual contradiction or as speaking of a tangible result in the form of a substitute for a forehead bereft of any mark. The following statements prohibit the wearing of *gopīcandana* along with *tripuṇḍra* thus: "If a twice-born wearing *gopīcandana* touches Śiva he goes to unending hell for twenty-one generations." "He who wears *tripuṇḍra* horizontally along with *gopīcandana* suffers in hell for sixty-thousand years." In the light of the reasonings stated before, and the prohibition on combining both *gopīcandana* and the *tripuṇḍra*, we have to conclude that the present passages concern a *Śaivāśramin*. In the scriptures of Śaivism, *Śaivāśramins* are prohibited from wearing *ūrdhva-puṇḍra*. In the *Purāṇa* too, an *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* is prohibited thus: "The prohibition of other *puṇḍras* enjoined on a follower of the Vedic path is common for a Śaivite who follows the *tantras*. There is no doubt about it." Though prescribed in the *Vaidikāhnika* section, combination of *puṇḍras* is forbidden in the *puṇḍra-samuccaya* section. Since this does not fit in the context, it has to be understood that such a combination is held as meritorious in the *Pāñcarātra* section." This statement of Brahmānanda Bhāratī is based on his ignorance of the logical arguments and propriety.

XII.3.12 If it be asked that though a *Vaidika* is generally prohibited from wearing *puṇḍra* with gap, how can his wearing a combination of *gopīcandana* and *ūrdhva-puṇḍra*, be not construed as virtuous appearance, it is replied thus: The combination of *gopīcandana* and *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* should not be worn by an exclusive *vaidika* or, special *śaivāśramin* even according to you. For the *vaidika* referred to above, the horizontal *puṇḍra* being superior of the two *puṇḍras* because it is directly praised by many Vedic passages and corroborative texts, wearing of sacred ashes is said to constitute the appearance of the virtuous. It may now be objected as follows: In the *Vāyu Purāṇa* which explains the doctrines of Śaivism and in the *Kālottara Āgama*, the following statement is found: "According to the *Śaiva* injunctions *puṇḍra* is said to be of six shapes namely, *liṅga*, lamp, crescent moon, quadrangle, circle and *tripuṇḍra*." Since all the six kinds of *puṇḍra* are enjoined as the means of attaining Śiva, it may be asked how one can speak of putting on the *tripuṇḍra* alone. The term 'Śiva', in accordance with the *Kūrma*, and *Skānda Purāṇas*, and *Śaivāgamas*, can etymologically denote the Trinity of Gods. Therefore, as *tripuṇḍra* with sacred ash, etc. constitute virtuous appearance, it is obligatory on an aspirant of knowledge to wear them.

XII.3.13 In this manner, as the wearing of *rudrākṣa* also indicates a virtuous appearance, an aspirant of knowledge should wear it. Thus, in the *Purāṇas* like *Skānda*, *Padma*, *Brahma*, *Nārada*, *Garuḍa*, *Vāyu* and in the *Upapurāṇas* like *Vāmana* and *Parāśara*, and in the *Āgamas* like the *Vāsiṣṭha Laiṅga*, there is decry of non-earnestness in wearing *rudrākṣa*, and praise of earnestness in wearing it. Through these and by the terms *'nitya'* and *'sadā'* sin is said to accrue when it is not worn. Further it is enjoined as obligatory. Depending upon certain situations, the wearing of *rudrākṣa* is (sometimes) enjoined as optional (sometimes) as expiatory and (sometimes) as a means to the knowledge of Śiva. Also, faults like the curse of six sages had already been enumerated. In the *Bṛhannāradīya* the praise of the faith in wearing *rudrākṣa* is stated as follows: "At the end of several births, a person, of his own accord evinces interest in wearing *rudrākṣa*, through the grace of Mahādeva."

In the *Skānda*, the word "*nitya*" (always) is used, regarding the wearing of *rudrākṣa*. "One should, with great devotion always wear *rudrākṣa* around one's neck, head, in the sacred thread (*yajñopavīta*) around ears and the two hands." There itself, sin is said to accrue when it is not done. "A brahmin who does any Vedic ritual without wearing *rudrākṣa*, because of delusion, goes indeed to hell." In the *Vāyavīya*, the term '*sadā*' (always) is used thus: "One should not wear *rudrākṣa* without devotion. Always it should be worn only with devotion." In all these passages the result of wearing it is not expressly stated. In the *Mānava*, it is referred to as expiatory in nature. "Even if a person wearing the *rudrākṣa* commits sin, he is not affected by it. Indeed this has been stated by Jābāla." In the *Garuḍa* (*Purāṇa*), it is mentioned as obligatory: "Even the grass wafted by the wind produced by the *rudrākṣa*-tree attains worlds of merit." In the *Skānda* it is said to be the means of the knowledge of Śiva, thus: Īśvara: "The *Jābāla Upaniṣad* is most ideal for obtaining knowledge about Me. Important means are dealt with there with utmost consideration for the living beings." Beginning with this passage, it is stated (further in the *Skānda* as follows): "Wearing of the *rudrākṣa* and the muttering (*japa*) of Śiva (*nāma*) is the means of attaining that knowledge." One can find many passages like these in the *Purāṇas* referred to before, highlighting this particular fact.

XI.3.14 A man of knowledge, for attaining salvation, should serve the temples of Śiva by white-washing, cleaning and raising gardens, etc. It may be noted that the *Sūta-saṁhitā* and the *Āgamas* like the *Vīra* also deal with this subject. Now the commentator concludes in a succinct way, the discussion on the doctrines of Śaivism explained so far at length, for the sake of practical utility (application) and for arousing confidence regarding its adaptability (by eligible persons). He also points out the propriety of its name (*viz*, '*Śivajñānabodha*") comprising twelve aphorisms), in the following manner: "*ittham vidyāt śivājñānbodhe śaivārthanirṇayam*". One should, in this manner, arrive at a correct decision regarding the topics of Śaivism, from the *Śivajñānabodha*".

XII.3.15 (In the compound 'Ś*ivajñānabodha*') the word "*jñāna*" (knowledge) is that by which a thing is grasped. Knowledge concerning Śiva is called "*Śivajñāna*", which is same as "*Śaivāgama*". The word "*bodha*" (enlightenment) means, ascertaining a given idea by clearing it of uncertainty caused by contradictions and the like. Thus the word "*Śivajñānabodha*" means that (Text) by which one ascertains *Śivajñāna* with a specific determination or discernment of its contents, steering clear of doubts or errors. The word (*Śivajñānabodha*) may also be dissolved as "*Śivajñānebhyo bodhaḥ*" (meaning, "enlightenment from the teachings about Śiva"). By this it can be interpreted that with the help of various logical arguments given before, several concepts about Śiva, which were at first silent (*mūka*) (*i.e.*, dormant) are now "awakened" or "inspired" (as it were, by the Text).

(Now for the compound "*Śaivārthanirṇaya*") the word "*nirṇaya*" (ascertainment) is derived as "*nirṇīyata iti*" (that which is ascertained or conclusively arrived at). The term "*śaivārtha-nirṇaya*" therefore means, "ascertainment of the topics of the *Śaivāgama* which are undisputed, and which are dealt with in this *Śivajñānabodha*." This ascertainment (*nirnaya*) was the object of enquiry at the beginning to this Text, and this ascertainment is unsublatable, important and unique. This (*nirṇaya*) has to be understood (*vidyāt*) in this manner (*ittham*). The idea is, that one should learn it (*vidyāt*) as the conclusive outcome of the series of doubts (questions) raised at the outset. Or, the whole sentence may mean, "One should know the conclusive opinion about the chief and unsublatable topics of Śaivism in this manner". It means that it should be understood in the way that it is taught (and in no other way). If, however, the variant "*Śivajñānabodham*" is accepted (in the place of "*Śivajñānabodhe*"), then the words "*ittham*" "*vidyāt*" should first be construed with the word "*śaivārthanirṇayam*". Then again they should be construed with that (word "Ś*ivajñānabodham*") which expounds it (*śaivārthanirṇaya*). Or, the word "*nirṇaya*" (ascertainment) may be taken to mean, "a means of ascertainment" (*nirṇāyaka*). Or, the word "*śaivārthanirṇaya*" may be taken as a *bahuvrīhi* compound and dissolved as "that by which ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) of the *śaivārtha* is accomplished. Then the word "*vidyāt*" will have to be simultaneously connected with the words "*Śivajñānabodham*" and "*śaivārthanirṇaya*" which are in co-ordinate Predication (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*).

Thus ends the brief commentary on the Twelfth Aphorism.

APPENDIX-I: INDEX OF TEXTS CITED

Deeply conversant with the Sanskrit tradition of *Śaivasiddhānta*, Sivāgrayogin quotes profusely from the *Mūlāgamas*, *Upāgamas*, *Purāṇas* and other texts, in order to justify the *siddhānta* position. Though most of the quotations are from the *Pauṣkarāgama*, he also draws from a wide variety of treatises. Śivāgrayogin also cites from miscellaneous texts, which he introduces with the expression: "*anyatrāpyuktam*" ("elsewhere also it is said"). The list of the texts from which he quotes is given below:

1. Acintyāgama
2. Ādityapurāṇa
3. Bhagavadgītā
4. Bhārata
5. Bodhāyana-smṛti-bhāskara
6. Brahmapurāṇa
7. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
8. Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa
9. Bṛhannāradīya
10. Devīkālottara
11. Dharmasārasudhānidhi
12. Dviśatikālottara
13. Garuḍapurāṇa
14. Jñānatilaka
15. Kālottarāgama
16. Kāmikāgama
17. Kaurma
18. Kiraṇāgama
19. Mālinī-vijaya
20. Mānavopapurāṇa
21. Mātaṅga
22. Mokṣakārikā
23. Mṛgendra
24. Padmapurāṇa
25. Parākhya
26. Paraśaropapurāṇa
27. Pauṣkarāgama
28. Ratnatraya
29. Sāṅkhyakārikā
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The Sanskrit text of the *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* has been published by the University of Madras under the Madras University Philosophical series — 49. Given below is the Index of the passages, quoted in the above text, along with the corresponding *sūtra* number and page number. Passages which are yet to be identified are marked with an asterisk — *.

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ABOUT THE BOOK

The *Śivajñānabodhasaṅgrahabhāṣya* of Śivāgrayogin (16th century) is a brief commentary on the *Śivajñānabodha*, a canonical treatise on the Śaiva Siddhānta. It explains the Siddhānta doctrines in a lucid style and paves the way for an easy understanding of Śivāgrayogin's another detailed commentary called *Vistarabhāṣya*. The author's profound scholarship in various branches of learning especially in the *Vedānta* is revealed throughout the work. Well-versed both in the Tamil and Sanskrit traditions of Śaiva Siddhānta literature, Śivāgrayogin makes a significant contribution to the basic philosophical tenets of the Śaiva Śiddhānta school.

This work contains an Introduction, English translation of the text and two Indexes. The introduction deals with the author, his date and his other works. The major part of the present work consists of a complete translation of the text in English followed by an index of texts quoted by the author and an alphabetical index of the passages cited by him.

ABOUT THE TRANSLATOR

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